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Viewing cable 06LAPAZ443, CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY: EYE ON THE PRIZE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06LAPAZ443 2006-02-21 17:56 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy La Paz
VZCZCXYZ0014
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLP #0443/01 0521756
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 211756Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8146
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 5618
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2884
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6757
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 3979
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1327
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 1226
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 3579
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 8481
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
UNCLAS LA PAZ 000443 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR FOR WHA A/S SHANNON AND P/DAS SHAPIRO 
NSC FOR DFISK 
USINCSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SOCI PGOV BL
SUBJECT: CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY: EYE ON THE PRIZE 
 
REF: LA PAZ 336 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary: The Constituent Assembly (CA) is shaping 
up to be Bolivia's grand political prize and the Evo Morales 
administration has devoted itself almost exclusively to 
passing legislation assuring near total control of the 
process to the MAS (the governing party), including with 
threats of social pressure.  Meanwhile, the opposition in 
Congress and the regions has sought to generate alternative 
projects and to prolong the debate -- to better the chances 
for a balanced outcome.  Whether the CA will simply revise 
the existing constitution or else (more ambitiously) 
"refound" the Bolivian state is a central question; the 
answer will turn on who is in charge.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) Long a large but undefined project looming on the 
political horizon, with some claiming it alone could repair 
Bolivia's fraying social consensus and others fearing it 
would inevitably fracture fragile national unity, the 
Constituent Assembly (CA) is now shaping up to be Bolivia's 
grand political prize.  Many observers see it as the crucial 
second step in a two-step process that began with the 
December 18 national elections.  Some believe its importance 
will dwarf that of the elections.  In concrete terms, 
controlling the CA could mean shaping Bolivia's political, 
social and economic direction for the next generation. 
 
3.  (SBU) These potentially stratospheric stakes explain why 
the government has devoted itself to passing its legislative 
proposal for the CA as quickly as possible, to the near 
exclusion of any other activity.  Many observers have 
commented that, apart from a few symbolic pronouncements 
(such as the public austerity plan, not yet approved by 
Congress), top government officials have done little else but 
campaign for the Assembly.  Moreover, the government's 
legislative proposal - three representatives per 
constituency, with candidates achieving more than 50% 
sweeping all three seats (ref) - seems designed to ensure 
that the MAS wins the two-thirds majority it will need to 
control the process outright.  On February 15, President 
Morales again publicly threatened to lead protest marches 
against the Congress should it fail to approve the 
government's proposal.  According to news reports, MAS 
legislators (who now have the power to do such things) set 
February 20 as the deadline to receive additional legislative 
proposals, a clear attempt to accelerate the process or at 
least to avoid prolonging it.  To many observers, the 
government is in a hurry because it wants to capitalize on 
its momentum out of the elections and its near 75% popular 
support in recent polls. 
 
4.  (SBU) Meanwhile, the opposition in Congress and the 
regions has tried to slow the process down.  Many observers 
believe that the longer the initial debate, the more the 
Bolivian people will become aware of the diverse alternatives 
and of the dangers of a MAS monopoly of power, the more 
likely the government's inflated popularity will drop, and 
therefore the better the odds that a politically balanced CA 
can emerge.  Civic leaders from Tarija, Beni and Pando have 
threatened that their departments will boycott the Assembly 
if Congress fails to consider their proposals, which call for 
representation primarily by region rather than by legislative 
constituency.  Other regional groups, including from Santa 
Cruz, have given their congressional representatives 
alternative proposals for Congress's consideration.  Some 
opposition legislators have told us that they might push 
proposals that feature corporatist representation, 
particularly for indigenous peoples, but largely for tactical 
(rather than ideological) reasons -- to attract the support 
of social sector and indigenous groups who oppose the 
government's proposal because it does not include such 
representation.  We have heard that congress has received as 
many as 12 legislative proposals so far. 
 
5.  (SBU) One central question relates to the scope and 
limits of the CA; that is, whether it will be simply 
"derivative," and seek to revise the existing constitution, 
or else "originary," a much more ambitious effort to clean 
the slate, restructure the Bolivian state and even "refound" 
Bolivian society as a whole.  The answer to this question 
will turn on who ends up controlling the CA process, probably 
the most crucial matter of all.  Ricardo Paz, a vociferous 
proponent of a CA ("as long as it's well done") told us 
recently that the government's proposal is designed 
exclusively to secure its hold on power, which, he mused, was 
not supposed to be the point at all.  Should that happen, the 
government will be able to do just about whatever it pleases 
-- at least in theory. 
GREENLEE