Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
2011/08/25
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Consulate Kaduna
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Ponta Delgada
Consulate Peshawar
REO Mosul
REO Kirkuk
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
US Delegation FEST TWO
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AF
ADANA
ASEC
AFIN
AMGT
AE
AORC
AID
AR
AO
AU
ASEAN
AGOA
AFGHANISTAN
AFFAIRS
AMED
APER
ASECARP
APEC
AEMR
AS
AA
ANET
AFLU
ABLD
AL
ASUP
AJ
APECO
AMER
ABUD
AODE
AM
AFSN
AESC
AND
AG
ALOW
AROC
AVIANFLU
ATRN
ACOA
AEGR
AMGMT
AADP
AFSI
ACABQ
APRM
AZ
AIDS
ASE
AGAO
ADCO
ABDALLAH
ARF
AIDAC
ACOTA
ASCH
AC
ASEG
AGR
ACS
AMCHAMS
AN
AMIA
ASIG
ADPM
ADB
ANARCHISTS
ALOWAR
ARM
AUC
AINF
AINT
AORG
AY
AVIAN
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARSO
ARABBL
ASO
ANTITERRORISM
ARABL
AOWC
AGRICULTURE
ALJAZEERA
AMTC
AFINM
AOCR
ABER
ARR
AFPK
ASSEMBLY
ASSK
AZE
AORCYM
AINR
AGMT
AEC
ACKM
APRC
AIN
ASCC
AFPREL
ASED
APERTH
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AOMS
AORCO
ANTXON
ARC
AFAF
ADIP
AIAG
AFARI
AEMED
AORL
AX
ASECAF
AOPC
ASECAFIN
AFZAL
APCS
AMB
AGUIRRE
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AIT
ARCH
AMEX
ALI
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
ALEXANDER
ATRD
AEIR
AOIC
ABLDG
ASEX
AFR
ASCE
ATRA
ASEK
AER
ALOUNI
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AMAT
AEMRS
ASPA
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ALL
AECL
ACAO
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORD
AFL
AME
ADM
ASECPHUM
AGIT
ABT
ASECVE
AGUILAR
AT
ABMC
ALZUGUREN
ANGEL
ASR
ANTONIO
BMGT
BEXP
BM
BG
BL
BA
BR
BTA
BO
BY
BBSR
BLUE
BK
BF
BTIO
BELLVIEW
BE
BU
BN
BH
BD
BC
BTC
BILAT
BT
BX
BRUSSELS
BP
BB
BRPA
BUSH
BURMA
BMENA
BESP
BIT
BBG
BGD
BMEAID
BAGHDAD
BEN
BIO
BMOT
BWC
BLUNT
BURNS
BUT
BGMT
BAIO
BCW
BOEHNER
BFIF
BOL
BASHAR
BIMSTEC
BOU
BIDEN
BZ
BFIN
BTRA
BI
BHUM
BOIKO
BERARDUCCI
BOUCHAIB
BORDER
BEXPC
BTIU
BTT
BIOS
BEXB
BGPGOV
BOND
BLR
CE
CG
CH
CVR
CASC
CU
CI
CD
CO
CDG
CB
CJAN
CPAS
COM
CVIS
CMGT
CT
CENTCOM
CNARC
CTERR
COUNTER
CHIEF
CDC
CTR
CBW
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CY
CA
CM
CS
CWC
CN
CITES
CF
CWG
CIVS
CFIS
CASCC
CROATIA
CONS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CASA
COE
CJ
CHR
CODEL
CR
CBC
CACS
CHERTOFF
CAS
CONTROL
CONDITIONS
CONDOLEEZZA
CITEL
CV
CLINTON
CHG
CZ
CON
CTBT
CEN
CRIMES
COMMERCE
CLOK
CRISTINA
CFED
CARC
CND
CTM
CARICOM
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CBTH
CHINA
CSW
CICTE
CJUS
CYPRUS
CW
CAMBODIA
CENSUS
CIDA
CRIME
CBG
CBE
CMGMT
CAIO
CEC
CARSON
CPCTC
CEDAW
COMESA
CVIA
CWCM
CEA
COSI
CAPC
CGEN
COPUOS
CGOPRC
COETRD
CKGR
CFE
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CLO
CAFTA
CVISU
CHRISTOPHER
CACM
CIAT
CDB
CIS
CUL
CHAO
CNC
CL
CSEP
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAN
CAJC
CUIS
CONSULAR
CLMT
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CAC
CROS
CIO
CPUOS
CKOR
CVPR
CONG
CONTROLS
CEPTER
CVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGKIRF
CDCE
DPOL
DEMARCHE
DHS
DR
DA
DISENGAGEMENT
DEMOCRATIC
DEFENSE
DJ
DY
DARFUR
DHRF
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DO
DARFR
DOC
DRL
DK
DOJ
DTRA
DOMESTIC
DAC
DOD
DEAX
DIEZ
DEOC
DELTAVIOLENCE
DCOM
DMINE
DRC
DCG
DPKO
DOMESTICPOLITICS
DE
DB
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DHLAKAMA
DHSX
DS
DKEM
DAO
DCM
DANIEL
DEM
DAVID
DCRM
ETRD
EAGR
ETTC
EAID
ECON
EFIN
ECIN
EINV
ELAB
EAIR
ENRG
EPET
EWWT
ECPS
EIND
EMIN
ELTN
EC
ETMIN
EUC
EZ
ET
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EU
EUN
EG
EINT
ER
ECONOMICS
ES
EMS
ENIV
EEB
EN
ECE
ECOSOC
EK
ENVIRONMENT
EFIS
EI
EWT
ENGRD
ECPSN
EXIM
EIAD
ERIN
ECPC
EDEV
ENGY
ECTRD
EPA
ESTH
ECCT
EINVECON
ENGR
ERTD
EUR
EAP
EWWC
ELTD
EL
EXIMOPIC
EXTERNAL
ETRDEC
ESCAP
ECO
EGAD
ELNT
ECONOMIC
ENV
ETRN
EIAR
EUMEM
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EREL
ECOM
ECONETRDEAGRJA
ETCC
ETRG
ECONOMY
EMED
ETR
ENERG
EITC
EFINOECD
EURM
EENG
ERA
EXPORT
ENRD
ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC
EGEN
EBRD
EVIN
ETRAD
ECOWAS
EFTA
ECONETRDBESPAR
EGOVSY
EPIN
EID
ECONENRG
EDRC
ESENV
ETT
EB
ENER
ELTNSNAR
ECHEVARRIA
ETRC
EPIT
EDUC
ESA
EFI
ENRGY
ESCI
EE
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
ECIP
EIAID
EIVN
EBEXP
ESTN
EING
EGOV
ETRA
EPETEIND
ELAN
ETRDGK
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EPEC
ENVI
ELN
EAG
EPCS
EPRT
EPTED
ETRB
EUM
EAIDS
EFIC
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EAIDAR
ESF
EIDN
ELAM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
ECN
EDA
EXBS
EINTECPS
ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ
EPREL
EAC
EINVEFIN
ETA
EAGER
EINDIR
ECA
ECLAC
ELAP
EITI
EUCOM
ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID
EARG
ELDIN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EFINTS
ECCP
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
EAIDNI
EFQ
ECOQKPKO
EGPHUM
EBUD
ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ
ENERGY
ELB
EINDETRD
EMI
ECONEFIN
EIB
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EIN
EFIM
ETIO
ELAINE
EMN
EATO
EWTR
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
EPPD
ENRGIZ
EISL
ESPINOSA
ELEC
EAIG
ESLCO
EUREM
ENTG
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ECINECONCS
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
EFND
EPECO
EAIRECONRP
ERGR
ETRDPGOV
ECPN
ENRGMO
EPWR
EET
EAIS
EAGRE
EDUARDO
EAGRRP
EAIDPHUMPRELUG
EICN
ECONQH
EVN
EGHG
ELBR
EINF
EAIDHO
EENV
ETEX
ERNG
ED
FR
FREEDOM
FINREF
FJ
FI
FRELIMO
FOREIGN
FAA
FETHI
FAS
FTAA
FRB
FAO
FCS
FINANCE
FWS
FTA
FEMA
FDA
FLU
FRANCISCO
FBI
FORCE
FO
FARC
FK
FT
FCSC
FAC
FM
FMGT
FINV
FCSCEG
FARM
FERNANDO
FINR
FIN
FINE
FIR
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FCUL
FKLU
FMLN
FISO
FIXED
GM
GMUS
GG
GR
GE
GAZA
GT
GH
GZ
GJ
GLOBAL
GV
GABY
GOI
GA
GCC
GB
GY
GATT
GC
GUAM
GEORGE
GTIP
GOV
GOMEZ
GUTIERREZ
GL
GKGIC
GF
GU
GWI
GARCIA
GTMO
GN
GANGS
GIPNC
GAERC
GREGG
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
GERARD
GI
HK
HR
HUMANR
HUMAN
HO
HA
HUMANRIGHTS
HU
HHS
HIV
HUM
HRKAWC
HILLEN
HILLARY
HDP
HUMRIT
HSTC
HUMANITARIAN
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HURI
HL
HRETRD
HOURANI
HG
HARRIET
HESHAM
HI
HNCHR
HARRY
HRECON
HRC
HOSTAGES
HEBRON
HUMOR
HSWG
HYMPSK
HECTOR
HN
HYDE
HUD
HRPGOV
HIGHLIGHTS
ID
ILC
IS
IZ
ICAO
IMO
ITU
IR
IAEA
ICRC
IPROP
IT
IBRD
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ISSUES
ITRA
IV
IO
IGAD
IRAQ
IN
IMF
ICTR
ISCON
IADB
IDB
IEA
INR
IWC
ICCAT
ILO
INMARSAT
IOM
ICJ
IQ
ISPA
ITRD
IPR
INTELSAT
ISN
IAHRC
INTERNAL
IFAD
IICA
IHO
IRAN
IL
IRCE
IC
INTELLECTUAL
IRM
IE
ICTY
IDLI
IFO
ISCA
INF
INL
ISRAEL
INV
IBB
INFLUENZA
ISPL
ITER
ITIA
INRA
ISAF
IACHR
INTERPOL
IFR
IRS
INRB
IEF
ISAAC
ICC
INDO
IIP
IATTC
INAUGURATION
IND
INS
IZPREL
IACI
IEFIN
INNP
ILAB
IA
IMTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
IFIN
IRAJ
IX
ICG
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IACW
IK
IUCN
IZEAID
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
ISO
ICES
IRMO
ITPGOV
IQNV
IMSO
IRDB
IMET
INCB
IFRC
JA
JO
JP
JM
JCIC
JOHN
JE
JEFFERY
JS
JUS
JN
JOHNNIE
JAMES
JKUS
JOSEPH
JML
JAWAD
JSRP
JIMENEZ
JOSE
JKJUS
JK
JAPAN
KMDR
KPAO
KPKO
KJUS
KCRM
KGHG
KFRD
KWMN
KDEM
KTFN
KHIV
KGIC
KIDE
KSCA
KNNP
KHUM
KIPR
KSUM
KISL
KIRF
KCOR
KRCM
KPAL
KWBG
KN
KS
KOMC
KSEP
KFLU
KPWR
KTIA
KSEO
KMPI
KHLS
KICC
KSTH
KMCA
KVPR
KPRM
KE
KU
KZ
KFLO
KSAF
KTIP
KTEX
KBCT
KOCI
KOLY
KOR
KAWC
KACT
KUNR
KTDB
KSTC
KLIG
KSKN
KNN
KCFE
KCIP
KGHA
KHDP
KPOW
KUNC
KDRL
KV
KPREL
KCRS
KPOL
KRVC
KRIM
KGIT
KWIR
KT
KIRC
KOMO
KRFD
KUWAIT
KG
KFIN
KSCI
KTFIN
KFTN
KGOV
KPRV
KSAC
KGIV
KCRIM
KPIR
KSOC
KBIO
KW
KGLB
KMWN
KPO
KFSC
KSEAO
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KREC
KFPC
KUNH
KCSA
KMRS
KNDP
KR
KICCPUR
KPPAO
KCSY
KTBT
KCIS
KNEP
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KNNB
KGCC
KINR
KPOP
KMFO
KENV
KNAR
KVIR
KDRG
KDMR
KFCE
KNAO
KDEN
KGCN
KICA
KIMMITT
KMCC
KLFU
KMSG
KSEC
KUM
KCUL
KMNP
KSMT
KCOM
KOMCSG
KSPR
KPMI
KRAD
KIND
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KTER
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KITA
KTSC
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KJUST
KMIG
KLAB
KTFR
KSEI
KSTT
KAPO
KSTS
KLSO
KWNN
KPOA
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KBTS
KWWW
KY
KJRE
KPAOKMDRKE
KCRCM
KSCS
KWMNCI
KESO
KWUN
KPLS
KIIP
KEDEM
KPAOY
KRIF
KGICKS
KREF
KTRD
KFRDSOCIRO
KTAO
KJU
KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW
KEN
KO
KNEI
KEMR
KKIV
KEAI
KWAC
KRCIM
KWCI
KFIU
KWIC
KCORR
KOMS
KNNO
KPAI
KBWG
KTTB
KTBD
KTIALG
KILS
KFEM
KTDM
KESS
KNUC
KPA
KOMCCO
KCEM
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KWN
KERG
KLTN
KALM
KCCP
KSUMPHUM
KREL
KGH
KLIP
KTLA
KAWK
KWMM
KVRP
KVRC
KAID
KSLG
KDEMK
KX
KIF
KNPR
KCFC
KFTFN
KTFM
KPDD
KCERS
KMOC
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KDRM
KEPREL
KBTR
KEDU
KNP
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KISLPINR
KTPN
KA
KJUSTH
KPIN
KDEV
KTDD
KAKA
KFRP
KWNM
KTSD
KINL
KJUSKUNR
KWWMN
KECF
KWBC
KPRO
KVBL
KOM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KEDM
KFLD
KLPM
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KM
KWMNCS
KAWS
KLAP
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KPFO
KDP
KCMR
KRMS
KNPT
KNNNP
KTIAPARM
KDTB
KNUP
KPGOV
KNAP
KNNC
KUK
KSRE
KREISLER
KIVP
KQ
KTIAEUN
KPALAOIS
KRM
KISLAO
KWM
KFLOA
LE
LU
LH
LA
LG
LO
LY
LANTERN
LI
LABOR
LORAN
LTTE
LT
LAS
LAB
LAW
LVPR
LARREA
LEBIK
LAURA
LS
LOTT
LOVE
LR
LEON
LAVIN
LGAT
LV
LAOS
LOG
LN
LB
MOPS
MO
MARR
ML
MASS
MZ
MR
MNUC
MX
MV
MCC
MY
MEDIA
MTCRE
MG
MCAP
MOPPS
MP
MI
MK
MC
MD
MA
MU
MASC
MW
MT
MEPP
MN
MTCR
MH
MEPI
MIL
MNUCPTEREZ
MMAR
MICHAEL
MUNC
MDC
MPOS
MONUC
MAR
MGMT
MAS
MEPN
MENDIETA
MARIA
MONTENEGRO
MOOPS
MSG
MARITIME
MURRAY
MUKASEY
MOTO
MCA
MFO
MEX
MRSEC
MMED
MACP
MAAR
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MAPP
MGT
MARQUEZ
MANUEL
MNUR
MCCAIN
MF
MOHAMMAD
MOHAMED
MNU
MFA
MILITANTS
MINORITIES
MTS
MLS
MILI
MIAH
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MARAD
MNVC
MINURSO
MNUCUN
MIK
MARK
MBM
MPP
MILITARY
MAPS
MNUK
MILA
MTRRE
MACEDONIA
MICHEL
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
MARRGH
MRCRE
MTRE
MORALES
MAP
MCTRE
MHUC
MOPSGRPARM
MOROCCO
MCAPS
NL
NU
NS
NI
NPT
NATO
NO
NG
NATEU
NSF
NZ
NAS
NP
NDP
NLD
NGO
NEPAD
NAFTA
NASA
NEA
NGUYEN
NIH
NK
NIPP
NONE
NR
NANCY
NEGROPONTE
NRR
NERG
NSSP
NSG
NSFO
NE
NATSIOS
NFSO
NATIONAL
NTDB
NT
NCD
NTSB
NRC
NELSON
NAM
NH
NPG
NEC
NSC
NFATC
NMFS
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NARC
NCCC
NA
NC
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NEY
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NW
NARCOTICS
NORAD
NOAA
NON
NTTC
NKNNP
NMNUC
NUMBERING
ODIP
OIIP
OPRC
OSCE
OREP
OTRA
OPET
OSCI
OVIP
OECD
OCII
OUALI
OPDC
OEXC
OFPD
OPIC
OFDP
OPCW
OECV
OAS
OM
OMIG
ODAG
OPREP
ORA
OIC
OEXCSCULKPAO
OIG
OASS
OFFICIALS
ORTA
OSAC
OIL
OIE
OEXP
OPEC
OPDAT
OMS
OES
OHI
OMAR
OCRA
OFSO
OCBD
OSTA
OAO
ONA
OTP
ORC
OAU
OXEC
OA
ODPC
OPDP
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OASC
OSHA
OPCD
OTR
OPPI
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OSTRA
OASCC
OBSP
OFDA
OPICEAGR
OIM
OGAC
OTA
OTRAORP
OPPC
OESC
OCEA
OVP
ON
OPAD
OTAR
OCS
ODC
OTRD
OCED
OSD
ORUE
OREG
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PGOV
PREL
PREF
PL
PM
PHSA
PE
PARM
PINS
PK
PUNE
PO
PALESTINIAN
PU
PBTS
PROP
PTBS
POL
POLI
PA
PGOVZI
POLMIL
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLM
PD
POLITICS
POLICY
PAS
PMIL
PINT
PNAT
PV
PKO
PPOL
PERSONS
PING
PBIO
PH
PETR
PARMS
PRES
PCON
PETERS
PRELBR
PT
PLAB
PP
PAK
PDEM
PKPA
PSOCI
PF
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PSOE
PELOSI
PROPERTY
PGOVPREL
PARP
PRL
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PBOV
PAO
PKK
PROV
PHSAK
PHUMPREL
PROTECTION
PGOVBL
PSI
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PUM
PRELKPKO
PATTY
PSOC
PRIVATIZATION
PRELSP
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PREC
PAIGH
PROG
PSHA
PARK
PETER
POG
PHUS
PPREL
PS
PTERPREL
PRELPGOV
POV
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN
PWBG
PMAR
PREM
PAR
PNR
PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO
PARMIR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PARTM
PN
PRE
PTE
PY
POLUN
PPEL
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PIRF
PGOVPM
PBST
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PRM
PRELKPAOIZ
PGVO
PERL
PGOC
PAGR
PMIN
PHUMR
PVIP
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PINL
PKPAL
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PHAS
PODC
PRHUM
PHUMA
PREO
PPA
PEPFAR
PGO
PRGOV
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PKFK
PEPR
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PGOVPHUMKPAO
PRELECON
PINOCHET
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PRELC
PREK
PHUME
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVPZ
PGOVKCRM
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PRELSW
PAHO
PEDRO
PRELA
PASS
PPAO
PGPV
PNUM
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PRFE
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PHUMPGOV
PVOV
PHSAPREL
PROLIFERATION
PENA
PRELTBIOBA
PIN
PRELL
PGOVPTER
PHAM
PHYTRP
PTEL
PTERPGOV
PHARM
PROTESTS
PRELAF
PKBL
PRELKPAO
PKNP
PARMP
PHUML
PFOV
PERM
PUOS
PRELGOV
PHUMPTER
PARAGRAPH
PERURENA
PBTSEWWT
PCI
PETROL
PINSO
PINSCE
PQL
PEREZ
PBS
RS
REFUGEES
RW
RP
RELFREE
RO
REGIONAL
RIGHTS
REACTION
REPORT
RU
RENAMO
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RM
REFUGEE
REL
RELATIONS
ROW
RREL
REGION
RATIFICATION
RBI
RICE
ROOD
RODENAS
RUIZ
RODHAM
ROBERT
RGY
ROY
REUBEN
RELIGIOUS
RUEHZO
RODRIGUEZ
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
RSO
RCMP
REO
ROSS
RPTS
RENE
REID
RUPREL
RMA
RI
REMON
RPEL
RFE
RFIN
RA
RAFAEL
RAY
RUS
RPREL
ROBERTG
RECIN
RAMONTEIJELO
SNAR
SP
SN
SMIG
SL
SOCI
SU
SG
SF
SENV
SZ
SOE
SCUL
SY
SO
SR
SYR
SE
SA
SW
SIPDIS
SCIENCE
SADC
SI
SCI
SOCIETY
SC
SAARC
STR
SECRETARY
SANC
SSH
ST
SNA
SGWI
SEP
SOCIS
SETTLEMENTS
SPECIALIST
SK
SHUM
START
STET
SCVL
SREF
SCHUL
SCUIL
SYRIA
SECURITY
SPCE
SYAI
SMIL
SOWGC
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SNAP
SPP
SCUD
SOM
SPECI
SMIGBG
SENC
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SENVSXE
SASIAIN
SACU
SENVSPL
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCOI
SCRS
SILVASANDE
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SM
SNARKTFN
SAAD
SD
SAN
SIPRNET
STATE
SENS
SUBJECT
SFNV
SECSTATE
SSA
SPCVIS
SOI
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SPTER
SKSAF
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SANR
SPSTATE
SMITH
SCOM
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
SNARM
SIPDI
SCPR
SNIG
SELAB
SULLIVAN
SENVENV
SECDEF
SOLIC
SOIC
SPAS
SASC
SOSI
SEC
SEN
SENVCASCEAIDID
TU
TH
TW
TSPA
TRGY
TPHY
TBIO
TIFA
TS
TZ
TX
TSPL
TT
TK
TC
TINT
TERFIN
TERRORISM
TIP
TURKEY
TI
TECHNOLOGY
TNGD
TRSY
TRAFFICKING
TOPEC
TPSL
TP
TD
TR
TA
TIO
TREATY
TO
THPY
TECH
TRADE
TPSA
TG
TAGS
TF
TRAD
THKSJA
TVBIO
TNDG
TN
TBIOZK
TWI
TV
TWL
TRT
TWRO
TSRY
TTPGOV
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TRBIO
TL
TPKO
TIA
TGRY
TSPAM
TREL
TNAR
TBI
TFIN
TPHYPA
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
TPP
TE
THANH
TJ
TBKIO
UNGA
USUN
UN
UG
UNSC
UK
UP
US
UNCTAD
UNVIE
UNHRC
USTR
UNAMA
UNCRIME
UNESCO
UV
UNDP
UNHCR
UNCSD
UNCHR
UZ
USAID
UNEP
UNO
UNPUOS
UY
UNDC
UNCITRAL
UNAUS
UNCND
UA
UNMIK
USTDA
USEU
USDA
UNICEF
UR
UNFICYP
USNC
USTRRP
UNODC
UNRWA
UNOMIG
USTRPS
USAU
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
UNFPA
UNSCE
USSC
UGA
UEU
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNION
UNCLASSIFIED
USPS
UNA
UMIK
USOAS
UNMOVIC
UNFA
UNAIDS
UNCHC
USGS
UNSE
UNRCR
UNTERR
USG
UE
UAE
UNWRA
UNCSW
UNSCR
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNPAR
UNC
UB
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNREST
UNHR
USPTO
UNFCYP
USCG
UNIDROIT
UNSCD
UPU
UNBRO
UNECE
USTRUWR
UNCC
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
VM
VE
VT
VETTING
VN
VZ
VIS
VC
VTPREL
VIP
VTEAID
VTEG
VOA
VA
VTIZ
VANG
VISIT
VO
VENZ
VAT
VI
VEPREL
VEN
WFP
WTO
WHO
WTRO
WBG
WMO
WIPO
WA
WI
WSIS
WHA
WCL
WE
WMN
WEBZ
WS
WAR
WZ
WMD
WW
WILLIAM
WEET
WAEMU
WM
WWBG
WWT
WWARD
WITH
WMDT
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WALTER
WRTO
WB
WHTI
WBEG
WCI
WEF
WAKI
WHOA
WGC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06DHAKA997, FRAUD SUMMARY - DHAKA
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06DHAKA997.
| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 06DHAKA997 | 2006-02-27 10:08 | 2011-08-25 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Dhaka |
VZCZCXRO9659
RR RUEHBI RUEHCI
DE RUEHKA #0997/01 0581008
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 271008Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY DHAKA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5617
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 8898
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA IN
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 0842
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 0199
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 8389
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 7305
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0970
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0332
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0203
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0184
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0018
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0916
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 2732
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 DHAKA 000997
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR CA/FPP
DEPT PASS TO KCC
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CMGT KFRD ASEC CVIS CPAS BG
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - DHAKA
REF: (A) CHENNAI 173(B) 05 DHAKA 779
(C)05 DHAKA 2242(D) 05 STATE 205073
¶1. SUMMARY. Dhaka is a high fraud post with a full-time FPM and
a busy FPU. Fraud, especially in IV and DV cases, is a daily
occurrence for adjudicators, and is most often found in ages of
children, marital status, and qualification for the DV program.
Most Bangladeshi documents are unreliable, necessitating frequent
field investigations. Bangladeshi officials, at times, issue
sue
certificates or other documents containing fraudulent information
to visa applicants as a favor. Post continues to expand our
contacts with local police and immigration services, and our new
A/RSO-I is making important progress in this area. END SUMMARY
¶2. COUNTRY CONDITIONS: Bangladesh is a developing country of
more than 150 million people living in an area roughly the size
of Wisconsin. More than a third of the population lives below
the poverty line, and the current per capita income is about
$390. More than 60% of the population is involved in agriculture
which accounts for about 25% of GDP. The national growth rate of
about five percent for the past decade has not been sufficient to
reduce poverty for the majority of Bangladeshis. The cost of
living (rent and food) for the poor and middle class is roughly
double that of Kolkata in the state of West Bengal in neighboring
India, and there is general economic insecurity at all levels of
society. Infrastructure, especially road infrastructure, is poor
outside of main cities and towns. This, combined with terrain
and climate considerations, makes the conduct of field
investigations a difficult task.
The vast majority of Bangladeshis are Bengalis though small
minorities of non-Bengalis, the tribal groups, also live in
Bangladesh. 90% of the population is Muslim, 7% are Hindu, and
the remaining 3% are a mix of Christians, Buddhists, and other
religions. Although a Muslim country, personal status laws are
based on ones religion. However, some civil laws are in
contradiction to traditional Islamic sharia, which presents some
interesting challenges in evaluating marriages, divorces, and
adoptions.
Bangladesh is a multi-party democracy, though the political scene
is dominated by the two main parties, the Awami League (AL) and
the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). A BNP-led coalition of
three Islamic parties is currently in power, but the country will
hold elections later this year. The past several years have been
turbulent as the opposition and the government have fought tooth-
and-nail over just about every issue. The AL-led opposition
actually walked out of the Parliament more than a year ago and
opposition lawmakers have only recently returned. The
confrontational nature of politics between the two major parties
and an unsettled law-and-order situation leave many Bangladeshis
uncertain about the long-term prospects for the country.
Politics are rough-and-tumble, and over the past year, there have
been several sensational assassinations of Awami League leaders
and several as yet unsolved grenade attacks on senior AL leaders.
However, in general, all political parties, even minor ones, are
relatively free to organize and operate, and the press has a
great deal of freedom to publish.
Bangladesh has a long history of large-scale labor export, both
legal and illegal, with millions of men and women working abroad,
principally in the Persian Gulf (over a million in Saudi Arabia
alone, according to the Saudi Embassy) and in South/Southeast
Asia. The government actively promotes international manpower
export and has an official government ministry (Ministry of
Expatriate Welfare) tasked to support the export of labor and the
remittance of wages. Remittances are an important element of the
Bangladeshi economy, and we feel this leads the government to
look with little enthusiasm on proposals to repair systemic
weaknesses in the issuance of documents and entry/exit controls.
We believe that this national interest on working abroad is one
of the main reasons that we receive little or no cooperation from
local police on the arrest and prosecution of document vendors
and forgers.
DHAKA 00000997 002 OF 008
The government has little effective control over the issuance of
official documents, such as birth certificates and marriage and
divorce certificates, making such documents easy targets for
abuse and fraud. Regulatory controls over these documents are so
lax that true counterfeits are rare since it is quite easy to
obtain a genuinely-issued document containing any information
desired by the visa applicant. Except for some birth documents
issued by the larger city corporations and municipalities,
official documents are not printed on security paper and do not
incorporate even the most basic security features. Controls over
passport issuances are equally weak, and the government has no
centralized control over or records of passport issuances. Post
has uncounted examples of Bangladeshis obtaining legitimate
travel documents in fraudulent names or with fraudulent dates of
birth or listing fraudulent parents. We also have many cases
where Bangladeshis have obtained multiple passports in multiple
identities. The record currently stands with one enterprising
chap who is known to have 17 different passports in five
different identities. Although Post has been working with the
Home Ministry on a machine-readable passport (MRP) project, it is
unclear when the program will actually commence. Furthermore,
without great institutional controls over issuances, the
situation will only come to mirror India, where hi-tech passports
are easily available in a fraudulent identity. (Ref A)
¶3. NIV FRAUD: Although Dhaka is a high-fraud Post, window fraud
on the NIV line is generally unsophisticated and obvious. Given
that most documents are considered unreliable, officers rely more
on effective lines of questioning during interviews. Dhaka sees
the usual array of fake bank and employment letters and
invitations, but we believe that our effective new officer
orientation and proactive FPU give the officers the needed tools
to recognize and deal with such cases. Our FPU has good
relations with most major banks and this is invaluable in
detecting or confirming fraudulent bank documents. In 2005, we
encountered only 1 washed NIV, but we are aware of 2 incidents of
counterfeit NIVs. We worked closely with our A/RSO-I to open an
investigation of the counterfeiter, and our A/RSO-I continues to
work with local police on these cases. On several instances, the
NIV unit has reported receiving inquiries from individuals who
wanted to verify that their visas are genuine. Suspecting the
worst, we always tell such callers that they have to bring their
visas in to the Embassy for us to verify the documents.
Unsurprisingly, no one has yet appeared to verify their visa.
Though Dhaka is a low-volume H1B and L visa country, most of our
serious NIV fraud is found in the H1B/H4 category. We have some
trouble with H1B renewals for smaller, less well-known companies
where questions may exist regarding the H1B applicants work
history or the basic legitimacy of the petitioner. However, most
of our fraud occurs in cases of first-time applicants from
Bangladesh. We regularly see applicants who present either fake
ke
university degrees from Bangladeshi or Indian schools or vastly
overstated work experience coupled with suspect certificates from
various IT training institutes. We also have difficulties with
H4 applicants. Since Bangladesh is country with a long tradition
of settled, i.e. arranged, marriages, it is not uncommon to
have a wife apply for an H4 who literally met her husband on
their wedding day. Then after spending a brief honeymoon with
him, she waved goodbye as he flew back to the US. It is
difficult to differentiate between legitimate settled marriages
and marriages strictly for immigration purposes. This problem is
also common with IV and DV cases and is discussed more fully in
the IV section.
R1s are also a problematic visa category as every year we see
many questionable R1 applicants seeking to go to the US to lead
Ramadan prayers. Most of these applicants have the most nebulous
of qualifications and employment histories, and FPU checks most
ost
often reveal that their qualifications are, at best, generously
overstated. We find in some cases that the real sponsor is often
a relative who sits on the management committee of the mosque
offering the invitation.
DHAKA 00000997 003 OF 008
Finally, Post also sees a number of Bhutanese NIV applicants who
are trying their luck in Dhaka instead of in New Delhi or
Kolkata. It is difficult to identify fraudulent B1/B2 applicants
because of a lack of knowledge about Bhutan and the lack of a
common language, so most applicants are merely 214b. We have
experienced some problems with fraudulent R1 applications. For
example, one group of 10 applied last year under the leadership
of two monks, one who had led another such group to the US and
the other with extensive travel in Europe. The group was
supposed to teach traditional Buddhist religious dance, song, and
prayers at a Buddhist center in Maryland. However, we found that
two of the religious workers had previously applied in New
w
Delhi for B1/B2 visas. We also found that, when asked to
demonstrate their prayers and religious songs and dances, half of
the group were just lip-synching or were too sick to dance.
Finally, we found that the monk who had traveled to the US had
forgotten to bring his three traveling companions back to Bhutan
when he left the US. As an added note, IDENT hits revealed that
two of these characters later applied for visas to attend a dairy
conference in Wisconsin, using different employment histories and
slightly different DOBs.
¶4. IV FRAUD: IV fraud occupies the majority of the FPUs
effort. We see all types of fraud in all visa categories. In
particular, we see a large amount of age fraud among applicants
claiming to be less than 21 years of age, marriage fraud, and
employment visa fraud. With the relative lack of security of
most Bangladeshi documents, official or not, it is very easy for
applicants to obtain fake or fraudulent documents to support
rt
their claims. FPU investigations uncover many instances where
responsible officials were aware that the documents they were
issuing contained fraudulent information, but they did it to
help [the applicants] travel to the US.
We see age fraud both with principal applicants and with
derivatives, though CSPA has reduced the number of age fraud
cases that we pursue. Since birth certificates are generally not
reliable and most births are late registered a few months before
a petition is filed, we generally rely on secondary documents,
such as school certificates, to corroborate the applicants
claimed date of birth. FPU investigations uncovered document
fraud, either in the form of forged certificates or certificates
with fraudulent information that is not supported by the schools
records, in more than 80% of cases involving suspected age fraud.
It is not uncommon to find cases where a school head master
admits that a certificate was issued as a favor to an applicant,
nt,
sometimes with a fake date of birth and other times for
applicants who never actually studied at the school. We also use
a bone-age test (Ref B) as an initial screen for possible age
fraud, though we apply a generous margin of error. Using the
results of the test, we have elicited dozens of confessions from
applicants and petitioners. Usually the fraud is only a few
years, though in extreme cases, we have seen misrepresentations
of 10 or more years in dates of birth. However, equally
important, with a positive result, we have been able to quickly
return many cases to IV where an officer initially had some doubt
about a child applicants age. In all fairness to applicants,
many people do not really know their dates of birth. In the
past, birth registration was never a priority and late
registrations were the norm rather than the exception. Only when
it was necessary, for example at school registration, would a
date of birth be established, hence the popularity of January 1
as a DOB in Bangladesh. The government is taking steps to
require birth registration within a year of birth, but that is
very much a work in progress.
In marriage fraud cases, we see fraudulent marriages, cases where
one spouse did not properly divorce his/her spouse in Bangladesh
before marrying again (usually found in IR2 step-child case), or
cases where an applicant hid an existing marriage during an F2A
or F2B application. Most cases involve AmCits or LPRs who were
born in Bangladesh and are seeking a Bangladeshi spouse. They
DHAKA 00000997 004 OF 008
ask their relatives to find a suitable spouse, and once the
matter is settled, they fly to Bangladesh for a wedding. As
previously mentioned with H4 cases, this tradition of settled
marriages poses difficulties for adjudicators. Since it is not
unusual for a spouse, especially a new wife, to know almost
nothing about their partner, we rely heavily on secondary
evidence to establish the bona fides of the marriage. Marriages
in Bangladesh are major social events, often times with several
sub-events and attended by many guests, sometimes several
hundred. In case of legitimate marriages, there will usually be
a bonanza of secondary evidence, such as photos, videos,
invitations, cards, etc., to back up the marriage. In most of
our cases with fraud, the lack of secondary evidence was one of
the initial red flags. We are also seeing a rise in the number
of cases of marriages where a US spouse, usually a man, met the
Bangladeshi spouse, usually a woman, through the Internet, though
the total number of these cases remains low.
We encounter both counterfeit and fraudulent marriage documents
and insufficient marriage documents, most often in the form of
Marriage Affidavits, which are not sufficient, in any case, to
serve as legal proof of marriage, except for Hindus and
Buddhists. In some cases, applicants present completely
counterfeit marriage documents, but at times, as with education
n
documents, we find cases where a marriage registrar issues a
fraudulent marriage certificate as a favor to the applicant.
These cases are generally identifiable as suspect because they
usually lack any secondary evidence. While it is rare to find a
case where an FPU document check uncovers a fake marriage
document but the case presents strong secondary evidence, it is
not uncommon for FPU neighborhood and documents checks to come
back as genuine in cases without strong secondary evidence. We
also routinely see cases involving counterfeit, fraudulent or
insufficient divorce documents. As with marriage documents, some
involve true counterfeits, but some involve fraudulent documents
given as a favor to the applicant. We also see cases where a
claim of divorce is based on an affidavit of divorce without a
corresponding official divorce certificate from a court or an
office authorized to register divorces. A bare divorce affidavit
is not sufficient in Bangladesh for any type of divorce, and the
presence of a bare affidavit is a key fraud indicator. We have a
nearly 100% fraud rate in cases of divorce affidavits, most often
in cases of IR2 step-children.
Historically, most of our E3 cases have been fraudulent,
especially for Indian specialty cooks. Over the past several
years, there have been several well-publicized cases of
immigration lawyers who confessed to large-scale abuse of such
visas on behalf of their clients, including many Bangladeshis.
Although the overall number of E3 principals applying for visas
is very low, most E3 cases are referred to the FPU for
investigation. We also process a large number of follow-to-join
cases for E3 derivatives. In these cases, we focus primarily on
age fraud concerns, though with the generous relief offered by
CSPA, most applicants will qualify as children.
Post receives a number of requests each year from DHS
adjudicators in the various service centers or in CIS offices for
document verification, generally for marriage and divorce
documents and work certificates. In 2005, we completed 17
investigations for DHS, and in 12 cases, we determined that the
applicant had submitted fake documents. Half of the bad cases
were marriage or divorce document checks, and the other half were
work certificates.
¶5. DV FRAUD: Bangladeshis are enthusiastic participants in the
DV program. For the past five years, Bangladeshis have submitted
more entries than anyone else, and Bangladesh perennially ranks
in the top 5 for DV winners. Unfortunately, Bangladeshis are
equally enthusiastic about DV fraud, and our DV unit faces a
daily barrage of fake or altered school documents, fraudulent
work letters, and suspect marriages. DV brokers and visa fixers
are a part of the landscape in Bangladesh (Ref C), and our A/RSO-
I continues to work with local police on several ongoing DV fraud
ring investigations.
DHAKA 00000997 005 OF 008
Occupational qualification fraud is the easiet to detect and
defeat. Using the O-Net standards, adjudicators ask detailed
d
questions about the applicants usual work and can usually
quickly identify those who qualify from those who are inflating
their qualifications. Relatively few cases are referred for
document verification, but in more than 70% of these marginal
cases, an investigation revealed that the applicants either
overstated their qualifications or submitted fraudulent work
letters.
Counterfeit and/or altered school certificates are also
commonplace. Post has extensive exemplar files of genuine and
fake Secondary School Certificates (SSC) and Higher Secondary
Certificates (HSC) from all the regional Boards of Education.
These are available in both hard copy and electronic soft copy,
available to consular staff through our FPU Front Page, a quasi-
website maintained on our consular shared drive with many such
resources and document guides. In the past, FPU teams made
frequent visits to regional Boards to check certificates. We
have cultivated good relations with Board officials, an effort
that pays handsome rewards in allowing us great access to the
Boards. We regularly sit with these officials to brief them on
counterfeits and altered documents that we have uncovered and to
talk about various security features that are slowly being
incorporated into Board certificates. We find that historically,
certificates from the Dhaka, Comilla and Sylhet Boards are the
most common counterfeits presented by applicants. In particular,
we believe there is one counterfeiter who specializes in Comilla
Board certificates, and we have seen many examples of his work,
both in Dhaka and in documents referred from Persian Gulf posts
for verification.
In October 2005, the Ministry of Education took a giant leap into
the 21st century by establishing a website for on-line
verification of certificates, www.educationboard.gov.bd. The
website allows verification of certificates issued after the
computerization of Board records, generally from the mid-1990s.
To access a record, you must enter the Board name, the year of
the test, the type of test, and the students Roll Number, all of
which are found on the certificate. From October 2005 to January
2006, we ran all Board checks in parallel to verify that the
results of the on-line check were consistent with the physical
Board records, and we found that on-line checks had a 100% match
to the physical records check. In many suspect certificates the
biographic information did not match the online check, indicating
that a physical change may have been done at the Board, after the
applicant won the DV in order to match the winning DV entry.
Since the online check is so easy, we have changed our processing
of DV cases, and the DV unit now conducts a check of all possible
education certificates before interview. While we must still
check older certificates at the Boards, we anticipate a 50%
reduction in the number of cases referred to the FPU for
verification. We will also randomly select one week a quarter
when all certificates will be sent for physical check in order to
continue to validate the accuracy of the data base.
Since DV winners automatically become the most eligible of
potential spouses, many of our cases involve winners who married
after winning the DV. As previously discussed, the tradition of
settled marriages makes it extremely difficult to distinguish
between traditional arranged marriages and marriages for
immigration purposes. Again, we rely on the usual array of
secondary evidence to establish that a genuine marriage exists.
¶6. ACS and PASSPORT FRAUD: We have extremely low incidence of
fraud in these areas. Rarely, we will have a CRBA case where DNA
testing shows that the alleged AmCit father is not actually the
father. This year, we are aware of three instances where
imposters attempted to use a US passport to travel to the US.
One was an imposter case, and the other two are more conventional
cover or photo-sub cases. In 2004, we also had four such cases,
one imposter and three photo- or cover-subs. However, the most
recent case has an unusual twist in that the true bearer of the
cover-subbed passport is a Bangladeshi-American with a history of
DHAKA 00000997 006 OF 008
losing passports. According to PIERS, the holder claimed that
the passport had been during a home invasion in February 1999.
However, while reviewing the case, Post FPM found one of the
other passports in our files that the holder claimed was lost on
a subway in New York City in September 1994. The British
Airline Liaison Officer (ALO) had intercepted the passport in the
possession of an imposter on November 14, 1994 in Dhaka. This
passport had a variety of entry and exit stamps, showing that
someone entered Bangladesh on May 31, 1994, and then stayed until
November 14, 1994. We found it remarkable that the passport was
lost in New York when it never left Bangladesh.
¶7. ADOPTION FRAUD: Adoptions are a difficult proposition in
n
Bangladesh. Bangladesh civil law makes no provision for
adoptions, and Islamic law prohibits all adoptions and Hindu law
prohibits almost all adoptions. The only recourse is for
Bangladeshi adults to apply for an order of guardianship under
the 1890 Guards and Wards Act. Foreigners are not permitted to
become guardians in this manner. In some cases, this order can
form the basis of an IR-4 petition. Most of our fraud involves
direct transfers between family members where a relative in the
US seeks to adopt a cousin or nephew/niece in order to give the
child a better life in the US. The family in Bangladesh
generally tries to fraudulently conceal their standard of living
in order to qualify the child as an eligible orphan.
There is also a tradition of social adoptions in Bangladesh
where families take in orphans of relatives or foundlings and
raise them as their own. The parents never regularize the
childs status, and the child may not even be aware of his or her
er
actual parentage. This causes very sad situations when DNA
testing reveals that one or another child may not be eligible to
receive a visa in preference cases.
¶8. ASYLUM and other DHS BENEFIT FRAUD: Dhaka handles both VISAS
92 follow-to-join cases and requests for investigation in ongoing
political asylum cases. We receive investigation requests both
from DRL/CRA and directly from some DHS FDNS officers. Last
year, we processed more than 100 follow-to-join cases and
conducted 22 investigations. In only 3 of our investigations did
we verify the documents submitted by asylum seekers. Our files
are literally bulging with hundreds of cases where the FPU has
uncovered document fraud in asylum cases.
Officers regularly hear admissions from derivatives that their
parents or spouses asylum case is bogus. When pressed to
describe the persecution that the asylee supposedly suffered,
most cannot name even a single incident, or if they can describe
e
some incidents, they claim that no police report was ever filed.
Furthermore, we encounter NIV and IV applicants, generally men,
who have a history of filing a fraudulent asylum claim coupled
with extensive illegal presence and/or a deportation. Generally,
they sheepishly admit that the asylum claim was only a method to
gain permission to stay in the US. We have also heard stories of
immigration lawyers in New York who regularly advised their
clients to file fake asylum claims under false identities as the
best way to gain legal status in the US. All of this leads us to
view asylum follow-to-join cases with some degree of skepticism.
However, as per FAM guidance, we suspend our disbelief regarding
the legitimacy of the basic asylum grant in most VISAS 92 cases
and merely focus on the derivatives. As with many IV cases, we
regularly find cases of probable and suspected age fraud among
child derivatives. However, given the generous nature of CSPA
relief, we rarely investigate these cases. In the very rare
instances where we uncover serious information about the basic
asylum claim, we forward our information to the appropriate DHS
office for review.
With investigations, we generally are asked to verify police or
court documents or medical certificates. As with most
Bangladeshi documents, police and court documents are easily
counterfeited. Fortunately, we have always been able to check
such documents at police stations and courts, though we always
DHAKA 00000997 007 OF 008
strictly adhere to the standards of confidentiality for such
investigations. Most often we find that the documents are
completely fake, though occasionally in cases where the police
records concern petty crimes, the documents turn out to be
correct. Most medical certificates are nearly unverifiable,
since most clinics and doctors offices keep minimal records.
Last year the FPM and the Deputy Political Officer drafted an
information paper on pertinent political and social issues in
Bangladesh for use by DHS asylum officers. Hopefully, this
information will make it easier for DHS officers to more easily
sort out genuine asylum cases from the vast sea of fraudulent or
spurious cases.
¶9. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: Most
Bangladesh government officials are helpful when approached on an
individual case basis, such as a school certificate or police
station check. However, at present, courts and the police are
still generally uninterested and unmotivated to take steps that
would hinder the ability of Bangladeshis to travel abroad in
search of work. Addressing this lack of interest has been one of
the key goals for our new A/RSO-I over the past six months. Our
active and energetic A/RSO-I has made remarkable steps in
strengthening his contacts and our links with the police,
especially Special Branch which controls officers assigned to
immigration duties, and the Directorate-General of Passports and
Immigration with goal of institutionalizing these relationships.
He has used training opportunities, both post-sponsored and
Department-sponsored, as his entre in these efforts. The
response has been overwhelmingly positive, and we hope to build
this relationship to the point where the police will actively
assist with the arrest and prosecution of offenders in serious
immigration fraud and alien smuggling cases. As an initial
indication of his success in forging cooperative relationships
with the right people in the police, our A/RSO-I recently
obtained a large number of immigration records requested by the
FPU for use in a validation study of F1/F2 applicants, the first
time we have obtained this type of information.
¶10. AREAS OF CONCERN: Last year, Chittagong, the major southern
port city, was identified as a transit point in the ongoing major
international smuggling of Chinese nationals using Singaporean
passports. Lacking any Western diplomatic missions to provide
de
airport coverage, mala fide travelers come from Bangkok for
further passage on to Dubai. The smuggling ring originally used
the main international airport in Dhaka, but the efforts of the
resident British ALO drove them out, forcing them to use the
smaller airport in Chittagong. We continue to be greatly
concerned with the lack of security with Bangladesh documents,
especially passports, though we have little optimism that the
government will have either the will or the capacity to
adequately address the problem in the near future.
Dhaka boasts an active Anti-Fraud Working Group comprised of more
than 20 members from many diplomatic missions, including all the
Europeans countries, Australia, Canada and the US. The group
regularly exchanges information about mala fide applicants, fake
documents, and fake document vendors. The British ALO is an
essential part of our efforts, providing a constant presence at
the airport to detect and confiscate fraudulent travel documents
of all kinds. Our A/RSO-I is working closely with the British
ALO to provide additional coverage, when needed.
¶11. STAFFING AND TRAINING: Post has a full-time FPM who also
doubles as the Deputy Consular Chief, a JO back-up, an EFM, and
four, soon to be five, full-time LES. Under post policy, all
fraud investigations are done by a team of one American and one
FSN. We are fortunate that our JO and our EFM are both FSI-
trained Bangla speakers, which helps reduce the possibilities of
malfeasance or fraud during the conduct of investigations. The
FPM and his alternate have taken the FPM course, and three of our
four investigators have attended the FPU FSN workshop at FSI.
FPM: Robert J. Jachim (EOD: JUN 2006)
Alternate FPM: Brian R. Peterson (EOD: SEP 2006)
EFM: Mark L. Stillwell
DHAKA 00000997 008 OF 008
FSN Supervisor: Syed A. Reza
FSN Investigators: John B. DCosta, Maske Jannat, and Khan J.
Ali
The FPM provides detailed training to all newly-arrived officers
and FSNs on current fraud trends, fraud history, and fraud
indicators. The FPU offers a monthly briefing on topics of
interest and the FPM provides a quarterly briefing/training,
usually covering the latest fraudulent documents or trends. The
FPU also maintains a local quasi-website on our consular shared
drive with scanned images of genuine and fake school certificates
and other personal documents, such as marriage and divorce
certificates. This information is available from the desktop of
all computers at the interview window.
¶12. Dhakas FPU is always ready to offer assistance to other
posts and agencies with questions regarding Bangladeshi documents
or applicants. We can be contacted through individual email or
through DhakaFPM@state.gov.
CHAMMAS