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Viewing cable 06BASRAH21, PRTS IN THE SOUTH: U.S. AND U.K. DISCUSS WHEN AND HOW THEY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BASRAH21 2006-02-19 13:17 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED REO Basrah
VZCZCXRO2211
OO RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHBC #0021/01 0501317
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 191317Z FEB 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0249
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0266
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000021 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SBU 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: PRTS IN THE SOUTH: U.S. AND U.K. DISCUSS WHEN AND HOW THEY 
WILL OPERATE 
 
 
BASRAH 00000021  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  On February 15, Ambassador Speckhard visited 
the U.S. Regional Embassy Office (REO) and the British Embassy 
Office in Basrah to discuss the formation of southern Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). TheU.K. is well-advanced in their 
planning, with the meetings taking place in the PRT headquarters 
building. The U.K side underlined its readiness to move swiftly 
to support to support the stand-up of the PRT. The discussion 
highlighted the challenges facing the Basrah PRT due to the 
current unstable security situation and a dysfunctional Governor 
and Provincial Council.  End Summary. 
 
Participants 
-------------- 
 
2.   (SBU) The meeting was hosted by the U.K. on the British 
side of the Basrah Palace compound, in the building that will 
serve as the Basrah PRT headquarters. Ambassador Speckhard met 
with representatives from the U.K. Foreign Commonwealth Office 
(FCO) in Basrah, the Department for International Development 
(DFID) and MND-SE to discuss the Provincial Reconstruction Team 
concept in southern Iraq. The main participants also included 
Greg Bates, Director, National Coordination Team (NCT), James 
Tansley, Her Majesty's Consul General and Maj. Gen. John Cooper, 
General Officer Commanding, MND-SE as well as representatives 
from the REO and USAID. 
 
 
Overall Assessments for Transition 
------------------------------------------ 
 
3.  (SBU) The Consul General (CG) began the meeting with an 
overview of each of the four southern provinces.  The overviews 
covered current situations regarding security, economics and 
governance, achievements to date and an assessment of readiness 
for transition.  Both Muthanna and Maysan were judged to be 
ready for transition by April/May and Dhi Qar was assessed to be 
ready for transition later in 2006.  Of the four southern 
provinces, Basrah was determined to be the most problematic in 
terms of governance and security.  Maj. Gen. Cooper said that 
recent efforts to clean up the police force in Basrah have been 
successful and they will continue to do so although it creates 
political difficulties with the Governor and Provincial Council. 
 
GOC Cooper comments on Maysan 
------------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) Ambassador Speckhard asked about the security 
situation in Maysan and if lawlessness there had the potential 
to spread to other provinces following the transition.  Maj. 
Gen. Cooper said that it would not.  Cooper said that the 
British would not withdraw entirely but would leave an element 
there and he was confident that re-entering the province to 
quell violence would not be a problem.  He said that the threats 
and violence found in Maysan result from the province's 
independent nature and issues that typically arise are generally 
contained amongst the local tribes and various political 
factions.  He said that this situation has been the norm in 
Maysan prior to the arrival of coalition forces and would 
continue to be the situation long after coalition forces leave 
Iraq.  Cooper stressed that the issues in Maysan would have to 
be solved by Iraqis at the national, local and tribal levels.  A 
layered approach, according to Cooper, would be more effective 
and coalition forces would support the Iraqis in the background, 
but resolution would have to come from the Iraqis themselves. 
He said he would not involve his troops in conflicts between 
Iraqis. But could move to contain conflicts if necessary.  The 
Consul General reaffirmed that Maysan should not be seen as 
unstable, but as independent. 
 
Basrah PRT 
-------------- 
 
5. (SBU) The CG stated that the U.K. team would continue to push 
ahead on projects that have already begun.  He said that the PRT 
would be operational in six weeks and fully staffed and 
functional three months from that time.  He added that the U.K. 
model anticipates 40 international staff supported by a large 
number of locally engaged staff and mentioned that the PRT team 
leader would report through the FCO to the NCT.  Ambassador 
Speckhard questioned the reporting line, noting the need for 
direct reporting to the NCT.  The CG clarified his statement 
that the PRT would report to him mainly on administrative and 
managerial issues.  He added that it was important to have open 
lines of communication for reporting purposes and that life 
support needs for staff members should be provided by each 
member's own country. Greg Bates clarified that all 
administrative and operational costs of the PRT should be borne 
by the host country and that funding from the NCT to the PRTs 
would be for reconstruction projects/programs. 
 
BASRAH 00000021  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
For the Near Future 
----------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) Ambassador Speckhard said that it would be a good idea 
for those involved in the Basrah PRT to make a trip to Baghdad 
to discuss and finalize administrative details. The CG also 
expressed an interest in visiting one of the three PRTs that is 
already functioning.  Other issues to be clarified involve the 
chain of command in terms of reporting.  There is also the issue 
of determining the location from which support would be provided 
to Muthanna province, assuming that it is not a Coalition-led 
PRT.  The CG suggested that the Muthanna PRT could be supported 
out of Basrah province, although he was open to US suggestions 
that Dhi Qar province might be better positioned to provide this 
support and engagement. 
 
Comment 
----------- 
 
7.  (SBU) Comment:  The visit of Ambassador Speckhard to Basrah 
was a success.  A number of participants commented that having 
all the players in one room to discuss the implementation of 
southern PRTs was very useful. The U.K is clearly committed to 
standing up the PRT.  The U.K. representatives were pleased to 
learn of the significant contribution that the U.S would make to 
this effort.. End Comment. 
 
8.  This cable has been cleared by Ambassador Speckhard. 
GROSS