Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06DAMASCUS392, AN ALAWITE-SUNNI CHAT ON KHADDAM, FUTURE OF REGIME

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06DAMASCUS392.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06DAMASCUS392 2006-02-02 15:08 2011-05-04 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Damascus
Appears in these articles:
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10402
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10403
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10404
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10405
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10406
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11322
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11323
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11324
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11325
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11326
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11327
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11328
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11329
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11330
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11331
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11332
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11333
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11336
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11337
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11338
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11339
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11340
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11341
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11342
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11343
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11344
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11345
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11346
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11348
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11349
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDM #0392/01 0331508
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021508Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6841
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0608
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000392 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: AN ALAWITE-SUNNI CHAT ON KHADDAM, FUTURE OF REGIME 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d. 
 
1.  (C)  The criticisms and maneuvering of former VP Khaddam 
continue to generate intense private discussion in Syria. 
According to Sunni politician XXXXXXXXXXXX on January 30, a 
retired senior Alawite military officer pribvately endorsed 
Khaddam's views and noted fears that he and other former 
Alawite security officers might be arrested for sympathizing 
or conspiring with Khaddam.  This officer pressed XXXXXXXXXXXX to 
find out if the U.S. wanted to get rid of Bashar al-Asad or 
preferred to maintain his minority regime in Syria. 
Separately, XXXXXXXXXXXX touched briefly on the political strength 
of recently released detainee Riad Seif and on the potential 
political power of the Muslim Brotherhood.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) A SUNNI-ALAWITE CHAT:  Sunni politician XXXXXXXXXXXX
recounted for Polchief January 30 a discussion he had earlier 
in the day with XXXXXXXXXXXX, an Alawite who served as a former 
senior Syrian army officer XXXXXXXXXXXX and still maintained close contact with former SMI 
head XXXXXXXXXXXX, considered the most influential of retired 
Alawite military officers in Syria.  XXXXXXXXXXXX told XXXXXXXXXXXX he 
had come on behalf of XXXXXXXXXXXX, whom he had seen at lunch the day 
before.  (Note:  According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX was Ghazi 
Kana'an's chief deputy in Lebanon for several years.) 
 
3.  (C) ALAWITE ENDORSEMENT OF KHADDAM:  XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX 
discussed the implications of the press campaign launched by 
former VP Khaddam in Paris.  XXXXXXXXXXXX had described Khaddam as 
"my friend" and noted somewhat cryptically that "he is 
depending on us."  XXXXXXXXXXXX had also noted that when he and 
other former (Alawite) security officials like XXXXXXXXXXXX and 
XXXXXXXXXXXX, and 
XXXXXXXXXXXX 
and others got together, they talked about "the same 
problems, in the same tone," that Khaddam had used.  These 
included Bashar al-Asad's mistakes in Lebanon, his mistakes 
in handling internal affairs in Syria, his misguided 
rapprochement with Iran, as well as his ill-advised embrace 
of Hamas leader Khalid Misha'al.  XXXXXXXXXXXX described XXXXXXXXXXXX as 
angry about Bashar's mistakes. 
 
4.  (C) KHADDAM'S LAST NIGHT IN SYRIA:  XXXXXXXXXXXX told XXXXXXXXXXXX 
that Khaddam had spent one of his last nights in Syria 
playing cards and discussing the situation with XXXXXXXXXXXX, who now fears that the regime is lying in wait for 
him.  XXXXXXXXXXXX said he thought Khaddam had contacted XXXXXXXXXXXX by 
phone in late January.  XXXXXXXXXXXX had reached out to XXXXXXXXXXXX and 
asked him, XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX to stand behind him if the 
regime tried to move against him, reported XXXXXXXXXXXX.  In 
XXXXXXXXXXXX view, Khaddam is planning more steps.  XXXXXXXXXXXX described 
Khaddam's actions as a conspiracy against the regime. 
 
5.  (C) BASHAR'S POPULARITY AMONG ALAWITES:  XXXXXXXXXXXX told 
XXXXXXXXXXXX that Asad was not popular at all among most Alawites, 
most of whom remain mired in poverty.  He had also probed 
XXXXXXXXXXXX about whether the U.S. wanted to maintain the Alawites 
in power as a minority regime and if it had objections to a 
Sunni regime in Syria, which in his view would provide more 
stability.  He had also noted that the Israelis wanted a 
minority regime.  XXXXXXXXXXXX said he countered that in his view 
the Americans did not favor continued rule by the Alawites, 
given Washington's support for democratization.  Both men had 
agreed that it would be impossible for an Alawite to become 
President of Syria after Bashar al-Asad, who had arrived to 
power under unique circumstances. 
 
6.  (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX IMPRESSIONS OF XXXXXXXXXXXX:  XXXXXXXXXXXX noted to 
Polchief that XXXXXXXXXXXX had wanted to convey his fear that the 
regime might try to imprison him because of his contacts with 
Khaddam.  Further, he had wanted to convey that "we are not 
with the President," said XXXXXXXXXXXX.  XXXXXXXXXXXX also wanted XXXXXXXXXXXX 
to try to determine whether the Americans wanted Bashar to 
continue in power or not.  XXXXXXXXXXXX had expressed concern that 
Khaddam was not accepted by the U.S. and at one point had 
complained that it seemed that the U.S. wanted Bashar to 
continue. 
 
7.  (C) RIAD SEIF; MUSLIM BROTHERS:  On other subjects, 
XXXXXXXXXXXX described recently released Damascus Spring detainee 
Riad Seif as a good man and as someone XXXXXXXXXXXX could work 
with, but noted that his political support beyond the elite 
level was very thin.  According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, there is still a 
strong perception that Seif is a leftist, which would hurt 
him with conservative religious people in Syria, the vast 
majority.  On a separate issue, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that an Islamist 
political movement in Syria led by the Muslim Brothers or 
some like-minded group would not have more than 10-20 percent 
support in Syria (see septel for a fuller discussion of his 
and others views on this subject.) 
 
8.  (C) COMMENT:  Although XXXXXXXXXXXX is one of our more 
reliable political contacts, it is still a bit difficult to 
know what to make of his conversation with XXXXXXXXXXXX.  It does 
seem to reveal some of the nervous fissures that Khaddam's 
press antics and maneuvering have opened up, at least on the 
outer fringes of the regime.  XXXXXXXXXXXX continues to nurse 
grander political ambitions, seeing himself as a conservative 
but broad-minded Sunni (and prominent businessman) with 
long-standing support in minority communities like the 
Alawites, Christians, and Kurds.  XXXXXXXXXXXX has created family ties and affiliations over 
the years that have helped him nurture special relations with 
senior Alawite regime figures, especially in the security 
services, even when his opposition politics led him to 
criticize the regime and call for change.  These affiliations 
also probably kept him out of prison over the years.  He is a 
harsh critic of Bashar and has refused repeated entreaties to 
meet with him since the young Asad took power.  XXXXXXXXXXXX 
assessed that the internal situation in Syria remained stable 
and the regime was weakened but still in control, with 
"outside permission" to remain in power. 
 
 
SECHE