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Viewing cable 06BAGHDAD293, UPDATE ON DETAINEE FACILITY INSPECTIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BAGHDAD293 2006-02-01 18:25 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #0293/01 0321825
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 011825Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2431
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000293 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MOPS PREL PINS PHUM KJUS MARR IZ
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON DETAINEE FACILITY INSPECTIONS 
 
REF: 05 BAGHDAD 4921 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The Iraqi Interagency Inspection Team 
(IIIT), created in response to the discovery of abuses at the 
Ministry of Interior's (MoI's) al-Jadriyah (Bunker) detention 
facility in November and supported by Multi-National 
Forces-Iraq (MNF-I), has conducted four unannounced 
inspections of Iraqi detention facilities: two Baghdad MoI 
facilities, one Baghdad Ministry of Defense (MoD) facility, 
and an MoI facility in Tal Afar.  All four sites had 
inadequate living conditions, health services, and legal 
access.  Detainees interviewed from three of the four sites 
alleged and showed signs of physical abuse.  At one site, 
MNF-I substantiated three reports of recent physical abuse. 
At another site, two-thirds of the detainees interviewed 
complained of past abuse and, of those seen, all showed scars 
consistent with being physically abused and tortured. 
Reports of bribery-connected releases were alleged at two 
facilities. Inadequate provision of food and water was noted 
at two of the four sites.  The Iraqi and MNF-I participants 
have submitted to the Prime Minister's office separate 
reports on the four visits detailing the findings and 
recommendations for follow-up actions.  Copies also have been 
submitted to Minister of Defense Sadoun al-Dulaime and 
Minister of Interior Bayan Jabr.  The next three inspections 
will take place over the next few weeks.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------------- 
MoI Special Police Commando 
Detention Facility - Baghdad 
---------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) On December 8, 2005, the IIIT conducted a surprise 
inspection of the Special Police Commando Detention facility 
in Baghdad (reftel).  The facility held approximately 625 
detainees in four large rooms and a courtyard.  Forty-six of 
these detainees were actually MoD detainees who apparently 
had been transferred from a MoD facility.  The facility had 
no records pertaining to these individuals and no one 
managing the facility knew why MoD detainees were transferred 
to this MoI facility. 
 
3.  (SBU) The detainees were held in grossly overcrowded 
rooms and exposed to extremely unsanitary conditions.  The 
rooms were dark, damp and without functioning electricity. 
Detainees were forced to remain in these rooms for 23.5 hours 
per day.  Deprived of light, most detainees had to cover 
their eyes from the sunlight when they exited their rooms for 
interviews with the IIIT representatives. 
 
4.  (SBU) Many of the detainees complained of physical abuse. 
 All who did so were screened by a U.S. medical officer who 
was able to substantiate three cases of recent abuse.  Many 
detainees who complained of past abuse showed scars 
consistent with being physically abused and tortured.  These 
claims included being raped, beaten with hoses and wires, 
hung from the ceiling, and burned with cigarettes.  Many also 
claimed to be victims of abuse at other facilities in the 
past and at their points of capture. 
 
5.  (SBU) Detainees complained of inadequate access to 
medical care.  Thirteen were injured to such a degree that 
they needed immediate medical care beyond what the U.S. 
medical officer could provide and so were hospitalized. 
Injuries included severe bruising consistent with being 
beaten, broken bones, burn marks, dislocated shoulders, and 
infections within wounds. 
 
6.  (SBU) All detainees complained of inadequate food and 
water.  Detention authorities confirmed that detainees were 
fed approximately twice a day with servings consisting of one 
half-slice of pita bread, a small piece of cheese, and a 
small portion of rice. 
 
7.  (SBU) All detainees complained of lack of access to 
courts or attorneys and alleged that the only way for them to 
be released from detention was to have their families bribe 
the judge and the detention facility commander.  That the 
judge released 50 detainees who admittedly had not been 
investigated and cleared by an investigative judge lends 
credence to this allegation. 
 
----------------------------------- 
MoD Iraqi Army Intelligence Service 
Detention Facility - Baghdad 
----------------------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU) On December 20, the IIIT conducted a surprise 
inspection of the MoD Iraqi Army Intelligence Service 
Detention Facility.  This facility held approximately 324 
detainees in overcrowded but not severely sub-standard 
conditions.  They were housed in seven rooms, each with its 
own latrine and shower.  Although the rooms were free of 
dirt, there was neither adequate air circulation nor heaters 
or air conditioners.  All rooms were dim and reeked from the 
stench of body odor.  Detainees slept on blankets and foam 
mats. 
 
9.  (SBU) Unlike detainees at the first MOI site inspected 
December 8, Iraqi Nation Intelligence Service (INIS) 
detainees were reasonably well-fed and did not claim or show 
signs of recent physical abuse.  However, two-thirds did 
claim past physical abuse and/or torture.  Many claimed that 
this abuse occurred at the point of capture or in other 
detention facilities.  Many detainees had scars consistent 
with being physically abused and tortured. 
 
10.  (SBU) Although there was a doctor on-site, three 
detainees suspected of having tuberculosis were simply 
quarantined to a separate room and were not receiving proper 
medical care.  We were told that if detainees at this 
facility are in need of hospital care, they can receive only 
one-day treatment due to the lack of secure facilities at 
area hospitals. 
 
11.  (SBU) There was little evidence that these detainees had 
been integrated into the Iraqi judicial system; most claimed 
to have been detained for more than three months, and most 
said they had not seen a judge or lawyer.  Many detainees 
alleged that they did not know the charges against them. 
According to the facility warden, a judge from the Central 
Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI) has reviewed each case.  (NOTE: 
MOD does not appear to have a legal basis for security 
detention under Iraqi law, and MNF-I has put significant 
effort in the Baghdad area into introducing due process to 
the cases of detainees captured by Iraqi Army units.  END 
NOTE.) 
 
--------------------------------- 
MoI Detention Facility - Tal Afar 
--------------------------------- 
 
12.  (SBU) On December 28, the IIIT conducted a surprise 
inspection of an MoI detention facility in Tal Afar.  This 
facility housed nine MoI detainees. Required records were 
up-to-date and contained an accurate accounting of all 
MoI-detained persons.  However, the team was told that MoD 
forces dropped off four detainees at the facility on December 
27.  These detainees were not properly entered into the 
detention facility's records, and MoD forces removed the four 
detainees from the facility prior to the arrival of the team. 
 MoD officials claimed that they frequently use the facility 
as a temporary holding cell until they can transfer detainees 
to an MoD detention facility.  That MOD detainees are moved 
through the facility without any recordkeeping concerned the 
IIIT. 
 
13.  (SBU) The rooms housing the detainees were substandard 
in that they lacked proper running water, heat, and bedding 
other than cardboard boxes on the cement floor.  The 
detainees appeared to be well-fed, were not apprehensive 
about communicating with the inspectors, and neither 
displayed signs of abuse nor claimed to have been physically 
abused. 
 
14.  (SBU) Due to the facility's close proximity to the local 
court, the IIIG was able to interview the four judges 
responsible for detainees.  These judges acknowledged that 
they did not have an adequate system for ensuring that 
detainees' cases were properly reviewed in a timely manner or 
that all detainees were being reported properly to the court. 
 The judges stated that they would coordinate with the 
detention facility officials to initiate a system whereby the 
judges would routinely visit the detention facility to 
inspect its records and to account for the detainees. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
MoI Detention Facility at the 
Major Crimes Unit Headquarters - Baghdad 
---------------------------------------- 
 
15.  (SBU) On January 19, the IIIT conducted an unannounced 
inspection of the MoI detention facility within the Major 
Crimes Unit Headquarters in Baghdad.  This facility housed 
214 detainees.  Compared to other Iraqi detention facilities 
inspected by the IIIT, this facility was slightly cleaner and 
provided better ventilation and heating.  Detainees were 
housed in groups of 11-15 per cell or 60-73 per cell.  Space 
was well below minimal international standards for humane 
treatment of detainees, with detainees barely being able to 
lay down at the same time within each cell.  Detainees slept 
on blankets.  There was one toilet and one shower per cell. 
One group of detainees was located on an outdoor, open-air 
patio, and was moved into a central hallway during inclement 
weather.  The facility was relatively clean and had no 
evidence of trash or human waste on the floors. 
 
16.  (SBU) Detainees reported receiving three small portions 
of porridge daily (approximately 150 grams per portion) and 
tap water from the bathroom.  They appeared to be well 
nourished and did not complain of lack of food or water. 
 
17.  (SBU) Detainees consistently reported a lack of medical 
care at the facility, which was confirmed by guards. 
Detainees and guards reported that no doctor had visited the 
facility in more than three months. Care was being provided 
in one cell by a detainee who is an Iraqi anesthesiologist. 
Detainees were provided medications by their families but 
reported that most medications were confiscated by the 
guards.  There were no obvious cases of serious illness or 
injury warranting emergency evacuation. 
 
18.  (SBU) Many detainees complained of being tortured at 
other facilities before they were transferred to the present 
facility.  Limited, direct examinations of approximately 20 
detainees were conducted by the U.S. medical doctor on the 
team.  No detainees claimed or displayed physical injuries 
consistent with recent torture or abuse.  However, some 
injuries observed were consistent with claims of prior 
torture and included poorly healed extremity fractures, 
burns, scars from whipping, anal injury with incontinence, 
foot deformity from being suspended upside down and 
repeatedly struck on the bottom of the feet, and inability to 
speak after blows to the head.  All examined detainees 
reported that they had not been offered or provided medical 
care at any time for their injuries. 
 
19. (SBU) COMMENT: The mistreatment discovered at the four 
inspected facilities inspected to date encompasses a handful 
of corroborated cases of deliberate torture, multiple 
uncorroborated allegations of previous torture weeks or 
months prior to interview, and widespread neglect and 
mistreatment severe enough to merit categorization as abuse. 
It is likely that both categories of abuse will prove 
difficult to eradicate.  Deliberate infliction of physical 
injury during interrogation is a long-embedded feature 
(perhaps the central feature) of Iraqi investigative 
practices.  Indeed, neglect and casual mistreatment of 
detainees are not only considered culturally acceptable, but 
are an inevitable and near-ubiquitous result of basic, 
systemic features of the current Iraqi detention system (such 
as unclear legal authorities, overcrowding, poor management 
of support contracts, judicial under-capacity, and 
corruption). 
 
20. (SBU) COMMENT CONTINUED: The work of the IIIT is going 
well to the extent that Iraqi participants from various 
ministries are attending meetings and the inspections.  They 
also appear to work well together and take their duties 
seriously.  However, the pace of the inspections is not going 
as quickly as anticipated.  We also fear that the momentum of 
the inspections and the composition of the team could be 
affected adversely during the government transition.  Above 
all, our foremost concern is that PM Ja'afari lacks the 
political will or ability to address the widespread abuse and 
lack of due process characteristic of Iraqi detention 
operations.  Early engagement on this issue with key figures 
in the incoming government will be critical in this regard. 
END COMMENT. 
KHALILZAD