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Viewing cable 06MANAGUA344, GOVERNMENT, PRIVATE SECTOR AND UNIONS BATTLE FOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MANAGUA344 2006-02-13 14:15 2011-06-21 08:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Managua
VZCZCXYZ0011
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0344/01 0441415
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 131415Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5274
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS MANAGUA 000344 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR FOR ILAB 
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO USTR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ELAB EFIN PGOV PREL ETRD KTEX NU
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT, PRIVATE SECTOR AND UNIONS BATTLE FOR 
CONTROL OF CAFTA TRADE PREFERENCE LEVEL (TPL) QUOTAS 
 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Nicaragua's government, private sector, 
and unions all realize that the preferential Tariff 
Preference Levels (TPLs) for textiles accorded to the country 
in the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) mean 
money and power, and they are engaged in an ongoing struggle 
to determine who will allocate the TPLs, and in what manner. 
Fears of government bias and corruption in TPL distribution 
are widespread, but so far no one has provided any proof of 
official wrongdoing, nor concrete analysis that the private 
sector could do a better job.  However, given Nicaragua's 
weak democratic institutions, the potential for corruption in 
TPLs is significant.  END SUMMARY. 
 
FACTORY OWNERS AND UNIONS WORRIED ABOUT BIASED GON TPL 
DISTRIBUTION 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2. (SBU) During a February 8 visit by laboff to the 
Korean-owned free trade zone factory Guanica in Diriamba, 
both company managers and union representatives expressed 
concerns regarding the government's pending allocation of the 
special textile TPLs given Nicaragua by CAFTA.  These treaty 
provisions will allow Nicaragua to ship 100 million SME 
(Square Meter Equivalents) in textiles made from components 
sourced from any non-U.S. or CAFTA country per year duty 
free.  Echoing comments that emboffs have heard from others 
in the private sector, most notably the association of free 
trade zone textile manufacturers (ANITEC), union leaders and 
company managers at Guanica complained that the government is 
preparing to distribute these TPLs in a non-transparent, 
biased manner. 
 
3. (SBU) Specifically, post interlocutors allege that the 
GON,s free trade zone corporation, which is managing the 
TPLs and insists it will do so fairly, plans to provide 
excessive TPL quotas to companies with strong political 
connections (especially Taiwanese-owned companies) at the 
expense of others (including Korean-owned companies). 
Factory managers at Guanica said they fear losing business as 
a result, while union leaders are worried that large TPLs 
will go to companies with poor labor rights records (many of 
which are Taiwanese), while factories with better labor 
situations will be disadvantaged because of a lack of 
political connections. 
 
TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS CLAIM PRIVATE SECTOR CAN BETTER 
ALLOCATE TPLS, BUT FAIL TO PROVIDE ANY EVIDENCE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
4. (SBU) ANITEC has alleged that if the government, and not 
the private sector, manages the TPLs, the process will be 
thoroughly corrupt.  During a December meeting, ANITEC 
President Carlos Sandino told emboffs that his organization 
could distribute TPLs in a more equitable and transparent 
manner than the government, and he urged the Embassy to 
support ANITEC,s position with the GON.  ANITEC 
representatives told emboffs repeatedly that the Mexican 
experience with public management of TPLs had been rife with 
corruption.  When emboffs requested documentation of that 
assertion, and available analysis demonstrating that private 
sector administration would be superior, ANITEC officials 
promised to document their claims, but none of the requested 
analysis has ever arrived at the Embassy. 
 
5. (SBU) ANITEC has also failed to deliver any research 
demonstrating that the proposed TPL split between existing 
and new investments (70  - 30) meets economic development 
objectives based on market and employment projections. 
According to ANITEC and GON sources, the TPL split represents 
a compromise acceptable to both the public and private 
sectors.  Finally, on February 6, in response to repeated 
Embassy requests for documentation of ANITEC's various 
assertions, econoff received a vague e-mail communication 
from the association claiming that an "accommodation" of the 
various private and public sector interests associated with 
the administration of the TPLs had been reached. 
 
6. (SBU) Throughout the local debate, emboffs have emphasized 
that the TPLs were included in the CAFTA-DR agreement for 
Nicaragua as a special economic development tool to spur 
investment and associated job creation, mindful of the fact 
that Nicaragua's textile sector is appreciably smaller than 
those in neighboring countries.  Emboffs have also indicated 
that the USG believes that the TPL percentage split between 
new and existing investments should be equitable and support 
economic development objectives by allowing for the 
introduction of diverse lines, making the sector more 
sustainable.  Administration of the TPLs should also be as 
transparent and efficient as possible. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
7. (SBU) Government, business, and unions all realize that 
Nicaragua,s special CAFTA TPLs mean money and power, and all 
want as much say as possible in their distribution.  Given 
the country's weak democratic institutions, the potential for 
TPL-fueled corruption and influence peddling is significant, 
regardless of who ultimately makes the decisions on TPL 
allocation. 
TRIVELLI