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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM487, Southern Sudan: Meeting with GoSS President's

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM487 2006-02-25 14:21 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO8824
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0487/01 0561421
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 251421Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1622
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0016
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000487 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINS MOPS PREL SU
SUBJECT:  Southern Sudan: Meeting with GoSS President's 
Advisors 
 
 
1. (U) SUMMARY:  On February 21, CG Juba met with 
Presidential Advisors for Legal Affairs Paul Mayom and 
Gender Affairs Awut Deng.  Mayom offered his views on GoSS 
priorities; following discussions ranged over alleged 
northern support of the Lord's Resistance Army, U.S. 
sanctions on Sudan, and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA).  Mayom briefly addressed the White Nile Ltd. vs. 
Total controversy, expressing his view that a partition of 
Super Block B was the correct solution.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------ 
SPLM/A to Remain GoSS Mainstay 
------------------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) Mayom offered a blueprint for how the South could 
succeed, beginning with a strengthened SPLM at the center. 
He said that the SPLM remained and would remain the mainstay 
for the GoSS for the foreseeable future and that it was 
essential to create functional institutions that could 
deliver palpable peace dividends to the population.  Absent 
this, popular dissatisfaction with the establishment would 
grow, and there would be no alternate political force to 
govern the South.  He stressed that the GoSS needed to 
simultaneously strengthen the SPLA.  The military was 
responsible for security across a vast stretch of territory 
and had to remain vigilant that old foes did not attempt to 
once again destabilize and fan conflict. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
Views on the LRA and Means of Addressing its Threat 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
3. (SBU) CG cited Salva Kiir's public statement about 
continued northern support for the LRA and asked if this 
represented a change of view within the GoSS.  Mayom 
responded that the North had brought the LRA into Southern 
Sudan on the pretext that Kampala supported the SPLA, and 
there was still evidence that northern support continued. 
Kiir's comments were simply an affirmation of the facts.  CG 
recalled Kiir's formula for dealing with the LRA - 
disarmament and pacification, return to Uganda, or a 
military solution - and noted that none of these seemed 
underway.  Mayom replied that the GoSS preferred option was 
its stated intention to facilitate a negotiated settlement 
between the LRA and the Ugandan Government that was not 
dissimilar to the peace deal between north and south Sudan. 
The GoSS remained hopeful this could still occur. 
 
4. (SBU) If it did not, he continued, two options remained. 
The second most favorable in the GoSS view was the return of 
the LRA to pursue its war in Uganda, since the LRA stated 
raison d'etre was to fight for the people of northern 
Uganda, not against Southern Sudan.  The least desirable 
option was a resort to arms.  The GoSS was aware that the 
pursuit and destruction of LRA elements in Southern Sudan, 
especially children pressed into arms by the LRA, would 
generate adverse international publicity. 
 
5. (SBU) CG countered that the LRA was having a 
disproportionately negative impact on the attempt to 
stabilize and develop the South.  How long could the GoSS 
let this persist?  Mayom replied that the CPA has a fixed 
deadline for the departure of Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) 
forces from the South and the deployment of Joint Integrated 
Units (JIUs) with mixed SAF/SPLA elements.  With the SAF and 
northern military intelligence personnel no longer on the 
ground to harbor and supply the LRA, a SPLA military 
solution would not be difficult. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
U.S. Sanctions: Unfair to Punish South for Actions of North 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
6. (SBU) CG said that he had heard a range of opinions on 
U.S. sanctions in prior meeting with GoSS officials and 
would appreciate a clear statement of GoSS policy.  Mayom 
replied that it remained exactly what Kiir had stated in 
Washington in November.  Given the war in Darfur and 
northern aggression in the East, the SPLM and GoSS could not 
morally call for a lifting of sanctions, even if the SPLM 
was a partner in government.  However, it was unfair to 
punish the South for actions of the North in which the South 
was no way involved, and thus sanctions should be lifted in 
the South to help promote recovery and development. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
CPA and Clarification of USG Objectives in So. Sudan 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000487  002 OF 002 
 
 
7. (SBU) Mayom said that he would appreciate an equally 
clear statement of USG policy toward Southern Sudan - what 
exactly did the USG seek?  CG responded that we remain 
committed to the CPA as the negotiated, mutually acceptable 
framework to maintain peace between the North and South, and 
we want both sides to respect their implementation 
commitments.  We also see an essential role for the SPLM, as 
a partner in government, in working to achieve a negotiated 
peace in Darfur and the East.  Without peace in all of 
Sudan, stability and democratic transformation would be 
challenged throughout. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Oil Controversy Continues:  White Nile vs. Total 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
8. (SBU) CG asked if Mayom could supply any information on 
the resolution of the controversy over who retained 
petroleum rights in what parts of Super Block B (Central) in 
the South.  Mayom launched into a long retrospective and 
eventually came to the point that the best solution would be 
a partition of the block between various groups.  He 
stressed that there were legal irregularities in the 
signature of the revised 2004 contract between Total and the 
GOS just prior to the signature of the CPA, a concession 
that Total had abandoned for twenty years, thus violating 
the terms of the initial contract.  He described the 
arrangement between White Nile (WNL) and Nilepet as more 
equitable to the South and invited comments from Awut Deng, 
one of the original board members appointed to Nilepet in 
2004.  She offered none.  Mayom said that huge concessions 
of this sort were an anachronism and that smaller blocks 
should be granted to a range of companies, including 
Chevron, if it remained interested. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
9. (SBU) This is the first time that we have heard a GoSS 
official suggest that the SPLA will wait until the SAF has 
completely withdrawn to take on the LRA, and cannot say if 
this is official thinking or Mayom's personal view.  Two 
years would be a long wait.  Mayom is known to be a strong 
supporter of WNL. 
 
10. (SBU) Salva Kiir's public statement in Juba on February 
21 in advance of his departure for Khartoum appeared to be 
walking back to some degrees his accusation of northern 
support for the LRA. 
 
--------- 
Bio Notes 
--------- 
 
11. (SBU) A Dinka from Bahr el Ghazal, Mayom was a trusted 
lieutenant of John Garang and was the first senior southern 
to advance to Khartoum after the signature of the CPA, to 
open the SPLM office there.  A lawyer by training, he has 
had numerous positions in the movement.  Although he serves 
as Kiir's advisor, he was reportedly at odds with Kiir 
during Kiir's confrontation with Garang in late 2004. 
 
HUME