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Viewing cable 06LIMA461, BRAZILIAN PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06LIMA461 2006-02-03 18:48 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Lima
VZCZCXYZ0257
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPE #0461/01 0341848
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 031848Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8569
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2932
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 9027
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ FEB QUITO 9988
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0154
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6490
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 8856
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 1435
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2229
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4099
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 000461 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SNAR BR PE
SUBJECT: BRAZILIAN PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR 
MARCO AURELIO GARCIA'S VISIT TO PERU 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Alexander Margulies. 
Reason: 1.4(b/d). 
 
---------- 
SUMMARY 
---------- 
 
1.  (C)  Brazilian presidential foreign policy advisor Marco 
Aurelio Garcia visited Peru the week of 1/30, meeting with 
President Alejandro Toledo; Foreign Minister Oscar Maurtua 
and other Foreign Ministry officials; Andean Community 
Secretary General Allan Wagner; leading presidential 
 
SIPDIS 
candidates Lourdes Flores, Ollanta Humala, Alan Garcia and 
Valentin Paniagua (all of whom he invited to visit Brazil for 
meetings with President Lula); and Congressman and long-shot 
presidential candidate Javier Diez Canseco.  According to 
Foreign Ministry and Brazilian Embassy sources, Humala is the 
only presidential candidate certain to visit Lula; Garcia's 
meeting with GOP officials concentrated on advancing the 
South American Community of Nations (CASA) in the face of 
serious internal difficulties within its component bodies the 
Andean Community of Nations (CAN) and MERCOSUR, as well as on 
providing Brazil's positive assessment of Evo Morales' 
prospects in Bolivia, its relative non-concern with the 
threat of increased coca cultivation there, and its interest 
in improved Peruvian-Chilean relations.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C)  On 2/2, Polcouns met with Foreign Ministry Under 
Secretary for the Americas Pablo Portugal, North American 
 
SIPDIS 
Affairs Director Nestor Popolizio, and U.S. Desk Officer 
Victor Altamirano, while Deputy Polcouns met with Brazilian 
Poloff Ademar Cruz, to discuss the recent visit of Brazilian 
presidential foreign policy advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia, 
particularly Garcia's invitation to Ollanta Humala, and the 
other three leading candidates, to visit Brazil for meetings 
with Lula.  U/S Portugal noted that Garcia, on the margins of 
the World Social Forum in Caracas, had asked Peru's 
Ambassador to Venezuela to help set up a follow-on visit to 
Peru for meetings with the top presidential contenders. 
Garcia also met with President Toledo, Foreign Minister 
Maurtua, Congressman Diez Canseco, a long-time personal 
friend of Garcia and Lula, and CAN SecGen Wagner. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS 
----------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C)  Brazilian Embassy Poloff Cruz said that Garcia was 
impressed that all of the leading presidential candidates 
tended to be analytical in their comments, and in many ways 
agreed in their assessments of the race.  Garcia invited all 
of them to meet with Lula in Brazil, but only Humala accepted 
outright.  Cruz then described Garcia's meetings with each 
candidate as follows: 
 
--  Lourdes Flores (Unidad Nacional):  There was not much out 
of the ordinary in the meeting with Flores; she did not/not 
talk about campaign strategy or financing.  She did go to 
great lengths to praise APRA candidate Alan Garcia and his 
contributions to the country; so much so that the Brazilian 
Embassy has concluded that there is an APRA-Unidad Nacional 
alliance for the second round, assuming that Garcia and 
Flores are not facing each other in the run-off.  (NOTE: 
Flores, on 2/2, said that she would not/not visit Lula, since 
"political debates should take place in Peru," and as a trip 
would take her away from the campaign.  END NOTE). 
 
--  Ollanta Humala (Union por el Peru):  The meeting with 
Humala took place at the candidate's house.  Humala was late, 
but his wife Nadine entertained the Brazilians graciously 
prior to his arrival.  Humala himself was very polite, 
upright and not at all a firebrand.  He went to great lengths 
to portray his views as sincerely nationalistic with abiding 
social concerns.  Humala expressed the desire to peacefully 
co-exist with both Brazil and the U.S.  He claimed to have 
plenty of financial support, which he said came from the 
business community.  Humala was very anxious to make the trip 
to Brasilia.  (COMMENT:  Cruz said that the Brazilian Embassy 
is concerned about how to handle the visit if Humala is the 
 
only one who meets with Lula.  END COMMENT). 
 
--  Alan Garcia (APRA):  Alan Garcia was not as upbeat as 
usual and seemed frustrated about his stagnation in the 
polls.  He did try to make the case about a "hidden" APRA 
electorate.  Otherwise he was his usual self, lauding the 
Lula government, the strategic Peru-Brazil partnership, and 
"typically" saying what he thought the Brazilians would want 
to hear. 
 
--  Valentin Paniagua (Centrist Front):  Paniagua was his 
usual professorial self, and the Brazilians do not/not see 
him as being a factor in the race. 
 
4.  (C)  Portugal provided the following assessment on Marco 
Aurelio Garcia's debriefing of Foreign Ministry officials on 
his meetings with the four presidential contenders: 
 
--  The Brazilian Government is very concerned about 
political, economic and social tensions in the region, and 
has decided to take a more active role. 
 
--  Brazil is not/not looking to exert leadership, but rather 
to play a constructive role by engaging in enhanced dialogue 
with political forces throughout South America.  This 
enhanced dialogue will also keep the GOB better informed, and 
thus in a better position to adjust its policies and actions 
as necessary. 
 
--  The GOB disapproves of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's 
actions that promote "intranquility" in the region, and 
disagree with Chavez's assessment that the countries belong 
to different "axis."  Instead, Brazil will push for South 
American integration, not division, viewing its role as that 
of a stabilizer, helping to glue the continent together in 
all respects. 
 
--  Following the uncertainties surrounding the election of 
Evo Morales in Bolivia, Brazil considers the Peruvian 
election to be key to preserving democratic stability and 
processes in the Andes.  Peru's importance is the reason why 
Chavez has intervened with his statements promoting Humala's 
candidacy and attacking Flores.  Morales also favors Humala, 
although he has been more cautious than Chavez in expressing 
his preference. 
 
--  Brazil's message to the four candidates has been to 
emphasize respect for democratic processes, as well as on the 
need to maintain governability following the election and the 
inauguration of the next government. 
 
----------------------------------- 
SOUTH AMERICAN COMMUNITY OF NATIONS 
----------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C)  According to U/S Portugal, Garcia's meetings with 
GOP officials focused on the future of the South American 
Community of Nations (CASA).  Portugal then provided the 
following read-out on those talks, at times requesting 
Altamirano to read verbatim from the Foreign Ministry's 
memcon on the Garcia-Maurtua meeting, to clarify specific 
points: 
 
--  Garcia has been chosen by Lula as Brazil's representative 
on the CASA Committee on Strategic Reflexion, which is soon 
to commence discussion on designing CASA's final 
institutional profile.  Chavez has named Integration Minister 
Gustavo Marquez to this committee, while Toledo has yet to 
decide between several qualified candidates. 
 
--  Brazil recognizes that for CASA to progress, its two 
component parts -- the Andean Community (CAN) and MERCOSUR -- 
must be stabilized.  It also recognizes that the CAN is in 
crisis due to Chavez's antics (Garcia recommended that the 
GOP just ignore his diatribes, adding that Lula has privately 
helped to rein-in the Venezuelan leader on this score), while 
MERCOSUR has serious internal problems due to the unhappiness 
of Paraguay and Uruguay, who believe that they are not 
getting a fair shake. 
 
--  The discussions on CASA concentrated on promoting all 
members' political buy-in on the organization; developing 
"innovative financing mechanisms," including private-sector 
participation, in order to pay for infrastructure 
integration, implement the CASA social agenda (a must if 
Venezuela's Chavez and Uruguay's Tabare Vasquez are to be 
brought on board), develop energy sources and connections, 
and promote air and maritime transportation. 
 
--  Brazil and Peru agree that Chavez's proposed Banco del 
Sur should not/not be relied on by CASA, but rather that the 
Andean Development Fund (CAF) should be strengthened and 
enhanced in order to channel these "innovative financing 
mechanisms." 
 
---------- 
BOLIVIA 
---------- 
 
6.  (C)  According to U/S Portugal, Garcia said that his 
meetings with Evo Morales and other Bolivian officials on the 
margins of Morales' inauguration went very well.  He said 
that Morales was impressed with Petrobras' importance to the 
Bolivian economy, as well as with its multi-billion dollar 
investment plans there, and wanted to work with the Brazilian 
oil giant.  Garcia stressed to the Peruvians that the 
Brazilian Government recognizes the absolute democratic 
legitimacy of Morales' government, is impressed by Morales' 
support in Congress, and believes that Morales has the 
democratic mandate to go ahead with a constituent assembly. 
 
7.  (C)  Foreign Minister Maurtua, U/S Portugal said, raised 
the prospect of increased coca cultivation in Morales' 
Bolivia, noting that most Bolivian cocaine is bound for 
Brazil.  Garcia responded, U/S Portugal related, by 
acknowledging this fact, but then minimized its importance 
claiming that most of this cocaine in not/not consumed in 
Brazil, but transits the country en route to Europe and 
Africa.  Garcia then added that he had warned Morales that 
the Bolivian leader had to confront narcotraffickers or they 
would destroy his presidency. 
 
---------- 
CHILE 
---------- 
 
8.  (C)  Garcia, U/S Popolizio stated, was hopeful that 
relations between Peru and Chile would improve following the 
inauguration of Michelle Bachelet and expressed interest in 
the ongoing dispute over maritime boundaries.  Foreign 
Minister Maurtua replied that bilateral ties are moving 
forward, that Peru views the maritime boundary problem as a 
legal and not a political issue, and, consequently, that the 
GOP plans to take this issue to the International Court of 
Justice and will not/not treat it as a political issue. 
STRUBLE