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Viewing cable 06BAGHDAD475, GOI, EMBASSY AND DFID EXPECTING BIDS FOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BAGHDAD475 2006-02-15 17:54 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXRO8619
RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHGB #0475/01 0461754
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 151754Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2714
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0998
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000475 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS, SENSITIVE 
 
LONDON FOR ARAB MEDIA UNIT 
 
E.0. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EPET EFIN PGOV ECON KCOR KPAO OPRC IZ
SUBJECT:  GOI, EMBASSY AND DFID EXPECTING BIDS FOR 
TV AND RADIO ADS, MINISTRIES STILL REFINING "THE 
MESSAGE" 
 
1.  (SBU) On February 12, Embassy ECON and PAS, together 
with the Iraqi Government Communications Directorate (GCD) 
and the UK's Department for International Development 
(DFID), met with two Iraqi production companies to present 
our request for proposals for TV and radio ads.  All said 
they had the technical capacity to do the job, even while 
admitting that the message was a tough one for a government 
that had credibility problems with most citizens.  The 
companies were told to provide their best quotes by February 
18, along with samples of previous work. 
 
2. (SBU) On February 13, representatives from Ministry of 
Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA), Ministry of Finance, GCD, 
Embassy, USAID, International Republican Institute (IRI) and 
(DFID) met again to refine the public messages, making 
progress that included drafting possible scenarios for the 
ads (including proposed audio and video components).  At 
present, we have four "approved" scenarios (approved by the 
public relations gurus), and out of ten total crafted by 
Embassy ECON and PAS based on messages provided by the 
Iraqis.  Messages tended to focus on fighting smuggling, 
targeting support to aid Iraq's poorest, diverting subsidies 
to public investment, and sacrificing now for future 
generations.  We re-circulateD the "scenarios" by email as a 
package to the public affairs group on February 14.  The 
public affairs experts agreed in the meeting to present the 
package to Directors and Ministers.  Separately, EconOff 
made clear to the Deputy Minister of Finance, and DFID and 
Embassy PAS have made clear to GCD, that progress must 
proceed apace if the Iraqi government hopes to retain U.S. 
funding for the campaign. 
 
3. (SBU) Even absent approval of the policy experts at each 
ministry, Embassy plans to provide the "scenarios" to IRI on 
February 14 or 15 to test with focus groups. 
 
4.  (SBU) Since our first meeting with GOI officials to 
discuss the campaign, the process has been buffeted by media 
reports, government infighting, and now rumor.  In late 
January, Sharqiya TV reported that fuel prices might go up 
"ten-fold"; in the February 13 meeting, some officials noted 
that Iraqis now believed they would ultimately have to pay 
1500 dinars per liter, rather than the current import price 
(750 dinars).  Also, public education has been affected by 
news reports February 11 that the General Director of the 
Oil Products Distribution Company said that LPG shortages 
resulted from the failure of the Ministry of Finance to 
settle import accounts with Turkey, Iran, and the Gulf 
States.  We saw immediate fallout from this comment when 
Radio Nawa hosted a call-in show for an hour on February 12, 
which PAS monitored.  Callers' views follow: 
 
- Government negligence and administrative corruption is the 
problem. 
- The Iraqi Prime Minister and the Oil Ministry are behind 
this crisis. 
- There is administrative corruption in the Oil Ministry. 
- Basra is the scene of much fuel smuggling. 
- The cabinet is corrupt. 
- We must control militias which belong to some government 
members and are smuggling oil products. 
- If we cooperate with security officials, we might stop 
fuel smuggling. 
- The Iraqi government is creating this crisis on purpose to 
divert us from other issues (delays in government 
formation). 
- Private fuel stations smuggle fuel abroad with help of 
members of Iraqi government. 
 
5.  (SBU)  When Embassy PAS shared these observations with 
one GCD official at the meeting, he shrugged and said the 
government is much weaker than Iraqi political parties and 
there was no bureaucratic or institutional mechanism to 
address the problem.  Bureaucrats were not the ones, he 
implied, who could close the gap and restore government 
credibility. 
 
6.  (SBU)  In another example, the GCD Director, a political 
appointee of Ja'aferi's, has absented himself from three key 
meetings, even as we are trying to "empower" his institution 
to coordinate messages for the whole government.  His deputy 
-- who has had to step into the void -- is smart but 
obsequious and terrified of command.  Other obviously Ba'ath 
era traits impede progress.  The deputy stated that he was 
unable to engage PAS officer in a "pre-brief," he said, 
because all comments must be recorded, and because it was 
inconceivable for anyone to talk before the session had been 
formally "opened." 
 
BAGHDAD 00000475  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
7.  (SBU)  In the February 13 meeting, participants proposed 
reviewing individually 29 separate proposals, and seemed 
shocked when urged to just toss out their favorites for 
general dissection by others, which they finally did.  The 
IRI director, who has been in Iraq for over a year, and the 
DFID advisor, both saw Embassy frustrations with slow 
progress.  They praised us for attempting to give the Iraqis 
ownership of this campaign, and encouraged our continued 
forbearance in this important capacity-building effort. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8. (SBU)  Iraqis -- especially government employees -- even 
while accepting much disarray in their daily lives -- seem 
unable to tolerate a freestyle approach in meetings.  It 
took quite some prompting by the non-Iraqi participants, but 
the in the end, the bureaucrats bravely abandoned their 
formalistic approach.  The process vividly underscores that 
we face major voids in human resource and institutional 
capacity.  We also see that the current public affairs 
approach:  carping among ministries or silence from the most 
senior officials, promotes neither public trust in the 
government nor the credibility of a future message.  As we 
continue pushing the agenda with the Iraqis involved in 
formulating a message, the Embassy will urge Iraqi officials 
to keep their discussions and institutional rivalries 
private. 
 
KHALILZAD