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Viewing cable 06HANOI461, STAFFDEL GROVE DISCUSSES BILATERAL RELATIONS,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06HANOI461 2006-02-27 09:21 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Hanoi
VZCZCXRO9518
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHHI #0461/01 0580921
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 270921Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0952
INFO RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 0617
RUEHZS/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 HANOI 000461 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR H, G/TIP, INL/AAE, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OTRA PREL PHUM KIRF SNAR KWMN KCRM OMIG VM
CH, CA, BU 
SUBJECT:  STAFFDEL GROVE DISCUSSES BILATERAL RELATIONS, 
CAMBODIA AND BURMA WITH MFA 
 
HANOI 00000461  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Senior MFA officials cautioned visiting 
Senate Appropriations Committee Majority Clerk Paul Grove 
that continued USG pressure on Burma and Cambodia will only 
push those countries closer to China, and will not succeed 
in convincing them to become more responsible international 
actors.  Vietnam is extremely appreciative of USG assistance 
in combating HIV/AIDS and Avian Influenza, and believes that 
the United States has an important role to play in the 
region.  Bilateral relations between the United States and 
Vietnam are going well, but Vietnam's WTO entry is still 
under negotiation and human rights/religious freedom will 
remain a contentious issue.  End Summary. 
 
MFA AMERICAS DESK 
----------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Senate Appropriations Committee Clerk Paul Grove 
met February 20 with MFA Americas Department Deputy Director 
General Nguyen Ba Hung.  Grove had been scheduled to meet 
with DG and Assistant Minister Nguyen Duc Hung, but Hung 
canceled at the last minute due to "urgent family business." 
(Note:  AFM Hung was also unable to attend the U.S.-Vietnam 
Human Rights Dialogue and missed a reception at the 
Ambassador's residence that evening.  End Note.)  Ba Hung 
noted that the U.S.-Vietnam Human Rights Dialogue (septel) 
was ongoing in the next room; Grove responded that the 
issues of human rights and religious freedom are of great 
importance to both the Executive and Legislative branches in 
the United States. 
 
3. (SBU) Ba Hung praised the strengthened relationship 
between the United States and Vietnam in 2005, noting that 
the highlight was Prime Minister Phan Van Khai's June 2005 
visit to the United States.  2005 produced many agreements 
between the Vietnam and the United States at the government 
and business levels, and the task in 2006 is to implement 
all of these agreements.  The second task is to work to 
bring Vietnam into the WTO, a goal Vietnam wants to achieve 
this year.  There is a great deal of work to do on Vietnam's 
WTO entry, Ba Hung conceded, but signals from the United 
States appear to Vietnam to be positive, and the GVN will 
"try to respond positively" after the most recent round of 
negotiations.  Third, the GVN is preparing for the visit of 
President Bush to Vietnam in the fall of 2006.  Combined, 
these tasks represent an intensive pace of relations, he 
said. 
 
4. (SBU) Vietnam does not, at the moment, see any major 
obstacles to ongoing good relations, Ba Hung continued.  The 
ongoing Human Rights Dialogue demonstrates that both sides 
have overcome the obstacles that might prevent such a 
dialogue, and no other major political or economic issues 
appear to be insurmountable.  Of course some "working level 
difficulties" still exist, he said. 
 
5. (SBU) One of those working level difficulties is the 
ongoing negotiation for Vietnam's entry into the WTO, Ba 
Hung explained.  There has been progress:  "The U.S. 
delegation told us that before the last round of talks, we 
were 20 centimeters apart; after the talks we are only two 
centimeters apart.  We hope the next round brings us 
together."  The GVN needs to review the U.S. recommendations 
and suggestions, and the U.S. side needs to examine the GVN 
offer.  These are technical differences, he said, that do 
not rise to the title of "obstacle." 
 
6. (SBU) In the realm of political issues, there remains a 
great deal of work to be done on human rights and religious 
freedom, Ba Hung said.  "With some principled actions we 
have taken together in the last year, such as the exchange 
of letters on religious freedom between Vice Foreign 
Minister Le Van Bang and Ambassador-at-Large for Religious 
Freedom John Hanford, we have created guidelines and 
principles for our joint work and cooperation to settle 
differences on this matter," he continued.  Since that 
exchange of letters, Vietnam has done a lot, including 
improving Vietnam's legal framework for religious belief, 
creating better conditions for religious practice, and 
making a concerted effort to meet the demands of the United 
States regarding prisoners of concern.  Of course, GVN 
actions were based on a desire to improve conditions for 
Vietnamese people and had nothing to do with pressure from 
the United States or the EU; nonetheless, where possible, 
GVN leadership attempts to take into account the concerns of 
the international community and respond to those as much as 
possible.  The "as much as possible" construction means that 
we will not be able to satisfy each other all the time, Ba 
 
HANOI 00000461  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
Hung added.  "Our security concerns on the one hand and your 
laws on the other will create a conflict," he said. 
 
7. (SBU) Vietnam has shown its cooperation with the United 
States on this issue in various ways, Ba Hung continued, 
including visits and dialogues and even facilitating 
meetings with "so-called dissidents" that the GVN would 
really rather not see happen.  The result of this, Vietnam 
hopes, will be a USG determination to remove Vietnam from 
the list of Countries of Particular Concern for religious 
freedom. 
 
8. (SBU) Grove noted that true security comes from the rule 
of law, and said that, in the eyes of the State/Foreign 
Operations Subcommittee, Vietnam's way of thinking on this 
subject is coming closer to the United States' way of 
thinking.  Threats, where they exist, are often 
transnational, such as drugs, HIV/AIDS and avian influenza 
(AI).  This is why the United States assists Vietnam, 
particularly in HIV and AI prevention.  Ba Hung responded 
that Vietnam greatly appreciates U.S. assistance in these 
areas and is aware that it has to work very hard to ensure 
that the assistance is used properly.  U.S. AI and HIV/AIDS 
assistance represents one of the largest projects the GVN 
has with any country, so the Ministry of Health (MOH) is 
under significant pressure to do a good job.  The GVN is 
aware that President Bush will want to see how these funds 
are being spent, and so MOH needs to strengthen its efforts. 
 
9. (SBU) AI and HIV/AIDS are threats to Vietnam's 
socioeconomic and national security, Grove continued. 
Vietnam faces other real challenges as well that come from 
its neighbors' actions, such as drugs and trafficking in 
persons (TIP), that cross borders.  Ba Hung agreed, noting 
that the long, difficult-to-police border with Cambodia is 
the site of significant trafficking in women in children as 
well as drugs.  Vietnam has made a strong effort to control 
TIP, but it still exists and is still a major problem. 
Grove said that the USG knows that Vietnam understands the 
dangers of drugs, HIV/AIDS, AI, TIP and other transnational 
threats, but the challenge is how to make less responsible 
regional states such as Cambodia and Burma understand the 
dangers as well.  Burma is a major source point for these 
transnational threats, he observed.  How can Vietnam engage 
with Burma to address them? 
 
10. (SBU) Ba Hung said that Vietnam addressed these issues 
with Cambodia in the context of annual interagency 
discussions held during leadership visits.  Lately, the 
focus has been on TIP, drugs and the rising problem of 
gasoline and oil smuggling.  Another problem is the issue of 
ethnic minority migrants from the Central Highlands 
illegally crossing the border into Cambodia.  Vietnam has 
been unable to stop this.  Burma is a different story. 
Vietnam has "good, not great" relations with Burma and has 
posted some successes in working with Rangoon on fighting 
drugs.  It remains a challenge, though, with some denial of 
real political problems by the Burmese government. 
 
11. (SBU) Grove said he hopes our areas of bilateral 
cooperation can be increased and expanded.  He added that he 
hopes that Vietnam will be able to play an active and 
constructive role in the region, and encourage positive 
developments within ASEAN and other regional organizations. 
Vietnam should be outward-looking and more involved with its 
neighbors, and that means more than simple cooperation; 
pressure and influence are crucial.  Drug trafficking in 
Cambodia, for example, is treated as a trivial criminal 
offense, with traffickers receiving little more than a slap 
on the wrist.  Ba Hung said that Vietnam's leaders try to 
persuade Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen to be more 
effective in the fight against transnational threats. 
Vietnam enforces drug laws vigorously, and executes "many" 
drug dealers each year.  In Cambodia, it is easy for them to 
escape prosecution.  Vietnam's enforcement is much better, 
but it is difficult to persuade Hun Sen to follow the same 
path.  Alluding to China, Ba Hung said "it is difficult to 
get Cambodia to cooperate with us because they listen to 
someone else."  The Cambodians are interested in give-and- 
take, and suggestions accompanied by either the offer of 
assistance or the threat to cut off assistance are more 
effective than discussions based solely on goodwill and 
friendship.  Hun Sen does not listen to Vietnam, Ba Hung 
said, because Vietnam has no leverage.  China, however, has 
leverage - and thus Hun Sen's ear.  Regardless, Vietnam will 
continue to press Cambodia to act responsibly. 
 
 
HANOI 00000461  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
MFA SOUTHEAST ASIA DEPARTMENT 
----------------------------- 
 
12. (SBU) Later the same day, Grove met with MFA Director 
General and Assistant Minister for Southeast Asia Do Ngoc 
Son.  Grove said he is interested in Vietnam's regional role 
and concerned about Vietnam's vulnerability to transnational 
threats originating in other, less responsible, Southeast 
Asian countries.  DG Son said that dealing with Southeast 
Asia is a high priority in Vietnamese foreign policy, and 
noted that no country can address transnational threats 
alone.  Vietnam greatly appreciates U.S. assistance on 
HIV/AIDS and AI, because it provides Vietnam a "strong hand" 
to combat these threats.  Drugs are another major concern, 
and a strong reason why Vietnam is working so closely with 
other countries in the region through the ASEAN drug 
committee and the six-party MOU on drug control.  Vietnam 
has a long border that is difficult to patrol, and so is 
very vulnerable to drug trafficking, DG Son said.  The GVN 
appreciates U.S. anti-drug assistance and funding and would 
like more. 
 
13. (SBU) Grove said that money is not the only issue; 
political will needs to be present for there to be a 
reasonable return on investment for assistance.  Vietnam is 
clearly serious about finding solutions to the problems of 
HIV/AIDS and AI, but the same cannot be said of Cambodia and 
Burma.  How can the region convince these governments to do 
better on the issues that affect all the states in Southeast 
Asia, Grove asked.  Their negligence affects everyone.  DG 
Son responded that he questioned whether the infrastructures 
in both countries are sufficient to cope with the 
challenges, and noted that they are very poor countries with 
significant needs for technical, material and human 
resources.  Vietnam is trying to build up its relations with 
Cambodia by increasing the frequency of bilateral meetings 
at the leadership level and at the local and provincial 
levels.  The success of this effort is clear already.  The 
recently concluded border agreement and an arrangement to 
allow Cambodian citizens to use Vietnamese education and 
health infrastructure in border areas are examples, he said. 
 
14. (SBU) Grove noted the problem with corruption in 
Cambodia, which exists throughout the public and private 
sectors.  The level of corruption has reached such 
proportions that it is impacting international aid, which is 
an essential part of Cambodia's operating budget.  The only 
country that is increasing assistance to Cambodia in the 
face of this corruption is China, which increases China's 
influence in Cambodia.  DG Son agreed that, in Cambodia, aid 
is not respected in some sectors, and therefore assistance 
is not well implemented.  The United States should keep in 
mind that Cambodia's leaders are interested in the 
development of the country for the benefit of the Cambodian 
people, and to that end they are developing relations with 
whatever countries can help them, which means China. 
China's emergence means that it has increased influence and 
presence in Southeast Asia.  Vietnam cannot, and does not 
want to, stop this.  The challenge is how to respond to it. 
In Cambodia, China is in the position to increase its 
diplomatic efforts, increase its assistance, increase its 
tempo of official visits, and thus increase its influence 
there.  Meanwhile, Vietnam is just trying to be a good 
neighbor and not interfere. 
 
15. (SBU) Grove suggested that Hun Sen's gravitation towards 
the Chinese is calculated; DG Son agreed that it is, and 
that it is designed to generate more foreign aid for 
Cambodia.  He cautioned that, if the United States continues 
to harp on human rights, HIV/AIDS and corruption in 
Cambodia, it will be forced to withdraw from Cambodia the 
way it has with Burma, thus abdicating all influence to 
China.  Grove acknowledged that Hun Sen is a complex and 
complicated leader, and that the United States cannot walk 
away from Cambodia without allowing China to fill the 
vacuum. 
 
16. (SBU) Grove said that Burma represents an even more 
difficult problem for Vietnam and the ASEAN region because 
of the "storm cloud" of drugs that gathers over Burma and 
then spreads to other countries.  The United States hopes 
Vietnam will help find a solution to the political situation 
in Burma that allows these transnational problems to fester. 
Grove said that the United States understands that Vietnam 
regards the situation in Burma as an internal affair, but 
noted that the problems that Burma exports harm Vietnamese 
citizens and Vietnamese children. 
 
HANOI 00000461  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
17. (SBU) DG Son said that ASEAN is in the process of 
gathering information on Burma, while respecting the 
principle of non-interference in internal affairs of member 
states.  ASEAN acknowledges the negative effects on member 
states of the situation in Burma.  The long embargo and 
strong sanctions of the international community and the 
United States have driven Burma into the arms of the 
Chinese.  When Khin Nyunt was in the government, more was 
possible, but now that Than Shwe has taken total control, 
things are more uncertain.  It is possible that the United 
States and the EU are demanding too much from Burma and 
asking the government to change too fast.  The leadership is 
military, trying to protect itself and survive.  ASEAN's 
strategy is to engage them, which is why Burma was admitted 
to ASEAN, and as a result they agreed to the road map. 
Engagement at such a high level may be too radical for the 
United States DG Son said, but it is the right direction: 
give them time, encourage them and engage them.  Pressure 
and isolation will not change the regime in Burma, it will 
simply deprive the USG of the opportunity to discover what 
and how they are thinking.  The USG is blocking them from 
speaking, and simultaneously building a wall between itself 
and the people and leaders of Burma.  That means that, 
instead of a dialogue, the USG is talking to a wall.  And 
for the Burmese generals, DG Son concluded, the only way 
around that wall is north. 
 
18. (SBU) Grove said the SPDC is its own worst enemy and is 
unwilling to talk.  Grove had wanted to visit Burma on this 
trip, but was not allowed to go.  DG Son suggested that this 
is probably the result of strong USG measures against Burma. 
The United States should reduce and soften its actions 
against Burma and see what the reaction is to that.  For 
Asians, "a soft voice is easier to listen to than shouting." 
The United States has an important role to play in the 
region and can help a lot.  The more the United States 
assists and takes part in the economic development of poor 
states in the region, the better.  In particular, DG Son 
said, Laos and Cambodia need assistance.  "Don't talk about 
human rights with them," he counseled.  "A country that 
needs health, food, humanitarian and development assistance 
is concerned with its stomach, not its human rights."  DG 
Son suggested a "2 + 1" formulation for the delivery of 
foreign assistance to the region, which could entail the 
United States and Vietnam partnering to provide aid to a 
third country.   Like Vietnam's relationship with the United 
States, as economic development occurs with other states in 
Southeast Asia, engagement on more issues of importance to 
the United States will be possible. 
 
19. (U) Mr. Grove has cleared this message. 
 
MARINE