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Viewing cable 06ANKARA452, LEVERAGING TURKISH EFFORTS AGAINST AFGHAN-

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ANKARA452 2006-02-03 15:28 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXRO5517
RR RUEHDA
DE RUEHAK #0452/01 0341528
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 031528Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2928
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0449
INFORUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 9744
RUEHDA/AMCONSUL ADANA 0360
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000452 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INL, EUR/SE, SA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR PREL TU
SUBJECT: LEVERAGING TURKISH EFFORTS AGAINST AFGHAN- 
ORIGIN OPIATES 
 
REF: Ambassador Wilson-A/S Patterson Meeting, 1/9/06 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Most of the world's supply of opiates 
originates in Afghanistan and passes through Turkey on 
its way to Western consumers.  Despite Turkey's 
relatively low consumption problem, it has worked hard 
to stop the flow of these narcotics and is willing to 
take on a larger regional role.  We believe there is an 
opportunity to enhance Afghan-Turkish cooperation on 
counternarcotics.  If Embassy Kabul concurs, we think 
it would be useful to consider developing mechanisms 
that would facilitate Afghanistan's collaboration with 
Turkey.  INL funding targeted to enhancing 
counternarcotics cooperation between Afghanistan and 
Turkey (and perhaps other Central Asian countries) 
would kill multiple birds with one stone: it would 
develop Afghan-Turkish synergies through collaborative 
efforts, enable Afghan law enforcement to learn from 
Turkish counterparts, and bolster Turkey's own efforts 
against drugs flowing from Afghanistan. 
 
-------------------------------- 
First Credible Line of Defense 
-------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) For a country with a negligible consumption 
problem, Turkey has taken ownership of the struggle 
against narcotics trafficking.  The Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) calls Turkey the first credible 
line of defense as opiates move from Afghanistan to 
consumer markets in the west.  In 2004, Turkey seized 
nearly 10,000 kilograms of heroin and 4,730 kilograms 
of morphine base.  Between January and November 2005, 
Turkish law enforcement agencies seized 7,760 kilograms 
of heroin.  On October 21, 2005, Turkish law 
enforcement seized a record 1,051 kilograms of heroin, 
which DEA believes is linked to a well-documented 
Pakistani trafficker.  DEA notes that every seizure 
made in Turkey reduces the availability and 
profitability of Afghan heroin.  In contrast to some of 
its regional peers, Turkey arrests, tries, and 
frequently convicts narcotics traffickers. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Turkey a Key Ally Against Afghan Heroin 
--------------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) DEA's Ankara-based regional office, which 
covers 43 countries, cites Turkey as the most 
cooperative and engaged partner in stopping the flow of 
Afghan heroin. Turkey is one of the most committed 
partners in DEA's Operation Containment, developed 
after September 11, 2001 to collectively target major 
regional drug trafficking organizations and combat the 
increasing threat posed by Afghan heroin.  Turkey co- 
hosted the first multinational Operation Containment 
conference in 2002 and a major international Operation 
Containment meeting in 2004, in which high-ranking 
Afghan counternarcotics officials participated.  Under 
Operation Containment, Turkey provided sensitive law 
enforcement information on a major Turkish drug 
trafficker, which led to a significant multilateral 
investigation with multiple high-level targets, 
including supply sources in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Turks Engage Afghans through Training Opportunities 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
4. (SBU) Turkey perceives Afghanistan's opiate 
cultivation and processing as its primary drug threat. 
To reduce this threat, the Turkish National Police 
(TNP), through its Ankara-based Turkish Academy Against 
Drugs and Organized Crime (TADOC), has hosted numerous 
training workshops involving Afghan law enforcement 
officers.  DEA and FBI consider TADOC to be one of the 
premier training academies in the region.  In 2003, 14 
Afghan officers attended anti-drug and organized crime 
investigation training, and 13 officers attended the 
Anti-Narcotics Training Program for Management-Level 
Law Enforcement Officers.  Six Afghan officers attended 
a DEA-sponsored Drug Unit Commanders School at TADOC in 
2004, and 19 officers participated in drug law 
enforcement training at TADOC in 2005.  TADOC has 
several training opportunities for Afghan officers 
lined up for 2006, including three drug enforcement 
 
ANKARA 00000452  002 OF 002 
 
 
training courses, a tactical police operations course, 
and a train the trainers course. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
INL Funding Key to Turkey's Regional Role 
----------------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Turkish officials, the TNP in particular, are 
eager to take on a larger regional counternarcotics 
role. One way to support Turkey's highly effective 
efforts, and at the same time use Turkey's model of 
success to help less developed Afghan and Central Asian 
counternarcotics efforts, would be to increase Turkish 
collaboration with Central Asian countries, especially 
Afghanistan. Training is good; joint work would be 
better.  TNP is very interested in working more closely 
with DEA and Afghan counterparts in Afghanistan, and 
would like to station a narcotics liaison officer in 
Kabul.  In addition, TNP officials would be eager to 
travel to Afghanistan for temporary duty assignments to 
include training workshops, investigations, operations, 
and mentoring. 
 
6. (SBU) We, of course, defer to Embassy Kabul on the 
facts, but our assessment is that the Afghans need all 
the help they can get on the counternarcotics side. 
They could benefit from more training that is closely 
connected with Turkey's status as a transit country. 
Communication between Afghan and Turkish 
counternarcotics personnel is limited.  Both sides 
would benefit from more organized communication flows, 
including on handling ongoing intelligence, buttressed 
by joint training in how to collect, analyze, and use 
information relevant to the Afghan-Turkey drug trade. 
Training in and support of joint Afghan-Turkish 
counternarcotics operations would complete the picture 
and substantiate what could be really effective 
measures to interdict and stop narcotics trafficking 
through this area. 
 
7.  (SBU) INL funding could support a number of 
initiatives to jump start Afghan-Turkish collaboration. 
This could include bringing Turkish officials to 
Afghanistan for on-the-ground training and enhanced 
cooperation on counternarcotics; joint training Afghans 
with Turks in intelligence development, sharing, and 
utilization and in joint operations, taking advantage 
of Turkey's excellent training facilities; and/or the 
establishment and support of a Turkish-Afghan bilateral 
working group on counternarcotics that would aim to 
develop intelligence sharing and joint efforts.  There 
may be other ways in which U.S. Afghan counternarcotics 
goals could be supported through an augmented Turkish 
role.  Besides the direct benefits that joint Afghan- 
Turkish efforts might bring, U.S. support for the 
effort could provide collateral gains for our 
understanding of the path of Afghan narcotics, 
traffickers, and how to interdict shipments. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
8. (SBU) While Turkey is a strong ally against the flow 
of Afghan heroin, it is not reaching its full 
potential.  INL funding would for the above-described 
activities would bolster Turkish counternarcotics 
efforts, increase cross-border coordination against 
trafficking networks, and at the same time enabling 
less developed Afghan and other Central Asian law 
enforcement agencies to learn from their Turkish 
counterparts. 
 
WILSON