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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM275, SOUTHERN SUDAN: MEETING WITH THE MINISTER OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM275 2006-02-06 13:06 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO7021
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0275/01 0371306
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 061306Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1291
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0009
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000275 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS, SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AND INL/CIV 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS KCRM ASEC EAID CG UG
SUBJECT:  SOUTHERN SUDAN:  MEETING WITH THE MINISTER OF 
POLICE AND SECURITY 
 
 
1. (U) CG Juba met with GoSS Minister of Police and Security 
Daniel Awet on February 3 to review progress in establishing 
a functional police force in Southern Sudan, and re- 
establishing security.  Awet began by discussing the 
structure of the police force in South Sudan.  There will be 
a total of 2,000 unified police, 200 for each state, that 
will remain under the direct control of the Ministry and 
take care of state to state transactions:  transfer of 
prisoners, internal investigations, etc. 
 
------------------------ 
Recruitment and Training 
------------------------ 
 
2. (U) Awet said that the GoSS has started training the 
first contingent of 300 on its own, a three-month process, 
and has requested UNMIS assistance with the remainder. 
Within a year, he hopes to have the unified force trained 
and deployed in place.  In addition, the Ministry is 
recruiting 1,800 police for each state (Note:  the actual 
populations and areas of each state vary greatly.  End 
note.), for a grand total of almost 20,000 police throughout 
the South.  Awet said that in addition to the police already 
under GoSS training, UNMIS has committed to train 500 and 
the UK has sent 200 more to Uganda for training. 
 
3. (U) Awet said that northern police officers formerly 
stationed in the South have already left for the North, and 
southern police in the North are returning, providing a core 
of trained officers.  He said that the southward transfer is 
not complete, but that the GNU had stopped paying southern 
police salaries in December.  The bulk of the southern force 
would be recruited within the ten states.  Awet said that he 
planned to recruit new people and not just demobilized SPLA 
soldiers, to help bolster the concept of rule of law among 
the police.  He listed capacity building as his ministry's 
top priority. 
 
----------------------- 
Equipment and Resources 
----------------------- 
 
4. (U) Awet listed infrastructure and equipment as next on 
the priority list.  Awet complained that the northerners did 
not leave anything behind, not even a single functioning 
vehicle.  UNDP has provided ten police sedans, one for each 
state, but the ministry alone had ten directors who need 
vehicles.  The police are still largely disarmed, a legacy 
of the past, since Khartoum had refused to arm southerners 
in the police force stationed in the South, for fear they 
would defect to the SPLA.  Awet said that the disarmament of 
civilians already underway in some areas would provide arms 
for the police. 
 
5. (U) Uniforms are also in short supply, although the 
British have promised to provide 10,000, half the total 
required.  And finally, communications are non-existent. 
Awet said the Ministry wants to procure Motorola-style 
radios for local communications and side-band UHF for state- 
to-state outreach.  He noted that these needs covered only 
the police.  The prisons and the fire brigade are also 
unequipped and under-trained. 
 
-------------------- 
Security and the LRA 
-------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Awet said that he remains very concerned about 
security conditions, including in Juba.  He said that rumors 
of a periodic LRA presence in town are true.  These 
individuals, however, are Sudanese nationals rather than 
Ugandans.  He accused hardliner elements in the North of 
continuing to recruit and pay southerners to create 
disturbances in the South.  The GoSS knows from papers found 
on dead LRA fighters, and from interrogations of captives, 
that many of these are Sudanese.  Most are Acholi, Awet 
continued, but there is a disturbing trend of Madi and Bari 
tribesman involved as well.  He said that these elements are 
not taking orders from Kony or Otti, who were on the run 
from UN justice, but rather from northern security 
officials.  Awet added that he intends to travel to Khartoum 
soon to confront El Zubier Beshir Taha, who he referred to 
as his GNU counterpart, over continued northern meddling in 
the South, and demand that Taha use his influence to stop 
this.  Awet said that due to economics and infrastructure he 
favors continued unity with the North, but only if the North 
complies with its CPA obligations and ceases to meddle. 
 
7.  (SBU) Awet said that he had reports that some LRA 
 
KHARTOUM 00000275  002 OF 002 
 
 
fighters had moved north out of DRC following the 
confrontation between the LRA and Guatemalan UN 
peacekeepers.  He said that the northward movement would 
increase when the rainy season arrives and fighters could 
move under the cover of high grasses, a tactic the SPLA had 
used in the past.  Awet said that since the LRA operated in 
groups of three to five - and never more than ten - stopping 
this infiltration would be very difficult.  Awet stated that 
he believed there are as many as 12,000 LRA in southern 
Sudan (Note:  Other sources put this number much lower.  End 
note.)  He concluded by saying he is aware that USAID could 
not engage in training and equipping police, but wondered if 
other branches of the USG might be able to assist.  Awet did 
not mention last year's INL assessment visit. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
8.  (SBU) The complicity of NIF elements from Khartoum in 
using rogue forces to sow disorder in the South is an 
article of faith among most senior GoSS officials, Awet not 
excluded.  The view that the LRA is morphing from a Ugandan 
into Sudanese force is also widely held.  To date, however, 
no one has offered conclusive evidence of Northern 
involvement, other than generalized accusations. 
 
 
-------- 
Bio Data 
-------- 
 
9.  (SBU) Awet is known as a straightforward and honest 
soldier who frankly expresses his views.  A strong supporter 
of John Garang, he was nonetheless one of the first SPLA 
insiders to challenge Garang on the decision to site the 
southern capital in Rumbek.  He was reportedly sent by 
Garang to Wau to detain Salva Kiir in November 2004, but 
ended up helping to broker the meeting in Rumbek in which 
top SPLM/A officials, including Kiir, aired their grievances 
with Garang.  Awet is said to have established cordial 
relations with Kiir.  Awet was a combatant in both Anyanya 
One and the most recent conflict, during which he was the 
senior commander in Bahr el Ghazal.  He moved his forces 
from there to support the successful SPLA attack on Torit. 
He may have attended the Sudanese Military College, but 
otherwise is not thought to have undertaken formal tertiary- 
level studies. 
 
HUME