Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06TOKYO642, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02/06/06

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06TOKYO642.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06TOKYO642 2006-02-06 08:18 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO6668
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #0642/01 0370818
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 060818Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8296
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 7079
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 4434
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 7496
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 4526
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 5638
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0422
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 6607
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 8697
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 TOKYO 000642 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST 
DIVISION; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
OFFICE; SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
ADVISOR; CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02/06/06 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Irresponsible of government not to make sure whether US 
observes Japan's beef import requirements; Safety policy 
abandoned? No buyer for over 2,000 tons of beef 
 
(2) Reasons for DFAA breakup initiative 
 
(3) Second-fiddle candidates for LDP leadership race -- Taku 
Yamasaki, Koichi Kato, representatives from LDP factions, LDP 
Upper House -- start preparatory steps for campaign 
 
(4) Bush and Koizumi - Battle over beef imports (part 1): Prompt 
decision on second ban has driven splinter in alliance even 
deeper 
 
(5) Bush and Koizumi - battle over beef imports (part 2): Power 
bases: Clash over food safety, interest 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Irresponsible of government not to make sure whether US 
observes Japan's beef import requirements; Safety policy 
abandoned? No buyer for over 2,000 tons of beef 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Pages 24-25) (Slightly abridged) 
February 1, 2006 
 
The government failed to conduct a fact-finding inspection, 
supposed to have been done before resuming US beef trade. 
Agriculture Minister Shoichi Nakagawa so "confessed" before a 
Diet meeting on Jan. 30. Conducting a prior inspection was 
decided at a cabinet meeting. Failing to do so is a violation of 
public faith. It was just recently after the restart of US beef 
imports when the revelation of the sloppy inspection system in 
the United States came out. As if to follow suit, the Japanese 
government has exposed its own failure to ensure public safety. 
Such being the case, who in the world can ensure our safety? 
 
"If the meat continues to fail to clear customs, it will become 
unmarketable, so we'd like the US to buy it back at the same 
price as the import bill," grumbled Tatsuo Iwama, executive 
director of the Japan Meat Import/Export Association, a group of 
40 distributors handling imported meat. 
 
Since the reinstatement of the ban on US beef imports on Jan. 20, 
a total of 1,380 tons of beef worth 1.4-1.5 billion yen have been 
stranded in warehouses or containers unable to clear customs. 
Combining meat stored at non-member companies of the association, 
the volume would be over 2,000 tons. 
 
Meat is stored at 20 centigrade below zero at present. Iwama 
lamented: "This is a last resort to maintain meat quality, but 
despite that, meat quality deteriorates day by day. We hope 
imports will be restarted again quickly, but chances are ...." 
 
Agriculture Minister Nakagawa revealed in his Diet replies on 
Jan. 30 that the cabinet-obligated prior-fact-finding survey was 
not conducted before the restart of US beef imports. 
 
On Dec. 13, the day after the removal of the import ban, the 
Agriculture Ministry and the Health Ministry dispatched a joint 
government fact-finding team to the US. On the 16th of that 
 
TOKYO 00000642  002 OF 011 
 
 
month, the first US beef shipment arrived in Japan. The team of 
10 officials was divided into three groups to each investigate 
one of three processes: 1) confirming the age of cattle; 2) 
confirming removal of specified risk materials (SRM); and 3) 
sorting out meat that was Japan-bound from that bound for other 
countries. Each group examined whether the processes were being 
observed. 
 
An official in the Health Ministry's Inspection and Safety 
Division said confidently: 
 
"One day was devoted to inspect each place. An on-site inspection 
was carried out at all facilities we visited to see that exports 
procedures were observed. The inspection did not end by just 
looking at files and papers." 
 
The US has 38 slaughterhouses exporting beef to Japan. Japan 
inspected 11 plants. The same official explained, "We had a plan 
to inspect all those facilities one by one over time." 
 
However, Yasuhiro Yoshikaka, chair of the Prion Research 
Committee of the Food Safety Commission, told Kyoto News Service 
when he was interviewed: 
 
"Our understanding was that the government would resume beef 
imports after examining (for instance, the effectiveness of the 
observation of the requirements)." 
 
Yoshikawa also pointed out that "audit" is used in the agreement 
between Japan and the US to mean "inspection," but he asserted 
that the word, "inspection," should replace "audit," because 
"audit" connotes something perfunctory. 
 
Responding to questions asking why a prior inspection was not 
carried out, Nakagawa said: "An effective survey was not possible 
before the lifting of the import ban." But Keisuke Amagasa, an 
expert on the BSE issue and representative of the Citizens' 
Biotechnology Information Center, criticized Nakagawa: "The 
prerequisite for resuming imports was to remove specified risk 
materials, so a prior inspection was essential." 
 
Agriculture minister shows no sign of self-reflection, insisting 
there is "no problem" with administration 
 
Until recently the Japanese government explained: "The US has 
promised to meet the export requirements." But in January, the 
sloppy state of the US inspection system was exposed, when a US 
inspector ignorant about what was defined as risk materials to 
remove (let beef with backbones be shipped to Japan). 
 
On Jan. 26, Prime Minister Koizumi made this seemingly defiant 
reply in the Diet: "The US is to blame. I don't understand why 
Japan is blamed." As of Jan. 30, when it was revealed that no 
prior inspection had been conducted, Nakagawa remarked 
indifferently: "I think on our part, there's no problem with our 
administration." 
 
Toshiko Kanda, secretary general of the National Liaison 
Committee of Consumer Organization, said angrily: "The primary 
responsibility definitely lies with the US, but it's also 
important for Japan on its part to do something to have the US 
side actively observe the rules. It's just an excuse to say, 'The 
US has said this or that.'" 
 
TOKYO 00000642  003 OF 011 
 
 
 
The Food Safety Commission's (FSC) final report released on last 
Dec. 8, which in effect moved Japan to decide on the resumption 
of US beef imports, did not make a prior fact-finding inspection 
a condition for the resumption of imports. 
 
The reason is that the FSC had to make a risk assessment on the 
premise that the export program would be observed. 
 
The report therefore attached a supplementary item to the 
conclusion. The report then reiterated: "A risk assessment this 
time was made on the premise that the export program on Japan 
will be observed. So, an oversight body (Japanese government) 
needs to guarantee that the export program is observed." 
 
Tokyo Medical College Prof. Kiyotoshi Kaneko, who served as 
deputy chief of the FSC's prion expert panel, said, "Our worst 
fear came true." He continued: 
 
"When we were asked to discuss the matter, we were told to 
discuss it on the premise that the export program on Japan would 
be observed. We were also told that the conditions to observe the 
program did not need to be put on agenda for discussion. We 
therefore did not discuss even once the question of whether to 
conduct a prior fact-finding inspection or an ex-post facto 
inspection. I repeatedly raised the question of whether the 
premise was reliable in actuality. The answer was that: 'the 
government is responsible.'" 
 
There is a rumor that there was a scheme to give the resumption 
of beef imports as a present to President Bush when he visited 
Japan last November. Kanda explained: 
 
"The report was released on Dec. 8, Thursday, and as quickly as 
the following Monday, the resumption of imports was decided. 
There was no showing of ways to make the other side observe the 
export program." 
 
Referring to this fact, some are beginning to conjecture that 
this explains why a full-fledged fact-finding inspection was not 
carried out in the US. In that way, even if there was a problem 
with imports, the Japanese government's responsibility would not 
be pursued. 
 
Amagasa said: 
 
"The recent incident stemmed from a US that is reluctant to 
improve its sloppy oversight structure and an irresponsible 
Japanese government that has left everything in the hands of the 
US." 
 
The hurdle of the resumption of beef imports has become even 
higher now. A panel member, Shigetaka Yamamoto, chief of the 
National Institute of Health Sciences' Biomedical Food Research 
Division, pointed out: 
 
"It's unrealistic to send inspectors to all facilities to inspect 
them around the clock. Before the second resumption of beef 
imports, the US government needs to re-educate its inspectors in 
the proper way and then report on the results of their re- 
training (to Japan)." 
 
Professor Satoshi Kai at the graduate school of Kyushu 
 
TOKYO 00000642  004 OF 011 
 
 
University, also a panel member, proposed this: "In the case of 
beef exports from Japan to the US, US inspectors came to Japan to 
authorize Japanese plants to export meat to the US. Japan, too, 
should establish a similar system." 
 
Professor Kaneko warned: 
 
"Consumers play the leading part. Insufficient communication 
between ministers, between the government and the concerned 
offices, and between the government and the nation have caused a 
dispute over the differences in the replies. Discord at home will 
make it difficult for Japan as a whole to assume a resolute 
attitude toward the US. The government needs to realize that if 
nothing is done, it could aggravate the wound, ending up with a 
loss of public confidence." 
 
Key points of the written government reply and the unified 
government view 
 
Written government reply as of Nov. 18, 2002 
 
The Health Ministry and the Agriculture Ministry think it 
necessary to send on a regular basis an inspector to the US 
before or after the resumption of US beef imports in order to 
inspect slaughterhouses in the US. 
 
Unified government view as of Jan. 30, 2006 
 
The written government reply endorsed the thinking of the Health 
Ministry and the Agriculture Ministry at the time. It is not 
necessarily true to say that it has decided to take a certain 
action. The Food Safety Commission's final report does not 
include the implementation of an inspection into the conditions 
for the resumption of imports. 
 
Desk memo: 
 
I was astonished at US Under Secretary of Agriculture Penn's 
remark that: "The probability of being involved in a traffic 
accident is higher than that of being infected with disease as a 
result of eating beef." We can ascertain the exact number of dead 
or injured in traffic accidents. But the US has not carried out 
blanket testing, so the (BSE) probability is unclear. In 
addition, the disease appears in people dozens of years ahead. So 
the policy-makers of today are not accused. I sensed this in the 
responses of Japan and the US. 
 
(2) Reasons for DFAA breakup initiative 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 3) (Full) 
Eve., February 2, 2006 
 
The Defense Facilities Administration Agency, an external body of 
the Defense Agency, is facing a scrap-and-build plan that would 
breaking it up and meld it into the Defense Agency. The reason 
for growing calls for a drastic shakeup of DFAA is the recently 
exposed bid-rigging scandal over DFAA-ordered construction 
projects for its contractors. However, there are complicated 
circumstances behind the scenes, such as complaints about DFAA in 
connection with the planned realignment of US forces in Japan. 
The Defense Agency, which desires to raise its status to a 
ministry, is apparently eager to set up itself as a policy- 
planning office like ministries. 
 
TOKYO 00000642  005 OF 011 
 
 
 
Bid-rigging scandal: A pillar of preventive steps 
 
"It's clear to me that the Defense Facilities Administration 
Agency has not taken the Central Procurement Office's 
misappropriation case as its own. I even feel angry." This 
comment came from Defense Agency Director General Fukushiro 
Nukaga when he met the press on Jan. 31. Gentle as he is, Nukaga 
unusually raised his voice. 
 
The CPO malfeasance case was brought to light in 1998 when Nukaga 
was in his current defense chief post. Nukaga, who was a first- 
time cabinet minister at the time, was driven to quit his cabinet 
portfolio four months later to take the responsibility for the 
scandal. CPO is a body in charge of buying or acquiring equipment 
and the like for the Self-Defense Forces. In the wake of the 
scandal, the Defense Agency reorganized CPO, segregating its 
contract divisions from the organization of CPO and transferring 
its cost-accounting divisions to an internal bureau of the 
Defense Agency. 
 
This time, DFAA became tainted with a scandal involving its 
retirees who have parachuted into a private-sector company like 
the CPO scandal. Late last year, Nukaga deemed it inevitable for 
prosecutors to indict those involved in the bid-rigging scandal. 
Since then, Nukaga, who learned a lesson from the CPO scandal, 
has been circumspectly prepared for the possible indictment. 
 
In the CPO scandal, officials were found to have destroyed 
evidence. Furthermore, CPO mishandled things after the case was 
exposed. This became a fatal blow to the Defense Agency. This 
time, the Defense Agency immediately launched a fact-finding 
committee and a preventive study group. Nukaga quickly pledged 
full cooperation for investigations in order to clean up the 
agency. 
 
As a pillar of preventive steps, the Defense Agency has a plan to 
dismantle and integrate DFAA. CPO once was the Special 
Procurement Agency, which used to be a counterpart of the 
occupation forces in Japan. Touching on this history, Nukaga 
criticized CPO for its personnel's underlying sense of 
entitlement from those days. "We will ferret out administrative 
and organizational problems so that such a case will not occur 
ever again," Nukaga said. "That's my responsibility," he added. 
With this, the second-time defense chief fretted about how to 
bail himself out by laying emphasis on his reform-minded stance. 
 
USFJ realignment: Gap with Defense Agency policy course 
 
"Contrary to what you might think," a Defense Agency official 
said, "we have little to do with the Defense Facilities 
Administration Agency." This official noted a "gap" between the 
Defense Agency's policy measures and DFAA's jobs, recounting that 
the gap came out through coordination with local governments over 
the realignment of US forces in Japan. 
 
Nukaga is inclined to disband DFAA. For one thing, Nukaga 
believes that DFAA's closed nature-even more than the bid-rigging 
scandal-has contributed to the delay in the government's local 
coordination over the realignment of US forces in Japan. 
 
On Jan. 30, when DFAA officials were arrested, the Defense Agency 
officially announced its appointment of DFAA Naha Bureau Director 
 
TOKYO 00000642  006 OF 011 
 
 
General Masanori Nishi to the post of Technical Research and 
Development Institute (TRDI) deputy director general, which is a 
de facto demotion. 
 
After hard negotiations, Japan and the United States agreed on a 
plan to relocate the US Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in 
Okinawa Prefecture to a coastal area of Camp Schwab in the island 
prefecture. The Defense Agency's Administrative Vice Minister 
Takemasa Moriya pushed for the plan. Nishi, tuning in to local 
opposition, was critical of the plan. Nishi's stance is said to 
have brought Moriya's anger down on him. 
 
Nishi is well spoken of in Okinawa, where many miss him. But in 
the eyes of Nukaga and Moriya, Nishi appeared to be "only turning 
his face toward Okinawa and reluctant to carry out the Defense 
Agency's policy measures." 
 
DFAA is tasked with improving the environment to secure the use 
of bases. Nukaga, however, urges DFAA to do some rethinking 
itself. "Security is not the kind of matter to be bargained with 
local heads for a happy medium," Nukaga said. He also said, "I 
don't want them to do their jobs with their usual approach." 
 
The Defense Agency gives top priority to the realignment of US 
forces in Japan. The Japanese and US governments have now agreed 
to relocate the heliport functions of Futenma airfield to a 
coastal area of Camp Schwab. To do so, however, the Defense 
Agency needs the governor's approval to use the surface of public 
waters to reclaim land from the sea. The agency is even poised to 
transfer the governor's reclamation-related entitlement to the 
state if the governor does not allow the Futenma relocation. 
There is no doubt that DFAA's reluctance about such a hardline 
stance has fueled arguments calling for the floated breakup of 
DFAA. 
 
Defense Agency's upgrading to ministry: Persuading New Komeito 
 
On Jan. 25, the House of Councillors held a question-and-answer 
session. Shozo Kusakawa, in his interpellation representing the 
New Komeito party, insisted that DFAA should be consolidated into 
the Defense Agency so that the Defense Agency will not fatten its 
organization in its upgrading to a ministry. In reply, Nukaga 
stated that there was "something difficult" in Kusakawa's 
suggestion. "However," Nukaga went on, "the suggestion is full of 
warmheartedness at its bottom." He added, "We'd like to make 
headway for transition to the status of a ministry with 
cooperation obtained." Nukaga had made arrangements with his 
agency's administrative officials on his parliamentary replies 
prepared by them. Nukaga told them to rewrite their scripts more 
easily, with the New Komeito in his mind. 
 
For one thing, the New Komeito is currently in office as the 
LDP's coalition partner. However, some people in the New Komeito 
are strongly opposed to the idea of raising the Defense Agency to 
the status of a ministry. DFAA's bid-rigging scandal this time 
could also work against the Defense Agency for the time being. 
However, Nukaga and others are emphasizing the necessity of 
raising the Defense Agency to a ministry from the perspective of 
administrative reform. They think that this standpoint, if it 
works well, can be convincing to the New Komeito and other 
parties. 
 
Moriya is even more positive about breaking up DFAA and 
 
TOKYO 00000642  007 OF 011 
 
 
streamlining it into the Defense Agency. The Defense Agency now 
has many more jobs to do along with the expanded scope of SDF 
missions overseas. In addition, the Defense Agency is required to 
cooperate with local governments in civil protection during 
emergencies. However, there is a limit to the number of divisions 
and offices to be newly created. The Defense Agency will need to 
realign its existing organizations so as enhance its policymaking 
functions. The Defense Agency would like to find ways and means 
for that purpose by breaking up DFAA. 
 
The Defense Agency is also thirsty for new posts, including a 
vice-ministerial-level defense councillor post that is on a par 
with the Foreign Ministry's deputy minister post. If DFAA is 
dismantled, its director general post can be slotted in for that 
new post. 
 
In addition, the Defense Agency also eyes establishing local 
outposts. The Defense Agency pales in comparison with other 
government ministries and agencies because none of its internal 
bureaus branches out across the nation. DFAA has a total of eight 
local bureaus in the country. However, none of these local 
bureaus serves as a point of contact for Japan's defense-related 
policies in general. In the event of disasters, for instance, 
each prefecture's governor is to ask a local garrison of the 
Ground Self-Defense Force for help. 
 
If DFAA is integrated into the Defense Agency, DFAA's local 
bureaus can be transformed into outposts for the Defense Agency's 
internal bureaus. One idea being floated is to turn each of these 
local DFAA bureaus into a regional bloc defense bureau. Another 
idea is to embed the nationwide network of SDF local recruiting 
offices-currently under the wing of GSDF army headquarters-in 
these regional defense bureaus as the Defense Agency's local 
points of contact. 
 
(3) Second-fiddle candidates for LDP leadership race -- Taku 
Yamasaki, Koichi Kato, representatives from LDP factions, LDP 
Upper House -- start preparatory steps for campaign 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Full) 
February 5, 2006 
 
Forces in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) are quietly moving 
into action with an eye on the September election for party 
president that will determine who will succeed Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi. 
 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe and other likely contenders 
for the party leadership race apparently will move their 
campaigns into full gear in the spring or later. However, "second- 
fiddle candidates" are now waiting for their chances to exercise 
their influence on the selection of candidates for the 
presidential race by taking preparatory steps. 
 
Yamasaki, Kato to respond to the government by pointing out what 
is right and wrong 
 
On Feb. 4 Taku Yamasaki visited the town of Mogami in Yamagata 
Prefecture to deliver a speech in the home constituency of Koichi 
Kato, a longtime ally of Yamasaki. 
 
Yamasaki said, "The next leader must balance domestic politics 
and foreign policy." 
 
TOKYO 00000642  008 OF 011 
 
 
 
Kato stated: "President Bush has told Mr. Koizumi that Japan- 
China relations should be repaired. I'm concerned about Mr. 
Koizumi's foreign policy." 
 
The two once formed a group with Koizumi called the "YKK trio." 
Yamasaki expressed in early January his desire to run in the 
presidential race. He said in a speech on Feb. 4, "Mr. Kato is 
one of the qualified candidates for the presidency." Kato has 
recently noticeably distanced himself from Koizumi, while 
standing at the forefront of criticizing the leadership in 
meetings of the party's General Council. 
 
Regarding the government's proposal of revising the Imperial 
House Law, about which a cautious view is growing in the ruling 
and opposition camps, Kato pointed out, "We will have no choice 
but to agree to the prime minister's proposal in the end." 
Yamasaki then agreed to Kato's view. 
 
The two were not necessarily solely criticizing Koizumi, but they 
appear to be aiming at playing up their political identity by 
pointing out to the government what they think is right or wrong. 
 
Factions to avoid becoming "hunting grounds" 
 
In a meeting on Feb. 2 of his faction, Chairman Yuji Tsushima 
said, "As a policy group, it is important for us to work out 
responsible policies for the public." He underscored his 
intention to come up with his faction's policy principles around 
mid-June. 
 
Last December the Tsushima faction (formerly the Hashimoto 
faction) staved off a  breakup after nearly one and a half years 
of decline. It will be difficult, however, for the faction to 
pick its own candidate for the presidency. By issuing a set 
policy principles, the faction aims not only at justifying its 
reason for existence but also at confirming internal unity so 
that the faction would not become a hunting ground for other 
factions. 
 
Factions in the LDP are in similar circumstances more or less. 
The Komura faction plans to formulate a policy statement calling 
for consideration not only to equal opportunity but also to equal 
results for all. The Nikai faction is working on its own policy 
proposals. 
 
Since the factions have rapidly lost influence since the 
inauguration of the Koizumi government, the prevailing view is 
that the factions will not take the initiative in selecting 
Koizumi's successor. They are having a hard time finding ways to 
be involved in the presidential election. 
 
Aoki remonstrates with Koizumi about his way of administration 
 
In a meeting on the night of Jan. 24 between Koizumi and senior 
ruling bloc members at the Prime Minister's Official Residence, 
Mikio Aoki, chairman of the LDP caucus in the House of 
Councillors, gave Koizumi a warning, saying, "It would be better 
for the prime minister not to talk about the presidential 
election." 
 
In a question-and-answer session at the full Upper House session 
on Jan. 24, Aoki referred to the good and bad effects of the 
 
TOKYO 00000642  009 OF 011 
 
 
Koizumi reform drive. He made this candid statement about the 
Koizumi style politics, "The prime minister should stop 
criticizing" the Upper House members elected in the proportional 
representation segment and their support bodies "for being forces 
of resistance." 
 
Aoki is interested in how to fight Upper House elections, which 
will take place next summer. He intends to go into those 
elections using a conventional election strategy. Regarding the 
view that Abe should be the character to use in the election, he 
commented, "We were defeated in the 2004 election by using 
Koizumi and Abe as the election combination." He has sought to 
check the mood that Abe should be regarded as the most likely 
successor to Koizumi. 
 
(4) Bush and Koizumi - Battle over beef imports (part 1): Prompt 
decision on second ban has driven splinter in alliance even 
deeper 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 1) (Slightly abridged) 
February 5, 2006 
 
Following the finding of specified risk materials (SRM) in a US 
beef shipment to Japan, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the 
morning of Jan. 20 ordered his staff to suspend trade for the 
second time. 
 
In Dec. 2003, the Japanese government placed a ban on US beef 
imports shortly after the first discovery of a BSE-infected cow 
in the US. Tokyo then decided to reopen the market under the 
conditions that only beef from cattle aged up to 20 months with 
SRM removed can be exported to Japan. But the incident happened 
only a month after the resumption of the trade. 
 
Referring to US beef in a policy speech given shortly before his 
decision to place the second ban, Koizumi underscored, "We will 
secure food safety and a peace of mind from the consumers' 
perspective." 
 
A proposal to place a partial ban was at first floated at a 
meeting of the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) and 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, but Koizumi 
promptly decided to place a total embargo, projecting his 
resolve. 
It is said that Japan-US relations have never been better thanks 
to the firm relationship of trust between Koizumi and Bush. Bush 
has steered clear of applying pressure on Japan, a measure that 
had marred bilateral relations during the Clinton administration. 
However, the issue of whether to resume US beef imports has been 
the only exception to such a smooth relationship. 
 
In June 2004, the G-8 Summit was held at Sea Island, Georgia. 
During the Japan-US summit meeting held over lunch, Bush stressed 
how delicious US beef was, that meat having been served as a main 
dish, and he then led off the subject by asking, "What has become 
of the BSE issue?" 
 
His remark implicitly reflected his hope for an early resumption 
of beef imports by Japan, but Koizumi sidestepped the question, 
noting, "Experts are now discussing the issue." 
 
During the summit meeting in Sept. 2004, held under the condition 
that the US side bring up the BSE issue, according to a senior 
 
TOKYO 00000642  010 OF 011 
 
 
Foreign Ministry official, Koizumi again replied, "The issue 
should be judged from a scientific viewpoint." 
 
Then National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, who was present 
at the meeting, reportedly called on Koizumi to make a political 
decision, noting, "You say that the issue should be judged from a 
scientific viewpoint, but there needs to be political will to 
make a top-down decision." This statement was not released out of 
consideration to bilateral relations. 
 
As the US government and Congress became increasingly disgruntled 
with Koizumi's adamant attitude and toughened their request, the 
reaction on the Japanese side became even stronger. 
 
At the time, Japanese beef exports to the US were still under 
suspension, a measure taken after an outbreak of foot-and-mouth 
disease. The US has kept the import ban in place due to the 
discovery of a BSE-infected cow in Japan in Sept. 2001. 
 
Japan adopted a blanket cattle inspection system to ensure food 
safety, but the US government refused to lift the import ban on 
Japanese beef. 
 
An aide to Koizumi complained of a unilateral request from 
Washington: "Japan is carrying out a blanket inspection, and yet 
the US has refused to lift the import ban on Japanese beef. 
Unless the US removes the ban in Japanese beef, Japan will not 
lift the ban on US beef imports." 
 
On Dec. 12, Tokyo and Washington mutually announced their 
decisions to restart beef imports from each other. It appeared 
that a splinter in the alliance had been pulled out. 
 
However, it now turns out that the splinter has been driven 
deeper into the alliance with the imposition of a second ban on 
US beef imports by Japan, following the finding of SRM in a US 
beef shipment to Japan. 
 
(5) Bush and Koizumi - battle over beef imports (part 2): Power 
bases: Clash over food safety, interest 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 1) (Excerpts) 
February 6. 2006 
 
Ever since Japan suspended US beef imports in Dec. 2003, 
President Bush has continued to urge Prime Minister Koizumi to 
reopen the Japanese market. The Republican Party's election 
situation is behind Bush's continuing call for reinstating the 
beef trade. 
 
Major beef producing states in the US are Texas, where the 
President himself has a ranch, Nebraska, Kansas and Colorado in 
order of output. The Farm Belt covering those mid-western states, 
where livestock raising is a major industry, is the Republican 
Party's power base. 
 
The National Cattlemen's Beef Association (NCBA) donated 386,000 
dollars to political parties and candidates in the 2004 election, 
of which 87% went to the Republican Party and its candidates. For 
his reelection in 2004 and the Republican Party's victory in the 
2006 off-year election, Bush needed to obtain support from beef 
producers by thrusting at Japan the request for the resumption of 
beef trade. 
 
TOKYO 00000642  011 OF 011 
 
 
 
Countering Bush's request, Koizumi has continued to insist, "I 
will judge whether or not to resume beef trade from a scientific 
perspective." Koizumi on his part had his own election situation. 
 
In order for him to press ahead with his reform initiative, 
countering "forces of resistance," who were against the 
privatization of postal services and Japan Highway Public 
Corporation, it was necessary to obtain popular support. 
 
Voters in urban areas, who ushered in the Liberal Democratic 
Party's (LDP) landslide victory in the September general election 
last year, have been the support base for the Koizumi reform 
initiative. Such people are at the same time consumers who are 
sensitive to food safety. If Koizumi gives priority to the Japan- 
US alliance relationship, making light of food safety, the 
public's support for his reform efforts would immediately lose 
steam. 
 
Looking back on Koizumi's adamant stance, one staff member at the 
Prime Minister's Official Residence noted: "The prime minister 
has consistently insisted that he would judge whether to restart 
US beef imports or not from a scientific perspective. So much so, 
we even thought we should consider the possibility of resuming 
such imports ourselves." 
 
Koizumi has categorically expressed his resolve to step down in 
September. However, in order to obtain support from the people 
for the continuation of his reform initiative, he has found it 
difficult to decide once more to resume the beef trade in a 
casual manner. On the other hand, Bush is under the gun to 
strongly urge Japan to resume US beef imports in order to help 
secure a Republican Party victory in the off-year election. 
 
Differences in their power bases are working to prolong the US 
beef import issue and even exacerbate it, despite the honeymoon 
relationship. 
 
SCHIEFFER