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Viewing cable 06TOKYO593, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02/02/06
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 06TOKYO593 | 2006-02-02 08:40 | 2011-08-25 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Tokyo |
VZCZCXRO9610
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #0593/01 0330840
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 020840Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8194
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 7031
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 4383
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 7442
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 4477
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 5589
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0364
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 6552
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 8651
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 TOKYO 000593
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST
DIVISION; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS
OFFICE; SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN,
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
ADVISOR; CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02/02/06
INDEX:
(1) Iwakuni to hold reference on relocation of carrier-borne
jets
(2) Mixture of motives of wanting to upgrading Defense Agency to
ministry status; Defense Agency wishes to promote upgrade
argument; Growing reluctance in New Komeito
(3) Editorial: Utterly corrupt DFAA lets officials lead bid
rigging as official duty
(4) Japan-DPRK talks set for Feb. 4, with top priority given to
progress on the abduction issue; Interview with Ambassador for
Diplomatic Normalization Koichi Haraguchi
(5) Editorial: Japan cannot resume US beef imports under current
conditions
(6) Shaky Japan-US-China relations - the light and shadow of
Koizumi diplomacy (Part 2): Yasukuni issue certain to shackle LDP
presidential race; China, ROK working together to block shrine
visits
(7) Aso's call for the Emperor's Yasukuni visit sparks fears for
the Emperor being used for political purposes; Some wonder why
Aso made the comment with strong protests expected; Calls are
genuine but too naive
ARTICLES:
(1) Iwakuni to hold reference on relocation of carrier-borne
jets
YOMIURI (Page 2) (Full)
Evening, February 2, 2006
Katsusuke Ihara, mayor of Iwakuni, today decided to hold a
referendum to ask citizens whether or not they would support a
plan to relocate carrier-borne aircraft from Atsugi Naval Air
Station in Kanagawa Prefecture to Iwakuni Air Station in
Yamaguchi Prefecture. The plan was included in the interim report
on the realignment of the US forces in Japan. Coordination is now
under way to set the vote for March 12.
Iwakuni's ordinance on referendums stipulates that a referendum
can be held at the mayor's instance. The poll will likely adopt
an alternative formula, under which voters cast a ballot for or
against the relocation plan. If a voter turnout falls short of 50
PERCENT , the referendum will become void, and ballot counting
will not take place. The outcome of the proposed referendum does
not have binding authority, but the ordinance provides that the
mayor, the local assembly and residents should respect the
outcome.
The interim report on the realignment of US forces in Japan,
released by the governments of Japan and the US last October,
incorporated the relocation of 57 career-borne jets from Atsugi
Naval Air Station to Iwakuni Air Station. Mayor Iwakuni's
position on the issue has been that the plan should be withdrawn.
He had hinted at the possibility of holding a referendum at town
meetings, "A referendum is one option in the event of the views
of citizens and the municipal assembly splitting over the issue."
TOKYO 00000593 002 OF 011
In the meantime, voices calling for a conditional strike have
been heard in the municipal assembly with one member saying, "We
should hold talks with the central government on specific
matters, under the premise that city will accept the proposal."
Some of the chiefs of seven towns and cities, which are to be
integrated into Iwakuni on Mar. 20, had voiced objection: "A
referendum is not suitable," or, "The proposed date is too close
to the date for the integration."
(2) Mixture of motives of wanting to upgrading Defense Agency to
ministry status; Defense Agency wishes to promote upgrade
argument; Growing reluctance in New Komeito
YOMIURI (Page 4) (Full)
February 2, 2006
In the wake of a bid-rigging scandal involving Defense Facilities
Administration Agency (DFAA) officials, Defense Agency (JDA)
Director General Fukushiro Nukaga announced that his agency would
disband the DFFA and integrate it into the agency. Nukaga is
worried that he might have to resign again from his post unless
he came up with drastic measures to deal with the scandal, which
is the most serious incident for JDA following the agency's
procurement scandal in 1998. The government and ruling camp have
been motivated to upgrade the JDA to the status of a ministry by
integrating the DFAA into the JDA. However, since there is a
growing cautious view in the New Komeito on upgrading the agency
to ministry status, whether the JDA can carry out organizational
reform is uncertain.
In a Budget Committee meeting yesterday morning of the House of
Councillors, Nukaga stressed the need for organizational reform
by disbanding the DFAA and integrating it into the JDA, saying:
"The Defense Facilities Administration Agency was established as
a special procurement agency during the Occupation. Agency
officials, having a sense of entitlement, did not have contact
with the Defense Agency. Such circumstances created the breeding
ground of corruption."
Nukaga appears to have wanted to prevent the scandal from
throwing a blanket on a growing mood of upgrading the JDA to
ministry status, which is the agency's earnest desire.
He seems to have thought that he should have carried out
organizational reform when he stepped down from the JDA chief's
post eight years ago to take responsibility for a procurement
scandal.
He also stepped down in 2001 as minister in charge of financial
affairs to take responsibility for having received donations from
the scandal-tainted KSD, a mutual-aid organization for small and
medium-scale businesses, even though he was then regarded as a
candidate for a presidency of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).
Due to the scandal this time, the New Komeito has put off making
a decision to approve the submission of bills to revise the
Defense Agency Establishment Law to the ongoing Diet session,
although the government plans to do so.
The revision bill is aimed to implement the largest-scale
organizational reform since JDA was established in 1954. The bill
TOKYO 00000593 003 OF 011
calls for merging the Defense Equipment Development Department
and Procurement Department, including the functions of the former
Procurement Headquarters, and creating an "Equipment
Headquarters" by the unified department. The bills also calls for
transferring part of the DFAA's policy-making function regarding
the US military bases in Japan to a "Defense Facilities
Division," which would be set up in the JDA. The ruling camp seem
unlikely to approve submission of the revision bill soon after
DFAA officials were arrested on suspicion of playing leading
roles in rigging bids for agency projects.
The bid-rigging scandal has begun to have an dampening effect on
the mood favoring the upgrade of the JDA to ministry status.
The government aims to submit a set of bills upgrading the JDA to
ministry status after the passage of a fiscal 2006 budget to the
current Diet session and to pass them through during the session.
A senior JDA official commented: "We would like to upgrade the
agency to ministry status under the Koizumi government." The
agency has regarded the ongoing Diet session as a good occasion.
The LDP has paid attention to the New Komeito's moves, with a LDP
member with closed ties to defense interests saying, "After
consulting with the New Komeito, the question is when the Cabinet
makes a decision to submit the bills."
Commenting at a press conference on Feb. 1 on the scandal's
effects on the notion of upgrading the JDA to ministry status,
New Komeito leader Takenori Kanzaki said, "Some say that the
scandal would apply the brakes, but others view that it has
sparked the integration of the DFAA into the JDA." A senior New
Komeito member was cautious:
"We cannot discuss the issue of upgrading the JDA to ministry
status under the situation where we don't know how far the
scandal will develop. It is dangerous to speed up discussions."
(3) Editorial: Utterly corrupt DFAA lets officials lead bid
rigging as official duty
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full)
February 2, 2006
The special investigation squad of the Tokyo District Public
Prosecutors Office arrested three officials at the Defense
Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA) on suspicion of leading
bid-rigging schemes for air-conditioning projects ordered by the
agency. The three are an incumbent deputy director general and
two former officers. The bridge-construction scandal involving
the vice president and other senior officials of now defunct
Japan Highway Public Corporation last summer was disclosed last
summer. Late last year, it was reported that electrical machinery
makers rigged bids for projects at Narita Airport only late last
year. These incidents have drawn growing public criticism of the
pattern of collusive ties between the public and private sectors.
Regarding DFAA, investigation is under way in yet another bid-
rigging case involving other major general contractors. Seeing
the repeated occurrence of big-rigging scandals, we feel a strong
sense of anger and disappointment.
Behind such bid rigging schemes is the practice of amakudari
(descent from heaven), under which government officials land
lucrative jobs in private firms after retirement. Officials
involved in such a practice take advantage of their positions and
TOKYO 00000593 004 OF 011
use tax money for their own benefit. Don't they realize the
viciousness and cowardice of the practice? The case this time is
particularly horrendous. It is suspected that successive agency
deputy directors general have been engaged in selecting and
determining which companies would be awarded contracts based on
how many retired agency officials the firms hired. In some cases,
deputy directors general reportedly ordered their juniors to
hurriedly cover them up by changing the already determined
bidders.
In 1998, a breach of trust incident involving the former
procurement headquarters in the Defense Agency was reported. The
aim was to secure post-retirement jobs at the companies awarded
the contracts for its officials. Reflecting on this, strict
conditions have been attached for officials of DFAA or the
Defense Agency to be hired within two years of retirement by
firms with close ties to them. DFAA, however, had made
arrangements to have judicial foundations hire deputy director
generals temporarily until private firms hire them.
It is outrageous that the DFAA had determined even temporary
jobs. It is necessary to consider future options for public
corporations, but the problem is that such crimes had been
continued systematically. In the recent case, prosecutors have
not arrested responsible executives on the corporate side, the
reason being that the agency officials took the initiative. What
is worse, most of the executives came from DFAA. The agency is
utterly corrupt and has made light of the public.
The deputy directors general appear to have engaged in bid
rigging as part of their duties. It is likely that other senior
officials were aware of such illegal practices and tacitly
approved them. We expect the special investigation unit to carry
out a thorough investigation to prove that the agency was
systematically involved in the case as a whole.
Under the revised Antimonopoly Act, administrative surcharge
payments have surged since this January. This measure is expected
to work effectively to restrict private firms from engaging in
bid-rigging practices. As long as there are public servants who
are looking for posts after retirement, however, big-rigging
schemes will never disappear. There will be no other means in the
end but to gradually raise the retirement age and completely
abolish the amakudari system in reforming the public servant
system.
As shown by the recent DFAA case, the rule that was set by the
National Personnel Authority to temporarily restrict retired
government officials from being hired by firms with close ties to
their agencies. Government officials must be prohibited from
taking advantage of their positions to secure post-retirement
jobs, although it is acceptable if they get jobs at private firms
on their own. Using official positions in getting jobs is a sort
of crime. The government is urged to work out measures to
prohibit government agencies from arranging post-retirement jobs
for their officers.
A punitive clause also should be incorporated in the Law of
Collusive Bidding at the Initiative of Government Agencies at an
early date.
(4) Japan-DPRK talks set for Feb. 4, with top priority given to
progress on the abduction issue; Interview with Ambassador for
TOKYO 00000593 005 OF 011
Diplomatic Normalization Koichi Haraguchi
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Almost full)
February 2, 2006
Prior to the upcoming talks between Japan and North Korea,
Ambassador for Japan-North Korea Diplomatic Normalization Koichi
Haraguchi was interviewed by the Tokyo Shimbun yesterday.
Haraguchi emphasized: "Making progress on the abduction issue is
a priority. Unless that issue is resolved, Japan cannot normalize
diplomatic ties with North Korea." The following are the key
points of the interview.
Interviewer: Takayoshi Goto
-- What is the outlook for the first bilateral talks with the
DPRK in nearly three years and three months?
Haraguchi: "The upcoming talks differ from past rounds in two
respects. First, Prime Minister Koizumi visited Pyongyang in 2002
and finalized the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration. The
declaration puts forward a direction (toward resolving
outstanding issues). So, if we proceed along that direction in
the negotiations, the talks will not run into the difficulties
that have been experienced before.
"Second, the upcoming negotiations will simultaneously deal with
three separate issues, including diplomatic normalization, in
three separate working groups. We learned from the past round of
talks that trying to deal with everything in one forum was
inefficient, as it was difficult to reach a consensus on how much
time should be devoted to each issue. With this new approach, we
hope the upcoming talks will make progress that will allow
specific steps to be taken."
-- What will Japan's basic approach be in these talks?
"The top priority is to make progress on the abduction issue.
Security issues, including North Korea's nuclear and missile
development, are also extremely important.
"Diplomatic relations will not be normalized without resolving
the abduction and security issues. This policy line will not
change. North Korea may put diplomatic normalization (that will
directly lead to economic cooperation) ahead of other issues, but
we on our part will respond in those talks after seeing how
things are progressing in the other working groups, one on the
abductions and the other on nuclear development."
-- There is the concern among the families of abductees that the
abduction issue may be put on the backburner.
"I understand their feelings well. We will negotiate while
keeping fully in mind our basic policy that we won't normalize
diplomatic ties unless the abduction issue is resolved. North
Korea has accepted our proposal to discuss pending issues in
separate working groups, so I think they hope to see progress (on
the abduction issue). If they want to move forward, then we will
call on them to understand Japan's position."
-- How much time do you think will be needed before diplomatic
normalization?
TOKYO 00000593 006 OF 011
"Everything depends on how North Korea responds. If North Korean
officials remain unwilling to resolve the abduction issue, it
doesn't matter how hard we work. If they sincerely strive to
resolve the issue, though, normalization will be possible."
DPRK negotiating team led by Ambassador Song Il Ho
The North Korean official in charge of diplomatic normalization
talks is Ambassador Song Il Ho. Song is 50. He assumed office as
deputy director-general of the Foreign Ministry's Asian Affairs
Department after serving in such posts as a standing committee
member of the DPRK-Japan Friendship Association and a research
fellow of the Foreign Ministry. He attended preparatory meetings
for the second round of Japan-DPRK summit talks in May 2004 as
the official on the ground responsible for working-level talks
with Japan, and in subsequent Japan-DPRK talks, he was on the
DPRK negotiating team.
Jong Thae Hwa served as ambassador in the previous diplomatic
normalization talks, but he retired last February. Since then,
the post of ambassador had been left vacant, but this past
January, Song was chosen to take the post.
Kim Chol Ho, deputy director-general of the Foreign Ministry's
Asian Affairs Department, is in charge of the abduction issue,
and Jong Thae Yang, deputy director-general of the ministry's US
Affairs Department, is tasked with the security issue.
Kim has experience negotiating with Japan while in the post of
chief of the Japan Division. Jong has served in the post of chief
of the US Division. He attended the six-party talks held in last
September.
(5) Editorial: Japan cannot resume US beef imports under current
conditions
ASAHI (Page 3) (Full)
February 1, 2006
Consumers' distrust of US beef is growing deeper, with
allegations emerging that the government abandoned its plan to
inspect US beef processors prior to resuming US beef imports last
December.
At a cabinet meeting, the government approved a report of replies
to questions by Democratic Party of Japan members and submitted
it to the Diet last November. The report included a plan to send
Japanese officials to the US to inspect beef processors before
and after resuming imports. But the government sent officers to
the US only once.
In a meeting of the House of Representatives, Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) Minister Nakagawa
said: "We did not take action based on the decision made at the
cabinet meeting." He then apologized. Later in the day, however,
he said that the government did not break a promise, explaining:
"The US has authorized slaughter facilities on its own
responsibility, so it is impossible for Japan to judge whether
the slaughterhouses have taken proper measures prior to resuming
imports."
We cannot easily dismiss this problem as a simple mistake made
when the written reply was worked out. The government's shifting
TOKYO 00000593 007 OF 011
explanations reflect the seriousness of the case. The government
is now forced to pay the price for having given priority to
quickly resuming imports over an effort to win consumer
confidence.
America's sloppiness is quite intolerable. Only one month after
Japan resumed US beef imports, backbones - designated as a
specified risk material (SRM) - were found in a US beef shipment
to Japan, although the US government had reiterated that thorough
safety measures have been taken. Consumers must be feeling that
what they had feared has come to pass.
Americans are less interested in the BSE issue and food safety in
general than the Japanese, and we have doubts about the
credibility of what the US promised. That is why Japan should
have prepared an effective monitoring system on its own
initiative.
The Japanese government sent an inspection team to the US the day
after it decided to resume imports. But the teams inspected only
11 of the 40 facilities authorized by the US government. The
facility that shipped beef with backbones attached was accredited
after the inspection team returned to Japan.
At Japanese ports, imported beef is in principle subjected to
sampling tests, so it is feared that SRM could be overlooked.
The US government has decided to compile a report documenting the
cause of the incident and preventive measures. It then will
present it to the Japanese government. In this envisioned
scenario, MAFF and the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare
will examine the report, and if the report is acceptable, Japan
will resume US beef imports. But the outlook for this is now
uncertain.
Japanese consumers have become very sensitive about the safety of
US beef. In order to overcome the blunders made by both Japan and
the US, the US must present a convincing report.
Japan banned US beef imports for two years. The US Congress and
government continued to pressure Japan to resume imports in order
to protect the country's livestock farmers. It is consumers,
though, who will decide whether to accept US beef.
Japan also should expand its program of inspecting processing
facilities in the US, as well as strengthen its quarantine
system. Japan and the US should inspect a larger number of such
facilities in the US. It might be an idea for both sides to share
in the costs.
In addition to the distrust in the US government, questions are
also being raised about the measures taken by the Japanese
government in response. We are far from a situation in which
Japan can reopen its market quickly. In order to regain consumer
trust in US beef, there is no option but for both countries to
make utmost efforts.
(6) Shaky Japan-US-China relations - the light and shadow of
Koizumi diplomacy (Part 2): Yasukuni issue certain to shackle LDP
presidential race; China, ROK working together to block shrine
visits
MAINICHI (Page 2) (Full)
TOKYO 00000593 008 OF 011
January 31, 2006
On Jan. 26, when budget deliberations began in the Diet, Chinese
Ambassador to Japan Wang Yi returned to his post after an absence
of one and a half months since he temporarily left for Beijing
last December. While he was away, a rumor flew about that he
might have been recalled due to the complication of the Yasukuni
issue.
Last Dec. 20, Wang and senior government officials, including
Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo, and a group of Japan experts
from the government-affiliated think tank China Institute of
Contemporary International Relations and the Chinese Academy of
Social Science came together somewhere in Beijing to discuss
Japan policy.
"Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi is expected to step down in
September. If the new prime minister visits Yasukuni Shrine,
China would never concede to Japan on the historical issues."
The secret gathering aimed at reshaping China's basic policy
toward Japan. That policy will form the core of diplomatic
strategy toward Japan by the Chinese Communist Party's Political
Bureau.
It is highly likely that China's strategy targets Chief Cabinet
Secretary Shinzo Abe, who favors prime ministerial shrine visits
SIPDIS
and is seen as the frontrunner in the Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) presidential race to find a successor to Koizumi. With the
prospect that Abe will succeed Koizumi, China, winning the United
States and South Korea over to its side, intends to build a net
to encircle Japanese lawmakers favoring a shrine visit. This is
the point in the basic policy, says a source in Tokyo involved
with Japan-China relations.
This secret meeting also hammered out this policy line: "China
will apply political through the force of good economic relations
between Japan and China. The private sector will move the
government."
As if to tune in to China, South Korean Foreign Affairs and Trade
Minister Ban Ki-moon stated: "If the successor to Prime Minister
Koizumi pays homage at Yasukuni Shrine, summit meetings between
the two nations would remain difficult to schedule." Ban made
this remark on Jan. 16 to a group of Japanese reporters who were
in Seoul as part of an exchange of Japanese and South Korean
reporters.
Some Japanese lawmakers have begun expressing discontent with
Koizumi's shrine visits. On Jan. 17, former Chief Cabinet
Secretary Yasuo Fukuda remarked in a speech at the Mainichi
SIPDIS
Public Opinion Forum in Fukuoka City:
"If it is a matter of the heart, don't you think there are ways
to avoid a dispute with other countries?"
On Jan. 26, the non-partisan parliamentary group, Council to
Study a National Memorial Facility, met after one and a half
months, with Fukuda in it.
The council is headed by Taku Yamasaki, former vice president of
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Yamasaki, who has come
forward as a presidential candidate, reiterated: "Our Asia
TOKYO 00000593 009 OF 011
diplomacy is now stalled. This situation must not be disregarded.
The next government's role is expected to be crucial."
Former LDP Secretary General Koichi Kato, a council member, is
critical of Koizumi's shrine visits. He noted:
"It is not wise policy to fan the flames of nationalism. If you
do so, it will come back to haunt you, and would end up flat on
your back. Japan may be in the process of feeling this boomerang
effect."
Moreover, Japan Business Federation (Keidanren) Chair Hiroshi
Okuda, influential in political circles said in his New Year's
press conference that a successor prime minister should refrain
from shrine visits.
Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe is objecting to this trend, arguing
that the Yasukuni issue "should not be put on the list of major
campaign issues in the presidential election." It is all right
not to use the Yasukuni issue in the election campaign, but what
will happen in actuality if Abe becomes the premier. Ichita
Yamamoto is a member of the House of Councillors from the Mori
faction who is the central figure among the group of lawmakers
supporting Abe as a presidential candidate. He notes:
"Even if a pro-China lawmaker takes office as prime minister,
relations with China would not go smoothly. If soon after taking
office, Prime Minister Abe visited Yasukuni Shrine and then made
a fresh decision, for instance, on freezing shrine visits for a
while, then he would be able to contain the objections of the
conservatives."
Foreign Minister Taro Aso, who supports the prime minister's
shrine visits, stated in a speech at a meeting of New Komeito
Upper House members on Jan. 28: "The best way would be for the
Emperor to visit the shrine." This remark has created a stir.
The Emperor had visited to Yasukuni Shrine until 1975. Why did
the incumbent foreign minister bring up such a visit at this
time? There is speculation that he might have tried to project
the difference in his approach from that of Abe, who has begun
wavering. Needless to say, no one should link condolences to the
souls of the war dead with political motives. But actual politics
cannot free itself from the Yasukuni issue, given the entangled
state of Japan's Asia diplomacy and the approaching LDP
presidential election.
(7) Aso's call for the Emperor's Yasukuni visit sparks fears for
the Emperor being used for political purposes; Some wonder why
Aso made the comment with strong protests expected; Calls are
genuine but too naive
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Pages 24, 25)
February 2, 2006
Foreign Minister Taro Aso's comment that it would be best for the
Emperor to visit Yasukuni Shrine has created a sensation,
immediately drawing fire from China, South Korea and other
countries. It may have a serious impact on the race to determine
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)'s new president in September.
Some also fear that it may end up embroiling the Emperor in
political affairs.
TOKYO 00000593 010 OF 011
Aso held a press conference on Jan. 31, in which he explained his
controversial Yasukuni statement this way:
"I have never said that I would like to see the Emperor visit the
shrine under the current situation. I simply wanted to present a
question as to what should be done to allow the government and
the Emperor to spontaneously express their condolences to those
who gave their lives for the country."
Aso sought the Emperor's visit to the war-related shrine in his
speech in Nagoya on Jan. 28 in connection with Prime Minister
Koizumi's shrine visits.
The domestic media immediately reported it in a critical tone.
The New China News Agency also decried it the following day as a
typical rightist view.
Such developments forced Aso to hold the press meeting Jan. 31.
Later in the day, he also appeared on a nightly news show to
minimize the impact of his comment, explaining that he made the
statement from the viewpoint of the spirits of the war dead.
During his tenure as policy research council chairman, Aso also
made this sensational comment: "(Korean people) began voluntarily
adopting Japanese names during Japan's colonial rule." Last
November after assuming the current post, Aso also said
provocatively, "In the world, China and South Korea are the only
countries that talk about Yasukuni."
Aso is not of course the first lawmaker who called for the
Emperor's Yasukuni visit. In August 2004, Tokyo Gov. Shintaro
Ishihara stated, "I would like to see the Emperor visit Yasukuni
Shrine in his private capacity on behalf of the Japanese people."
This statement also sparked controversy.
Shiro Akazawa, professor of modern Japanese political history at
Ritsumeikan University, wondered why Aso made such a
controversial comment at a time like this, saying:
"Mr. Aso has long been an advocate of official visits to the
shrine. He seems to have turned up the volume of his call. Such
calls were initially directed only at the Emperor and the prime
minister, but the Emperor has gradually moved away from the
focus, and the Imperial Household Agency apparently has no
intention of setting foot in a minefield. I don't know what
prompted Mr. Aso to make such a statement as foreign minister at
a time like this when strong backlashes were expected from inside
and outside Japan. He stressed the viewpoint of the spirits of
the war dead in calling for the Emperor's shrine visit, but not
all people hailed 'Banzai' for the Emperor when they died. We
cannot assume that all did (like Mr. Aso)."
Emperor Showa paid homage at Yasukuni on eight occasions in the
postwar period, the one in 1975 being the last.
Yasukuni's collective enshrinement, including Class-A war
criminals, is often cited in explaining his discontinuation of
shrine visits. Emperor Akihito has not visited the shrine since
ascending to the throne in 1989.
Last June, the government released a statement saying: "Emperor
Showa had visited Yasukuni Shrine in his private capacity. The
Emperor performs only such acts in matters of state as are
TOKYO 00000593 011 OF 011
provided for in the Constitution. Visiting shrines is not part of
acts in matters of state."
Aso's statement was taken to indicate that the capacity argument
made it difficult for the Emperor to visit the shrine.
But Akazawa thinks that Emperor Showa was opposed to enshrining
Class-A war criminals at Yasukuni and that that was why he
stopped visiting there after 1978.
Some wonder if the Emperor, the quintessential public figure, can
do anything in his private capacity, while some others fear that
the Emperor might be used politically.
Following Ishihara's comment urging the Emperor to visit
Yasukuni, Imperial Household Agency Vice Grand Steward Shingo
Haketa, currently grand steward, noted: "If the Emperor's conduct
carries political significance, we have to think about it
carefully."
Akazawa also said, "The Imperial Household Agency is expected to
remain cautious about calls for visits to Yasukuni by the
Emperor.
But many bereaved families and supporters backing Koizumi's
Yasukuni visits are hopeful that his annual visits will help
reopen the door for visits to the shrine by the Emperor.
Kyoto Sangyo University Prof. Isao Tokoro, who is an authority on
imperial affairs, explained:
"To bereaved families and those worshiping the war dead, it is a
long-cherished desire for the Emperor to start visiting Yasukuni
because Emperor Showa kept visiting there until 1975 without
creating any problems. Their desire is genuine but too naive. It
is important to spread the correct perception of Yasukuni Shrine
and the National Chidorigafuchi War Dead Cemetery throughout the
world, including Japan."
Aso is a possible candidate for the LDP presidency. Will his
controversial comment have any impact on the race?
Political commentator Minoru Morita said in a critical tone:
"His grandfather, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, openly referred
to himself as the Emperor's subject. I think Aso, a supporter of
Prime Minister Koizumi's shrine visits, also broached the Emperor
in an attempt to play up his political identity for the
presidential race. But it simply backfired. Aso may or may not
drop out of the presidential race, but such would be a minor
political matter. But if Japan became isolated in the
international community because of his comment, that might harm
Japan's national interests, which would be a major problem."
Saitama University Constitutional Law Prof. Takashi Miwa said:
"Yasukuni Shrine is a religious facility. Under the Constitution,
it would be problematical for any public figure -- whether it's
the prime minister or the Emperor - to visit Yasukuni. Calls for
a visit to the shrine by the Emperor, who carries greater
authority than the prime minister, are a real a problem,
especially for the Imperial Household Agency."
SCHIEFFER