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Viewing cable 06ANKARA544, TURKEY SAYS IT PLANS TO CUT STRAITS OIL TRAFFIC IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ANKARA544 2006-02-08 14:18 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXRO0007
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIHL RUEHIK RUEHKUK
RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHMOS RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHAK #0544/01 0391418
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 081418Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3016
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:PDUSDP/ISA:EUR/ISA:NESA/DSCA//
RHMFIUU/425ABS IZMIR TU//CC//
RHMFIUU/39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000544 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 4212/ITA/MAC/CPD/CRUSNAK 
DOE FOR CHARLES WASHINGTON 
EUR ALSO FOR MATT BRYZA AND STEVE MANN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EPET ENRG EWWT SENV TU RU
SUBJECT: TURKEY SAYS IT PLANS TO CUT STRAITS OIL TRAFFIC IN 
HALF 
 
REF: A. 05 ANKARA 7078 
     B. 05 ANKARA 6769 
     C. 05 ANKARA 5080 
 
1.  (sbu)  SUMMARY:  With oil transit traffic in the 
congested Turkish Straits continuing to grow, the Straits are 
regarded by some as nearing their capacity for maximum safe 
throughput.  Yet, despite the commercial arguments, regional 
governments and oil companies have not been able to come to a 
consensus on additional Bosphorus "bypass" routes because of 
the old "first mover/free rider" conundrum.  In what appears 
to be a strategy designed to break the conundrum and build 
support for Turkey's favored Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline project, 
Turkish officials have recently begun saying they will aim to 
cut tanker traffic in the Straits by more than half its 
current 3 mbd.  Energy Minister Guler's February 8-9 visit is 
an opportunity to discuss these issues with senior Turkish 
energy officials.  End Summary. 
 
Straits Conundrum 
----------------- 
 
2.  (sbu)  The Turkish government is increasingly concerned 
about the continuing growth of oil tanker traffic in the 
Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits and passing through the 
historic megalopolis of Istanbul.  Current volumes of 140-150 
million tons per year (3 million b/d), primarily come from 
Russia, but significant incremental volumes will increasingly 
come from Kazakhstan. 
 
3.  (sbu)  While generally obligated to guarantee free 
commercial passage under the long-standing Montreux 
Convention, the GOT has over the years succeeded in imposing 
safety-linked limits on large tanker traffic (spacing, 
weather, and nighttime restrictions) and has done a good job 
of managing traffic growth.  In its third year, the Vessel 
Traffic System (VTS) is seen as having done a good job in 
improving safety and efficiency in Straits management, 
particularly during the winter seasons, although key oil 
companies, such as Chevron and BP, are cautiously pushing for 
incremental improvements and efficiency in safety practices. 
The companies point out that the greatest safety risks come 
from small tankers, freighters and local traffic, not from 
the 7-8 well-regulated very large crude carriers used by 
major western companies that move through the Straits daily. 
 
4.  (sbu)  Despite improvements in traffic management, there 
is broad consensus that the Straits are close to capacity and 
cannot handle unlimited increases in volumes.  There is also 
recognition that the use of the Straits is not cost-free. 
Companies pay in the form of the extra costs of queuing and 
delays, which mount significantly during the winter.  In 
addition, a Straits closure due to a major accident could be 
a significant disruption to global markets and a potential 
catastrophe for affected companies and Turkey.  Given these 
considerations, there has been genuine commercial interest in 
potential Bosphorus bypass projects.  The Bulgaria-Greece 
Burgos-Alexandropolos and the Turkish Samsun-Ceyhan routes 
are generally perceived as front-runners.  The former is seen 
as cheaper and supported by Russian companies, while the 
latter is championed by the GOT as part of its vision of 
Ceyhan as a regional energy hub. 
 
5.  (sbu)  Still, all parties are frustrated by their 
inability to move forward on potential pipeline bypass or 
multiple bypass solutions.  The long-recognized 
first-mover/free-rider conundrum remains the stumbling block: 
 Companies that commit to the investment and costs of a 
bypass would incur extra costs, while non-participants could 
continue to use the "free" existing Straits passage. 
 
6.  (SBU)  In a new development that seems aimed at breaking 
 
ANKARA 00000544  002 OF 002 
 
 
the impasse, the GOT has privately been spreading word that 
the current level of 140 million tons per annum of oil 
transit is untenable.  Recent statements by GOT officials to 
us and company reps have cited a target of 65 million tons 
per year (a number put forth by the IMO 10 years ago as a 
safe capacity limit).  This appears to be a carefully vetted 
position of the GOT.  Company reps have told us they fear 
that this could be a prelude to a public relations campaign 
that would -- citing the risk of a disaster in Istanbul -- 
demonize the big oil companies without getting at the other 
factors that affect Straits safety. 
 
7.  (sbu)  Comment:  If this is indeed the GOT's strategy -- 
to force a consensus on Samsun-Ceyhan by raising the rhetoric 
about Straits and perhaps imposing artificial limits not 
justified by safety needs -- it seems like a non-transparent 
strategy that would be very likely to backfire.  The GOT 
needs the support and good will of the companies for the 
major investments required to make Samsun-Ceyhan viable.  A 
more transparent way to deal with the myriad issues linked to 
Straits transit and bypass issues would be for the GOT to 
work with regional producing and transit countries, as well 
as major consumers and companies, to build a broad consensus 
on the need for alternative routes and an understanding that 
"first movers" would not be penalized.  Since this idea was 
discussed by Energy Under Secretary Sami Demirbilek and DAS 
Bryza in August (ref c), local reps of Chevron, BP, and BOTAS 
have told us their companies would support a broad 
participation conference that could create a genuine 
consensus on a bypass route (as well as assuring safety in 
the Straits).  Minister Guler's upcoming Washington visit 
would be an excellent opportunity to review these issues. 
WILSON