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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM291, Sudan: Government-Imposed Impediments to

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM291 2006-02-07 14:59 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO8613
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0291/01 0381459
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 071459Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1328
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000291 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AF/EA, DCHA 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
USMISSION UN ROME 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR JMELINE, TSHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI KAWC SU
SUBJECT:  Sudan:  Government-Imposed Impediments to 
Humanitarian Assistance 
 
REF:   Khartoum 0149 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in 
Darfur are becoming increasingly frustrated by Sudanese 
government Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) procedures 
on reporting, hiring, permits, and visas.  The Technical 
Coordination Committee, which was formed to monitor the 
implementation of the "fast-track system," no longer 
meets, and the U.N. has not engaged donors on this issue 
as it had in 2004 and 2005.  The increasing number of 
restrictions, combined with the insecurity in the region 
(reported septels), is slowly but steadily eroding 
humanitarian space and capacity in Darfur. 
2.  These constraints gradually reduce the ability of 
NGOs to deliver services in Darfur in an efficient 
manner.  Added to this is the closing of humanitarian 
space owing to insecurity (reported in septels). 
Humanitarian actors in Darfur believe we are returning to 
the situation as it was in 2004, when the humanitarian 
community was blocked from delivering services to war 
victims in Darfur.  As reported reftel, the U.S. Charge 
d'Affaires met with the Government of National Unity 
(GNU) Minister of Humanitarian Affairs and HAC 
Commissioner regarding many of the challenges to the 
humanitarian community outlined here.  Post will raise 
these issues yet again with the HAC and Ministry of 
Humanitarian Affairs.  On February 7, post sent a letter 
signed by the USAID Senior Humanitarian Affairs Advisor 
to the HAC Commissioner urging action on particular 
issues concerning HAC impediments to the work of the 
humanitarian community in Sudan.  However, the U.N. also 
needs to show leadership on this issue by reforming the 
donor principals group to advocate on these issues with 
the government.  End Summary. 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
3.  Since the surge in humanitarian needs in 2004, a 
continuing dialogue has been occurring with the 
Government of Sudan (GOS), and now the Government of 
National Unity (GNU), regarding humanitarian access in 
Darfur.  In 2004, the GOS dragged its feet on permitting 
new NGOs to come to Sudan to work in Darfur because of 
the military operations that were underway at the time. 
Following very heavy diplomatic pressure from a strong 
donor principals group, a special status known as "the 
fast track system" was negotiated for NGOs coming to 
operate in Darfur.  This system imposed a moratorium on a 
number of procedures that normally could take up to a 
year to accomplish, if an NGO followed the normal 
application process to work in Sudan.  The moratorium 
authorized the following:  (a) immediate accreditation to 
work in Darfur (only); (b) visas within 48 hours issued 
at all Sudanese embassies around the world, limited to 
validity of three months; (c) expedited handling of all 
requests for importation of project supplies for Darfur; 
and (d) rapid customs clearance of drugs imported for 
health programs and limited sample testing in order to 
maximize shelf life in the field. 
 
----------------- 
Visa Restrictions 
----------------- 
 
4.  Since that time, the government has maintained the 
three-month visa system despite efforts by the U.N. to 
obtain one-year visas for humanitarian workers in Darfur. 
The current moratorium for Darfur expired on December 31, 
but was extended until January 31 in view of the end of 
year holiday season.  All NGOs therefore had to renew 
their employees' visas on January 31.  Some staff who 
were out of the country on that date are now having 
difficulty obtaining re-entry visas.  It is worth noting 
that visa renewal costs USD 240.  With approximately 
 
KHARTOUM 00000291  002 OF 003 
 
 
1,000 relief workers in Darfur, this is a significant 
source of income for the HAC. 
 
5.  Development Alternatives, Inc (DAI), the implementing 
partner of USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives 
(USAID/OTI), has been unable to obtain a one-year visa 
for its chief of party, an Irish national, much less a 
three-month renewable visa under the Darfur practice. 
Another expatriate staff member, a U.S. national, has 
been denied a visa to return to Sudan.  The Embassy and 
USAID have raised this issue with the authorities, but 
with no positive results to date other than the issuance 
of a work permit for the chief of party, which is useless 
without a visa. 
 
------------------------------- 
HAC Involvement in Staff Hiring 
------------------------------- 
 
6.  The most intrusive of HAC policies, and the one to 
which NGOs object the most, relates to the level of HAC 
involvement in staff recruitment.  All hiring must go 
through the HAC.  When an NGO wishes to advertise an 
opening, the HAC must first approve, the NGO must pay a 
fee, and the HAC posts the job.  Applicants submit their 
paperwork to the HAC, not to the hiring NGO.  The HAC 
sets a review date, sometimes several months after the 
job has been posted.  The NGO comes to the HAC office to 
review the applications, many of which have been 
misplaced or confused with other NGOs' applications.  The 
HAC selects the individuals it deems most qualified for 
the jobs and very frequently attempts to dismiss the CVs 
selected by the NGO.  If the NGO rejects one candidate 
that the HAC wants, the HAC usually slips the CV back in 
at the bottom of the pile to be reviewed again. 
Southerners who attempt to submit applications are often 
eliminated immediately because they have not fulfilled 
the military service "requirement" in the north. 
Diaspora applicants, particularly southerners, withdraw 
their applications when they learn that the HAC will be 
screening them. 
 
7.  Following this lengthy screening process, the HAC 
selects a date for interviews, again, often several 
months away (due to the "workload" at the HAC).  Usually, 
the NGOs tell us, only one or two of the applicants show 
up on the appointed day.  All interviews are conducted on 
the HAC premises, with no opportunity for NGOs to 
interview candidates in private.  NGOs are also unable to 
contact applicants themselves, because the HAC does not 
show them the applications.  (Comment:  At times, NGOs 
have been able to "read" phone numbers from the 
applications, most often those belonging to applicants 
who failed to come for their interviews and are often the 
candidates the NGOs prefer to hire.  When NGOs have 
contacted these candidates, they have learned that the 
HAC never invited them to an interview.  End comment.) 
The HAC schedules a second round of interviews and, 
again, only a few candidates show up.  The interview 
process is accordingly lengthy, while this cat and mouse 
game with the HAC is played.  One NGO reported that it 
took five months to hire a cashier. 
 
8.  NGOs must inform the HAC of expatriates who are 
arriving in the country.  It is not unusual - indeed it 
was frequent during the early days of the Darfur crisis - 
for the HAC to refuse an expatriate NGO employee a work 
permit on the pretext that a Sudanese member of staff can 
do the job adequately.  An NGO recently had this problem 
with technical staff in water and sanitation.  It makes 
it difficult to meet the HAC's requirement for "capacity 
building" if NGOs cannot bring in experts capable of 
training national staff, or local organizations which 
might work with the NGO. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
New Reporting Requirements Linked to Travel Permits 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
9.  Beginning in late 2004, the HAC insisted that all 
 
KHARTOUM 00000291  003 OF 003 
 
 
NGOs submit reports on their activities in Darfur, as 
they are required to do for work elsewhere in the 
country.  These reports are submitted monthly and provide 
the key information about NGO activities.  Often, they 
are nearly the same reports submitted to donors, but the 
NGOs do not provide financial details to the HAC.  The 
HAC has also introduced a new annual reporting format 
that calls for more detailed information than required in 
the past.  NGOs object to the intrusive questions on 
finances, especially as they relate to payroll and 
salaries.  The international NGO consortium members have 
agreed to provide annual and monthly reports to the HAC, 
but have refused to provide detailed budget information. 
In the regions, HAC officials are now linking submission 
of reports by NGOs to issuance of travel permits to field 
sites.  Several NGOs that have failed to submit monthly 
or annual reports have been denied permission to travel 
to the field.  DAI's chief of party has been denied 
permission to travel outside Khartoum despite having 
submitted a report.  The HAC is demanding the financial 
details on DAI's activities. 
 
--------------------- 
Training Requirements 
--------------------- 
 
10.  For the last few years, HAC has been trying to 
broaden the role of national NGOs in the humanitarian 
response.  There is general agreement that this is a 
desirable goal, but the HAC is denying visas to some 
international staff of NGOs on the grounds that national 
staff can fill the indicated position.  International 
NGOs are objecting on the grounds that the international 
staff are needed precisely in order to train national 
staff to take a given job.  As a result, HAC has 
instituted a new system of "internships" under the guise 
of building national capacity.  HAC's real intention 
appears to be, based on a review of this issue with a 
number of NGOs, to place friends and relatives with 
organizations.  The NGO is not given the opportunity to 
select the intern or the position to be filled.  Quite by 
luck, a qualified individual may be chosen, but in most 
instances, NGOs have had to accept "interns" with 
backgrounds unsuited to the positions.  OTI's partner DAI 
has also been instructed to take on interns. 
 
HUME