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Viewing cable 06TUNIS373, HAMAS VICTORY: DEMOCRATIC REFORM IMPLICATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06TUNIS373 2006-02-21 16:17 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tunis
O 211617Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9846
INFO THE MID EAST PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS TUNIS 000373 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KMPI KDEM PREL XT TS
SUBJECT: HAMAS VICTORY: DEMOCRATIC REFORM IMPLICATIONS 
 
1. Summary: Pro-democracy contacts from across the region 
were shocked by the magnitude of the recent Hamas 
electoral victory, but at the same time were impressed by 
the genuinely democratic process. Looking at the impact 
that these events could have on democratic reform in the 
region, the democracy activists draw several conclusions: 
 
--  Elections can bring real change.  The sweeping 
victory and acceptance of the results by Fatah send a 
strong message on democracy?s potential to both 
governments and people across the region. 
 
--  Change can be a mixed bag.  While activists call the 
elections a ?turning point? for democratic development in 
the region, they wonder about the commitment of Islamist 
groups to democracy once in power. 
 
--  Moderates aren?t ready, Islamists are.  With few 
exceptions across the region, moderate political forces 
are in disarray and would not do well if democratic 
elections were held today.  Islamist groups are better 
organized, with a substantive message and a loyal 
constituency base. 
 
--  Autocrats will capitalize on fear.  Governments will 
use the specter of Hamas?s victory to resist democratic 
reform, arguing that it plays into the hands of 
extremists; whereas, the long-term solution is for the 
governments to open up more. 
 
--  The USG and others need to maintain pressure on 
governments to undertake real reforms and provide 
assistance to moderates so that they will be able to 
compete with Islamists and existing regimes.  End 
summary. 
 
2.  The MEPI Regional Office canvassed 16 democracy 
activist contacts from across the region (Bahrain, Egypt, 
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Territories, 
Tunisia, Yemen) regarding the recent Hamas victory and 
its likely impact on democratization efforts.  Below are 
the common themes that emerged from the responses of 
these activists, most of whom have participated in BMENA- 
sponsored events.  Some of the views appear inconsistent, 
but we believe they accurately reflect the state of the 
debate taking place in civil society at the moment. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Good Election, Surprising Results 
--------------------------------- 
 
3. Our democracy contacts were unanimous in judging the 
Palestinian electoral process as generally transparent 
and fair.  They were equally unanimous in their surprise 
at the magnitude of the Hamas victory.  The most common 
reasons offered for the results were: 
 
--  Hamas's victory should be seen as a vote against the 
corrupt, ineffective, and chaotic governance of the 
Palestinian Authority (PA). Whereas Hamas has the solid 
ideological support of some 30 per cent of the 
Palestinians, the rest of its support was simply a non- 
ideological vote against the PA. 
 
--  The Israeli occupation is to blame, as it gradually 
destroyed the PA's infrastructure and credibility with 
Palestinians. In a twist on this theme, some contacts 
said the victory should therefore be seen as the 
culmination of the PA?s failed attempts to achieve a 
comprehensive settlement with Israel. 
 
--  A Hamas victory could not have been possible without 
the blessing of the USG, given its intelligence capacity 
and influence over all the political players. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Democratic ?Turning Point?, But with a Twist 
-------------------------------------------- 
4. Several activists called the elections a ?turning 
point.?  They believe that Palestinians have demonstrated 
that fundamental change is possible through the 
democratic process.  The Hamas victory, combined with 
Fatah?s acceptance of the results, presents a clear 
challenge to other governments in the region to accept 
the principle of the people?s right to change their 
governments.  No one is predicting an imminent wave of 
democratic reform as a result of the elections, but most 
of our contacts stated that these elections were proof of 
positive momentum.  Some even called it ?irreversible.? 
 
5. At the same time, the fact that Hamas was the victor 
poses a dilemma for the same democracy activists ? what 
to do when you like the process, but not the results. 
Our contacts feel that the Hamas results, combined with 
the strong showing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt?s 
recent parliamentary elections, could have significant 
implications throughout the region.  Many of our contacts 
remain highly skeptical of the Islamist commitment to 
democracy once in power.  They fear that the Mulsim 
Brotherhood/Hamas results are galvanizing other Islamist 
groups to push for more democracy in the hopes that 
elections will allow them to advance their conservative 
agenda. 
------------------------------------- 
Moderates Aren?t Ready, Islamists Are 
------------------------------------- 
6.  This fear of the Islamist forces is clearly linked to 
our contacts? view of the current balance of power 
between Islamists and moderates.  Islamist political 
parties/organizations are the most potent opposition 
political force in almost all Arab countries, despite 
efforts by governments to rein them in.  In free and 
fairly contested elections, these parties would in many 
cases be elected to power.  At the same time, most 
governments have been successful at keeping moderate 
political parties and NGOs weak and without the means of 
creating a popular base.  While activists admit that this 
sort of competition is an aspect of democracy they must 
accept, they are worried that the lack of a level playing 
field could result in a domino effect and an Islamization 
of the region. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Leaders Exploit Hamas Example, but Democracy IS Answer 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
7.  Our contacts already see governments across the 
region using the Muslim Brotherhood/Hamas results as an 
argument to ?go slow? on democracy, with the postponement 
of Egyptian local elections the clearest example.  They 
expect autocratic governments will use the specter of the 
Islamist domino effect to push back against Western 
pressure to undertake serious democratic reforms.  This 
is the wrong conclusion to draw from the Palestinian 
elections, they contend, which were a major step towards 
democratic reform.  The only way to defeat Islamists and 
other extremists in the long run is to open up.  Beyond 
the ballot box, democracy requires the development of a 
democratic culture, rule of law, accountable governments, 
and a broad range of viable political choices, not just 
autocrats vs. extremists. 
 
8.  The democracy activists we spoke to offered several 
common suggestions for USG and Western governments: 
 
--  Maintain pressure on Arab governments to democratize 
their systems, including allowing all opposition groups 
to operate freely. 
 
--  Make foreign economic aid contingent on Arab 
governments? efforts to democratize and the outcomes of 
these efforts; 
 
--  Provide assistance to strengthen moderate political 
parties and independent civil society; 
 
--  Maintain momentum for the reform process in BMENA; 
 
--  Insist on independent international observers for all 
future elections. 
 
HUDSON