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Viewing cable 06MANAGUA394, OIL PROFITS TAX: GON HAVING IT BOTH WAYS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MANAGUA394 2006-02-17 23:15 2011-06-21 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
VZCZCXRO1816
OO RUEHLMC
DE RUEHMU #0394/01 0482315
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 172315Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5331
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 0542
RUEHDG/AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO IMMEDIATE 0499
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 000394 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2016 
TAGS: EPET EINV PREL PGOV NU
SUBJECT: OIL PROFITS TAX:  GON HAVING IT BOTH WAYS 
 
REF: 05 MANAGUA 2613 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli; reasons 1/4 (b), (d), (e) 
 
 
 
1. (C) Summary:  The February 13 political &deal8 that 
ended the week-long Managua bus strike over rate increases 
continues to reverberate in the political sphere and the 
business community.  Representatives of the FSLN, Alternativa 
Cristiana, and Camino Cristiano signed a document with the 
FSLN Mayor of Managua in the presence of Cardinal Obando y 
Bravo and an OAS representative, committing to introduce a 
law which will create a special &temporary8 tax on oil 
company profits that, at least in the case of Nicaragua,s 
only refinery, amounts to a confiscation of all profits.  The 
tax is supposed to be &reviewed8 in four months, during 
which period the GON will supposedly ensure import of new 
Japanese buses for which passengers will be happy to pay 
higher fares.  The proposal generated immediate protests from 
private sector organizations, and the umbrella organization 
COSEP issued a press statement, along with AMCHAM and the 
Italian-Nicaraguan Chamber of Commerce, calling on the 
Assembly to reject the tax, reject further subsidies to the 
transport collectives, instruct the competent authority (city 
of Managua) to apply rate increases, and if that is not done, 
to transfer the city transport council to the central 
government.  Nevertheless, a draft bill to implement the tax 
has been introduced in the legislature, and FSLN leader 
Daniel Ortega, in full campaign mode, has excoriated the 
&shameless, thieving, grasping, lying8 oil companies, the 
private sector and political groups who oppose the law, and 
the &subservient8 media that has generally taken their 
side.  FSLN Managua Mayor Nicho Marenco and Cardinal Obando y 
Bravo both called upon the Assembly to enact the law.  End 
Summary 
 
2. (C) Augustin Fuentes, general manager of Esso Standard, 
Nicaragua,s only refinery, called on Ambassador February 16 
to update us on the status of the confiscatory oil profits 
tax that is being touted as the &solution8 to the transport 
crisis.  He emphasized that the tax is 3% on net sales, not 
on profits, explained that his profit margin over sales was 
in fact just 3% last year, so it is in effect a 100% tax on 
profits, and complained that the GON and FSLN each claimed 
the other was responsible for the situation.  Though both the 
PLC and Camino Cristiano,s Reverend Osorno had assured him 
there were not enough votes in the Assembly to pass the law, 
Fuentes was unhappy that the GON had allowed the FSLN to take 
the issue as far as it had gone.  Comment: The final 
agreement containing the profit tax proposal was signed by 
CC,s Delia Arellano as well as Alternativa Cristiana deputy 
Orlando Tardencilla (the Assembly,s Herty supporter, and at 
one time a nominal member of the pro-Bolanos Blue and White 
bloc).  A bill proposing the tax was submitted to the 
Assembly February 15, signed by Tardencilla, Arellano, FSLN 
deputy Edwin Castro, and APRE,s Miguel Lopez Baldizon.  The 
bill will be sent to the Economic Committee, whose chairman, 
PLC deputy Wilfredo Navarro, has already expressed 
opposition.  The ALN-PC has also come out publicly against 
the idea.  End comment. 
 
3. (C) Fuentes shared figures on his balance sheet provided 
to the tax authorities for the last three years, noting that 
this normally confidential information was about to become 
public.  His profit margin was 5% in 2003 ($9 million), 1% in 
2004 ($2.9 million), and 3% in 2005 ($11.1 million); he 
expected the margin to remain at approximately 3% for 2006. 
He stressed that Esso was already offering bus owners a 2 
cordoba discount on gasoline and a 1 cordoba discount on 
diesel at the pumps, money which comes out of company 
pockets.  He also questioned the 20 million cordobas/month 
which the transport cartel claims to require to maintain bus 
fares at their current 2.50 cordobas, since on the basis of 
their daily fuel consumption, the subsidy required should be 
on the order of 8-9 million cordobas/month.  Comment:  this 
tracks with other reports that the transport cooperatives 
overstate the number of units actually on the roads, and 
feeds general suspicion that the bus owners are funneling the 
money into FSLN coffers or their own pockets. 
 
4. (C) Fuentes also shared a suspicion that perhaps the FSLN, 
which allowed Esso to operate the refinery during the 1980s, 
now wants to force the parent corporation to pull out of 
Nicaragua in order to free up the refinery for the 
Venezuelans.  He pointed out that during the strike, many 
ordinary Nicaraguans were forced to pay extra for transport 
to work, and had in fact laid out more than the difference 
between the current fare and the &market8 rate would amount 
to over a four-month period. 
 
5. (C) After the meeting, DCM contacted Presidential 
Secretary Leonardo Somarriba to reiterate our unhappiness 
with the proposed anti-business measure.  Somarriba attempted 
to justify the GON,s action by pointing out that the GON had 
not endorsed the confiscatory tax; indeed, they had insisted 
on rewriting the February 13 agreement from its initial draft 
so that it was clear that the tax was an initiative of the 
legislators and the GON had only committed to assist in 
importing new buses and signed on to a call for an audit of 
what had been done with previous subsidies.  He added that he 
expected the bill to die in the Assembly, in which case the 
GON would have to deal with the problem at a later date. 
 
7. (C) Econ Counselor consulted local IMF resrep Humberto 
(&Tito8) Arbulu on the Fund,s views of the GON,s options. 
 Arbulu said that of course the law was a terrible idea, but 
that the Fund would not have independent grounds to object if 
the GON insisted this was the only way to keep within the 
public expenditure ceiling agreed to in the IMF program.  He 
said that the IMF program did not incorporate any specific 
GON commitments to refrain from further transportation 
subsidies (there is a commitment to allow electricity rates 
to rise and avoid further subsidies), though the GON had made 
its own public commitment during the last transportation 
crisis of September 2005 that there would be no more money 
given to transport groups.  The IMF program does contain a 
commitment to amend the Energy Stability law in order to 
eliminate market distortions (including calls to regulate the 
fuel market); however, the deadline for this action is the 
August review, and the GON could argue that the &temporary8 
confiscatory tax on oil company profits, while clearly a step 
backward, would expire before the deadline. 
 
8. (C) Arbulu said that, within the limits of agreed overall 
spending, and commitments to maintain the level of social 
spending, the GON would be free to rearrange its priorities 
to grant a further transport subsidy.  However, acceding to 
such a request would open the floodgates to other requests, 
including demands to increase salaries for teachers and 
health workers (in the case of salaries, however, there is a 
commitment not to increase the total wage bill, so any 
increase for teachers or health workers should be compensated 
by cuts in other salary accounts).  The IMF would object to 
subsidizing the transport companies by waiving fuel taxes 
(ISC) for buses for four months (a suggestion of Fuentes), as 
this would create a breach in the GON,s revenue targets. 
 
9. (C) Arbulu had no confidence in the arrival of the 
promised new buses; there has been talk of new units for 
years and none have appeared.  He also said that he would not 
place too much confidence in the PLC,s declared hostility to 
the legislation:  one phone call from Ortega to PLC leader 
Aleman and the PLC deputies could well execute a 180-degree 
turn on this issue.  Arbulu appeared perturbed that the GON 
-- specifically Finance Minister Arana who should be the 
GON,s voice of reason on economic matters --  had not come 
out publicly against the tax, and that Arana had actually 
been quoted in the press to the effect that if the Assembly 
passed the bill, the GON would have to implement it.  Such 
GON passivity implies that the executive has ceded economic 
policy to the Assembly.  Arbulu said that, judging by recent 
experience, the way to stop the tax bill would be to take it 
to the National Dialogue (Comment:  of course, the February 
13 political deal was taken in the context of a session that 
very much resembled the Dialogue). 
 
10.  (C)  Comment:  We agree that the PLC's declared 
opposition to this offensive bill could prove a weak reed. 
We understand that the GON does not want to create more 
problems for itself, but we will continue to urge the 
executive to take a responsible stance in the face of blatant 
confiscatory legislation pushed by the FSLN, if only to force 
the aggressively partisan Managua mayor to assume the 
solution of the problems he himself created by blocking 
justifiable fare increases with a threat of violent protests 
from Sandinista-inspired student groups while simultaneously 
urging further subsidies for the anti-competitive 
FSLN-dominated transport collectives. 
TRIVELLI