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Viewing cable 06BAKU317, AZERBAIJAN'S OPPOSITION LEADERS DISCUSS PLANS WITH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BAKU317 2006-02-28 14:16 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Baku
VZCZCXRO1685
RR RUEHCD RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHSR
DE RUEHKB #0317/01 0591416
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 281416Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9741
INFO RUCNOSC/ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY COOPERATION IN EUROPE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000317 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM KDEM ASEC PGOV PREL PINR IR AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN'S OPPOSITION LEADERS DISCUSS PLANS WITH 
AMBASSADOR 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION. 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: During separate mid-February meetings with 
Ambassador, three prominent opposition leaders discussed 
their plans for party development and election strategies 
this year.  While Ali Kerimli's Popular Front has 
reconstituted the Azadliq Bloc as a political bloc (without 
Musavat) and will boycott the May rerun elections, the party 
intends to remain active by holding public discussion forums 
on issues important to Azerbaijan's development.  Kerimli 
also asked for the international community's assistance to 
push the GOAJ on democracy and confront it on its missteps. 
Isa Gambar, chairman of Musavat party, stated that his party 
would seek to build a broader base of support in advance of 
the May reruns, in which Musavat will participate.  Gambar 
also spoke of his concern over Iran's nuclear proliferation 
intentions, and asked that the West not forget about Iran's 
northern neighbor.  Azerbaijan National Independence Party's 
Etibar Mammedov focused his comments to the ambassador on his 
party's internal divisions.  Mammedov maintained that despite 
the current chairman's power grab, he remains the rightful 
leader of ANIP and will guide decisions for the party, 
including participation in the May rerun elections.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
KERIMLI: DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLE MUST CONTINUE 
------------------------------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) Popular Front Party (PFP) Chairman Ali Kerimli 
expressed disappointment about the lost opportunities 
resulting from the November parliamentary elections, but 
resolved to continue pushing for democratic development 
(despite the fact that his party will boycott the May 
elections).  To fill the gaps of public discourse left by the 
"rubber stamp Parliament," he reported that PFP would hold 
numerous discussions throughout the year with the 
participation of a number of actors on everything from the 
oil revenues to election code and system reforms.  He also 
said his party will increase its activity in the regions to 
attract more supporters and would work with the international 
community to increase its efforts on democratization in 
Azerbaijan.  Finally, Kerimli said the party would continue 
to struggle for freedom of assembly. 
 
3. (SBU) Ambassador responded that he was pleased PFP would 
continue party-building activities this year and detailed 
several USAID-sponsored programs focused on democratic 
development.  Ambassador cautioned that these programs were 
not intended to produce immediate results, but rather to 
empower citizens with the knowledge and ideas needed to build 
a vibrant, democratic society for themselves.  Kerimli 
acknowledged that it was the role of Azerbaijanis, not 
outsiders, to build democracy.  However, he told Ambassador 
that programs would not be effective unless the USG worked on 
three key objectives first.  He encouraged the Ambassador to 
look at the obstacles to democracy and try to overcome those 
obstacles (such as falsified elections) by directly 
confronting the GOAJ on those issues.  He also said that the 
opposition and the GOAJ needed to be able to build a 
relationship through dialogue, and that the USG should 
support truly independent media.  Ambassador responded that 
Kerimli's points were largely accurate and they were areas in 
which the USG has been and would continue to be active. 
 
GAMBAR: SEEKING THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE 
----------------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Musavat chairman Isa Gambar also gave a broad 
overview to Ambassador of his party's plan for the coming 
year.  He said the party would focus on unifying Musavat's 
message with society and strengthening ties with the 
international community.  Musavat also plans to participate 
in both Parliament and the May 13 rerun elections.  Gambar 
asserted that "more than 50 percent of society" did not favor 
Musavat's participation in Parliament and the reruns, but 
said this was due to people's distrust of Parliament.  He 
decided to allow his party to participate in parliament in 
hopes of being able to convince the public it was the right 
thing to do.  In a thinly veiled criticism of Kerimli, Gambar 
added that certain "forces" are trying to use the decision to 
weaken the party by pointing out so-called inconsistencies. 
Gambar asserted, though, that Musavat has not been 
inconsistent and has remained faithful to both its supporters 
and its platform. 
 
5. (SBU) Changing topics, Gambar remarked that his party had 
always been interested in a democratic and liberal Iran.  He 
said, however, that the situation had become dangerous with 
Iran's desire for nuclear weapons.  Gambar said that nuclear 
proliferation would pose a direct threat to Azerbaijan, 
limiting its independence through the pressure Iran would be 
 
BAKU 00000317  002 OF 002 
 
 
able to exert on the GOAJ.  The hand of Iran in Azerbaijan 
was already evident, he said, as evidenced by Iran's attempts 
to influence opinion both on Iraq and Prophet Mohammed 
cartoons.  He said he favored resolving the Iran crisis 
through peaceful negotiations, but time was running out. 
Gambar estimated Iran would have a nuclear weapon within 
several months.  Gambar asked that the West help protect 
Azerbaijan from attack in the event that Iran develops 
nuclear weapons.  Because Iran seeks to work against both the 
US and US-allies, Gambar believes Azerbaijan would be 
directly in the line of fire.  Ambassador agreed that the 
Iranian situation was of concern, but the USG was working 
together with its European allies to negotiate a solution and 
to support internal Iranian movements for democracy. 
Ambassador added that he understands Azerbaijan's 
vulnerabilities, particularly with regards to Nakhchivan's 
energy supply. 
 
MAMMEDOV: WILL THE REAL ANIP PLEASE STAND UP 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Etibar Mammedov called on Ambassador to discuss the 
current tensions within his party.  Mammedov stepped down 
from a direct leadership role in the Azerbaijan National 
Independence Party (ANIP) more than a year ago, but 
maintained influence over its activity.  However, earlier 
this year the chairman of ANIP, Ali Aliyev, began a direct 
power play to apparently wrest the party from Mammedov's 
control.  Mammedov has now reasserted his control over ANIP, 
creating two factions.  Mammedov attributed the party's 
internal strife to the illegitimate and unwarranted power 
grab by Aliyev.  Mammedov said that Aliyev had run roughshod 
over ANIP's party council and had failed in his duties. 
Mammedov reported that his wing of the party council would 
meet on February 17 to decide whether ANIP would participate 
in the May rerun elections.  Mammedov affirmed that he 
believed participation in the reruns was in the party's 
interest and expected ANIP to field candidates in the 
election.  (Aliyev's ANIP wing has signed an agreement with 
the Azadliq Political Bloc, which will boycott the May 
elections).  Mammedov added that the two persons currently 
elected to Parliament under the ANIP banner were not in fact 
ANIP party nominees but rather prominent individuals who were 
party members supported by their political allies. 
Separately, Mammedov underscored his concern for the welfare 
of the Azeri community living in Iran in light of Iran's 
increasingly bellicose stance on the international stage. 
Mammedov concluded by asking the Ambassador for USG 
assistance in training ANIP's candidates for participation in 
the May reruns. 
HARNISH