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Viewing cable 06SANTIAGO401, SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ)

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06SANTIAGO401 2006-02-27 20:11 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Santiago
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 SANTIAGO 000401 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
FOR DS/IP/ITA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AMGT ASEC PTER
SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ) 
 
REF: SECSTATE 17684 
 
POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
 
1.  (SBU) DEMONSTRATIONS 
 
A.  ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN COUNTRY 
CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT SIGNIFICANT ANTI-AMERICAN 
DEMONSTRATIONS? 
 
Yes.  A small community of Arab-Muslim descent could 
demonstrate against U.S. interests.  Members of this 
community have participated in demonstrations concerning the 
war in Iraq.  Not to be confused with this small group is the 
larger Chilean community of Palestinian Arabs and Lebanese - 
many into their third and fourth generations - who are fully 
integrated into Chilean society, but may share some of the 
same political positions.  Members of this community have 
also demonstrated against U.S. interests.  The sizable Cuban 
community living in Santiago is also capable of carrying out 
demonstrations against U.S. interests. 
 
B.  HAVE THERE BEEN ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE 
COUNTRY WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS? 
 
Yes, there have been two Cuban lead demonstrations. 
 
C.  HAVE DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF U.S. 
DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES? 
 
Yes. 
 
D.  WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF THE ANTI-AMERICAN 
DEMONSTRATION? 
 
30 to 50. 
 
E.  ARE ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS USUALLY TRIGGERED BY 
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES, MILITARY ACTIONS, OR BY 
DOMESTIC ISSUES? 
 
Yes, demonstrations have been triggered by all of the above. 
 
F.  ARE DEMONSTRATIONS GENERALLY VIOLENT OR PEACEFUL? 
 
Demonstrations directed at the Embassy are generally 
peaceful.  Demonstrations directed toward the host 
government, which take place away from the Embassy, can and 
often do turn somewhat violent, with rock throwing and 
molotov cocktails.  Police respond with tear gas and water 
cannons. 
 
G.  IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO 
USG PROPERTY OT INJURIES TO USG EMPLOYEES? 
 
No. 
 
H.  IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATORS EVER PENETRATED OUR 
PERIMETER SECURITY LINE? 
 
No. 
 
I.  HAVE THERE BEEN ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE 
COUNTRY WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS? 
 
Yes. At the huge copper mines - most located in the distant 
northern part of the country, but a couple are within a 
two-hour drive on Santiago. 
 
J.  HAVE DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF U.S. 
DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES? 
 
No. 
 
K.  WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ANTI-GOVERNMENT 
DEMONSTRATION? 
 
May be as strong as 5000. 
 
L.  ARE DEMONSTRATIONS GENERALLY VIOLENT OR PEACEFUL? 
 
Demonstrations are generally peaceful. However, there are 
often groups participating in these demonstrations who are 
prone to violence. Due to this, some demonstrations do turn 
violent. 
 
M.  IF VIOLENT, HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO 
USG PROPERTY? 
 
No. 
2.  (SBU) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS 
A.  IS THE HOST COUNTRY ENGAGED IN AN INTERSTATE OR 
INTRASTATE CONFLICT? (THIS MAY INCLUDE BATTLES BETWEEN 
ORGANIZED AND VIOLENT DRUG CARTELS). 
 
No. 
B.  IF AN INTRASTATE CONFLICT, IS IT AN INSURGENCY LIMITED TO 
A SPECIFIC REGION OR IS IT A COUNTRYWIDE CIVIL WAR? 
 
N/A 
 
C.  IF LIMITED TO A SPECIFIC REGION, ARE ANY U.S. DIPLOMATIC 
FACILITIES LOCATED IN THIS REGION? 
 
N/A 
 
D.  HAVE ANY OF THESE FACTIONS INVOLVED IN INTRASTATE 
CONFLICTS SIGNALED OR DEMONSTRATED AN ANTI-AMERICAN 
ORIENTATION? 
 
N/A 
 
3.  (SBU) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES 
 
A.  ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES PROFESSIONAL AND 
WELL-TRAINED? 
 
Yes. However, they do not coordinate with one another on a 
consistent basis. 
 
B.  HAVE THEY BEEN TRAINED BY U.S. AGENCIES?  IF SO, PLEASE 
ELABORATE ON EFFECTIVENESS OF TRAINING. 
 
Yes. Both of the Chilean national Police agencies (the 
Carabineros and the Investigaciones) have received training 
from U.S. law enforcement agencies. Training has improved 
their effectiveness, both law enforcement agencies have 
continued to seek our assistance in training. 
 
C.  ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CONFRONTED WITH SERIOUS, 
WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION IN SIDE THEIR AGENCIES? 
 
No. Transparency International rated Chile as ranking just 
below the U.S. in the perception of corruption, by far the 
best rating for any country in Latin America. 
 
D.  ARE THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES PROFESSIONAL AND CAPABLE OF 
DETERRING TERRORIST ACTIONS? 
 
Yes.  In 2004, the Chilean Government created a new de facto 
intelligence service, which currently provides analytical 
support for the operational units within Policia de 
investigacion de Chile (PICH) and the Carabineros. 
Supportive of the U.S., they share their product with 
appropriate Embassy officials.  Chilean services have been 
supportive in multiple bi-national intelligence operations. 
 
E.  HAVE THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES BEEN COOPERATIVE WITH U.S. 
EMBASSY REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION AND SUPPORT? 
 
Yes. But only if done through proper formal channels. 
 
F.  ASSUMING THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST THREATS IN 
RECENT YEARS, HAVE HOST COUNTRY SECURITY SERVICES BEEN ABLE 
TO SCORE ANY MAJOR ANTI-TERRORISM SUCCESSES? 
 
None identified in recent years.  However, Chilean security 
services have general skills and the will to successfully 
neutralize terrorist plans when/if identified. 
 
G.  HAS HOST COUNTRY BEEN RESPONSIVE (RE: TIMELINES AND 
ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES) TO EMBASSY REQUEST FOR PROTECTIVE 
SECURITY? 
 
Yes. Response to request for security support have been 
immediate and more than adequate.  Host government protective 
security services originating from the Carabineros de Chile, 
although professional, are inflexible when it comes to 
adjusting motorcade support for visiting U.S. dignitaries. 
On VIP visits, they make few or no concessions to their 
concept of appropriate security - i.e. when it comes to how 
many agents are allowed in a room in addition to the 
Carabineros themselves; whether line of sight will be 
respected in a bilateral meeting, etc. 
 
H.  HOW DOES THE EMBASSY ASSESS THE OVERALL SECURITY AT MAJOR 
AIRPORTS IN THE COUNTRY?  (EXCELLENT; VERY GOOD, 
GOOD/AVERAGE; POOR) 
Good. Overall security at Chilean airports is good.  In the 
Terminal, there is a uniformed police presence which consist 
of airport police (Carabineros) and PICH police in the 
immigration section.  Metal detectors are used at entrances 
to gate areas and are of sufficient quality to detect weapons 
such as guns and knives.  However, a determined terrorist 
could circumvent these measure.  International travelers are 
given a more thorough check at Santiago International 
Airport.  Access to aircraft is easy and flight line security 
is generally poor as trucks are not thoroughly checked. 
There is a Company-size counter-terrorist trained Special 
Forces unit Fuerzas Aereas de Chile (FACH-Chilean Air Force), 
this unit is assigned to guard against and respond to a 
hijacking or other terrorist incidents at the airport. 
 
I.  HOW EFFECTIVE ARE CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION AGENCIES? 
 
Effective.  Customs controls are generally effective at 
Santiago (for incoming items) and Iquique (for outgoing items 
because Iquique is a duty-free zone).  Everyone entering 
Chile must pass through  immigration checkpoints.  While 
magnifiers are available at Santiago Airport and Chilean 
customs officials have received training in detection of 
fraudulent passports, Chile permits entry with only an easily 
counterfeited Identification Card by citizens of many 
countries in the region. 
 
J.  HOW EFFECTIVE ARE BORDER PATROL FORCES? 
 
Average.  Chile uses its military and police for border 
control.  However, the Chilean government publicly admits 
that they do not have the kind of equipment and resources 
needed to effectively control their long land and maritime 
borders.  While Chile has extensive land and sea borders 
where determined groups could enter undetected, the main 
established crossing points are well guarded. 
 
INDIGENOUS TERRORISM 
 
4.  (SBU)  ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS 
 
A.  ARE THERE INDIGENOUS, ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS IN 
COUNTRY? 
 
Uncertain.  There is conflicting information about 
Anti-American indigenous groups in Chile.  Iranian-backed and 
Hezbollah-backed groups have continued to seek support from 
indigenous individuals. 
 
B.  IF YES HOW MANY? 
 
N/A 
 
C.  HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT ANTI-AMERICAN ATTACKS WITHIN THE 
LAST 12 MONTHS? 
 
No. 
 
D.  WERE ANY OF THESE LETHAL ATTACKS? 
 
N/A 
 
E.  HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. DIPLOMATIC TARGETS? 
 
No. 
 
F.  HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. BUSINESS, U.S. MILITARY , OR 
U.S. RELATED TARGETS? 
 
No. 
 
G.  HAVE GROUPS LIMITED THEIR ATTACKS TO SPECIFIC REGIONS OR 
DO THEY OPERATE COUNTRY WIDE? 
 
N/A 
 
H.  IF ATTACKS ARE LIMITED TO REGIONS, ARE THERE ANY U.S. 
DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES LOCATED  IN THESE REGIONS? 
 
N/A 
 
5.  (SBU)  OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS 
A.  ARE THERE OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS (NOT 
ANTI-AMERICAN) IN COUNTRY? 
 
No.  However, there is an indigenous Mapuche Indian 
population in southern Chile, which does resort to violence 
directed toward host government and some property owners in 
the region.  This activity, while not anti-American in 
nature, could affect Americans who are in the wrong place at 
the wrong time. 
 
B.  IF YES, HOW MANY? 
 
N/A 
 
C.  HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT ATTACKS IN THE CAPITAL OR IN 
AREAS WHERE U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES ARE LOCATED? 
 
No. 
 
D.  WERE ATTACKS LETHAL AND/OR INDISCRIMINATE? 
 
N/A 
 
E.  HAVE THERE BEEN ANY AMERICANS KILLED OR INJURED IN THESE 
ATTACKS? 
 
No. 
 
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM 
 
6.  (SBU) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INDICATORS 
 
A.  ARE THERE ANY FOREIGN TERRORIST GROUPS THAT HAVE A 
PRESENCE IN COUNTRY? 
 
Yes.  There is reporting that suggest Hezbollah supporters 
are present in northern Chile.  Additionally, there are 
indications that there may be Pakistani extremists and others 
sympathetic to Al-Qaida.  There is a radical fundamentalist 
presence in Iquique, Chile and to a lessor degree in 
Santiago.  These fundamentalist who are known to be 
associated with Hezbollah are increasing their presence and 
activity in Chile.  To date, law enforcement has been unable 
to collect sufficient intelligence to gauge their true 
intentions.  There is substantial information that indicates 
that significant financial fund-raising for Hezbollah is 
taking place in northern Chile within the Muslim community. 
No hostile activities have been detected originating form the 
Islamic Center in Santiago, nor from a Sunni Mosque. 
 
B.  HOW DOES THE EAC ACCESS THIS PRESENCE? 
 
The Santiago Islamic Center certainly provides financial 
support to unknown terrorists.  Sporadic reporting suggests 
that these groups have capability to plan operations should 
they chose to do so.  Periodically there is unsubstantiated 
reporting which indicates an intention to plan a terrorist 
act somewhere in the region, but nothing definite.  The 
Hezbollah groups in the northern part of Chile are believed 
to be financial cells. 
 
C.  IS THE HOST GOVERNMENT SYMPATHETIC TO THE SE GROUPS? 
 
No.  The host government is working with the U.S. government 
to monitor them and take action against them if required. 
D.  ARE THERE SUSPECT NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS) 
IN THE COUNTRY THAT HAVE A RELATIONSHIP WITH ANY OF THESE 
GROUPS? 
 
No. 
 
E.  ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN COUNTRY 
THAT ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THESE GROUPS? 
 
Yes.  The relatively small non-native, Arab-Muslim population 
of Chile finds some political sympathy in the much larger, 
100-year-old community of Chileans of Arab descent. 
Religious elements of the Iranian government have contact 
with and monetary support to the Santiago Islamic Center. 
 
F.  HOW DOES THE EAC ACCESS THE LEVEL, INTENT, AND SCOPE OF 
HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN COUNTRY? 
 
There are Islamic groups with anti-U.S. sentiments present 
and active in Chile.  Information on their connections to 
specific hostile intelligence services is unreliable.  We 
have no information regarding intent to engage in anti-U.S. 
terrorist acts in Chile. 
 
G.  HOW DOES THE EAC ACCESS THE AVAILABILITY OF WEAPONS AND 
EXPLOSIVES IN COUNTRY OR FROM NEARBY COUNTRIES FOR HOSTILE 
TERRORIST ELEMENTS? 
 
The capability exists, due to lax border control and poor 
container security procedures at Chilean ports. 
Participation in the current U.S. container security 
initiative will help tighten the illegal smuggling of these 
types of weapons from Chile, but Chile is not a CSI country 
yet.  Explosives are easily to obtain due to extensive mining. 
KELLY