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Viewing cable 06ABUJA596, Avian Flu in Nigeria: The Long Haul

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ABUJA596 2006-03-16 10:52 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Abuja
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000596 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
USDA FOR FAS/OA, FAS/DLP, FAS/ICD AND FAS/ITP 
USDA ALSO FOR APHIS 
USAID REGIONAL HUB OFFICE ACCRA 
CHERYL FRENCH APHIS DAKAR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TBIO KFLU EAID AMED EAGR NI AVIANFLU
SUBJECT: Avian Flu in Nigeria: The Long Haul 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Despite a substantial effort to respond to 
the Avian Influenza (AI) outbreak in Nigeria by the GON and 
international partners, the epidemic clearly has not been 
brought under control.  Given the weak human- and animal- 
health infrastructures, and the complicated issues of 
federal-state coordination and resources, even with the best 
will in the world, the AI situation will remain a serious 
problem for the foreseeable future.  Recognizing that 
efforts to halt the spread in birds have been unsuccessful 
to date, there is an urgent need to limit human exposure and 
improve human surveillance.  The Mission will consult with 
other partners to develop and support recommendations to the 
GON for the most effective strategy, given the limitations 
in Nigeria.  End Summary. 
 
Still Not a Pretty Picture 
-------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) A month after Avian Influenza (AI) was confirmed in 
Nigeria, it is clear that the battle against AI is going to 
be a long, hard slog.  One UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization official has predicted it would take three 
years to come to grips with AI in Nigeria.  The plans 
currently implemented in Nigeria provide for a response 
considerably after the fact in AI-affected areas. The plans 
do not make any real attempt to catch and quickly halt the 
spread of outbreaks in new areas.  Much of the response so 
far has focused on commercial or semi-commercial operations, 
and has not yet tried come to grips with backyard flocks. 
Yet culling backyard flocks may be the key to controlling 
the spread of the virus and limiting human exposure. 
 
3. (SBU) Even in Kaduna, which has been acknowledged to have 
the most effective response, Western news agencies reported 
that when they visited villages near Sambawa Farm, where the 
first outbreak was confirmed, chickens were dying, but no 
official had visited the affected villages, and villagers 
had no information on what to do.  Local press has reported 
that dead chickens have been dumped at a number of sites, 
and attempts to contact the state avian flu response unit 
regarding this were unsuccessful.  The USAID-designed and - 
funded pilot culling program will be expanded to include 
Katsina and Kaduna as well as Kano, at the GON's request. 
 
4. (SBU) Surveillance remains weak and testing is slow. 
Despite early reports of possible outbreaks in Jigawa State, 
it is still officially AI-free, though outbreaks have been 
confirmed in all surrounding territories. There are a number 
of states with reports of suspected outbreaks and/or samples 
sent for which there is no final determination. The most 
recent report is of 1,000 dead chickens and ducks dumped in 
Yola, the capital of Adamawa State in the Northeast. 
Cameroon on March 12 became the fourth country in Africa to 
report an outbreak of AI, after the virus was found in 
poultry in Far North Province, which borders Nigeria.  Tests 
at the Pasteur Institute in Paris showed this outbreak was 
H5N1.  The outbreak in Cameroon suggests that the virus is 
probably present in Adamawa and Borno States. Little 
information is being made available about the extent of 
outbreaks in affected states. 
 
5. (SBU) Meanwhile, the outbreak officially reached the 
southern half of Nigeria, as H5N1 was confirmed in Benue, 
Anambra, Rivers, and Ogun States.  The latter three are not 
contiguous to other infected areas.  In some cases the 
outbreaks were found in urban districts, so there is a 
strong chance the disease was imported in live poultry 
coming from the North to urban markets.  In other cases the 
virus may be present but as yet undetected in intervening 
areas. 
 
6. (SBU) On possible human cases, we just don't know. 
Western press reports from the field indicate that many 
potentially exposed people are fearful of authority, and of 
possible quarantine or worse. In an effort to get a clearer 
picture, the Centers for Disease Control is carrying out two 
human-surveillance activities to try to get a better sense 
of the level of possible human exposure. 
 
7. (SBU) The GON plans to pay compensation in Katsina, 
Bauchi, and Nasarawa States -- although the compensation 
program for now does not apply to small backyard poultry 
farmers. The compensation as currently designed and 
implemented does little to either encourage AI reporting, 
facilitate culling, or to provide relief to industry or 
householders. 
 
8. (SBU) Comment: Despite its clear shortcomings, the 
Nigerian response has been a substantial effort. The 
unpalatable truth is that GON probably has responded about 
as well as it is able to, given the weakness in its human- 
and animal-health infrastructure.  Even given sufficient 
political will, Nigeria is unlikely to be able to control or 
limit the impact and spread of AI in Nigeria or to its 
neighbors.  Given this, the major challenge is how to limit 
human exposure and create human-surveillance capacity.  An 
early step would be to better link human surveillance with 
animal surveillance and culling efforts.  There is a serious 
lack of resources reaching the state level in Nigeria. 
USAID therefore is increasingly working directly with the 
states.  The mission also will consult with international 
organizations and donor agencies on how to better direct 
anti-AI resources to Nigeria's states, where they are needed 
most. 
 
9. (SBU) A second challenge will be managing the economic 
impact. The AI epidemic has reached the stage that the 
country's poultry industry could remain under semi-permanent 
threat.  This threat could be great enough to affect many 
Nigerians who rely on chicken and eggs as important protein 
supplements. 
 
10. (SBU) Comment continued: If Nigeria's response has been 
ineffective, it likely is among the most effective in West 
Africa. Other states may look to Nigeria, through ECOWAS and 
otherwise, for support in battling AI, and Nigeria may try 
to be responsive.  Any response, however, is likely to be at 
the expense of the already overburdened effort in Nigeria. 
From our perspective, it appears that just as Nigeria will 
not be able to control or limit AI, neither will its 
neighbors. Even if Nigeria or another country could do so, 
any success would be likely to be undermined by a weak 
response in neighboring countries. 
 
11. (SBU) Comment continued: Mission proposes to consult 
closely with other donors to assess the most effective 
course of action given the ground realities and limitations 
in Nigeria. We will then seek to provide some concrete 
recommendations to the GON on how to proceed and to orient 
our assistance to support those recommendations.  Among 
other things, we will look at supporting increased capacity 
at the UN organizations dealing with AI. 
CAMPBELL