Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06TOKYO77, GOJ REACTIONS ON DOHA ROUND AFTER HONG KONG

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06TOKYO77.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06TOKYO77 2006-01-06 08:23 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO4102
RR RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #0077/01 0060823
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 060823Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7111
INFO RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 3882
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 4021
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 6551
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 6910
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 5103
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2738
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 000077 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE ALSO PASS USTR FOR A/USTRS CUTLER AND DWOSKIN 
USDOC FOR ITA/OFFICE OF JAPAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ECIN ETRD EINV PGOV JA
SUBJECT: GOJ REACTIONS ON DOHA ROUND AFTER HONG KONG 
MINISTERIAL 
 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (U) WTO member states obtained about as much as they 
could under the circumstances at the Hong Kong Ministerial, 
according to Japanese officials from several ministries at a 
symposium hosted by Aoyama Gakuin University's WTO Research 
Center.  The Director-General of the Agriculture Ministry's 
International Affairs Bureau, Kaoru Yoshimura, insisted there 
had been progress on agriculture and was confident that 
negotiators could come up with a final agreement.  A top 
Foreign Ministry official, Seiichi Kondo, stressed to the 
audience the importance of a successful Doha round, saying it 
would resolve economic disputes that would otherwise turn 
into political issues.  Akira Kamitobe, of the Finance 
Ministry, focused on the need to improve existing trade 
rules, in particular the anti-dumping agreement -- which 
would be key to boosting Japan's economic growth potential. 
Although Japan has been a fairly passive player in advancing 
the Doha talks so far, this conference demonstrates that the 
government at least sees the need to put a positive public 
spin on the importance of reaching a successful agreement. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
MOFA: Spinning Story 
-------------------- 
 
2.  (U) Ambassador Seiichi Kondo of the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry's Economic Affairs Bureau stressed the importance to 
Japan that the Doha Trade Round succeed.  He emphasized the 
WTO,s importance in resolving trade disputes.  The 
difficulty in trying to move forward more quickly in Hong 
Kong, he said, reflected the fact that reaching consensus is 
becoming much more difficult -- particularly as the WTO 
membership becomes larger and more diverse.  It is no longer 
possible, he noted, for the United States single handedly to 
lead other WTO member countries.  Interests in the trade 
organization vary widely.  Kondo added that it was hard for 
government negotiators to forge deals when non-government 
entities -- the business sector, media, academic 
institutions, and other interest groups -- clamor to be 
heard.  He said that WTO negotiations will move more smoothly 
in the future when governments learn to collaborate better 
with these groups. 
 
 3.  (U) Kondo conceded what had become increasingly obvious 
in recent months: that agriculture was front and center the 
focus of the Doha Development Round, whether the attention 
was merited or not.  He also conceded that, owing to domestic 
political constraints, Japan's position in the talks -- 
particularly with respect to agricultural market access and 
domestic supports -- was difficult.  Kondo underscored, 
however, that free trade and a successful Doha Round was 
critical to Japan's economic expansion and farm sector reform 
would be important to improving Japan's outlook. 
 
4.  (U) Meeting deadlines set in Hong Kong mattered, Horohisa 
Soma, of MOFA's International Trade Division, suggested to 
the gathering.  Although there was some possibility that the 
United States would extend Fast Track authorization beyond 
its expiration date, Japanese negotiators could not count on 
any extension.  Therefore a trade agreement needed to be 
wrapped up well in advance of mid-2007.  For his part, 
somewhat tautologically, Kondo said that agreeing to 
modalities by the end of April, as called for in the 
Ministerial Declaration, depended on whether WTO 
Director-General Lamy could draw constructive responses from 
negotiators.  Kondo added that Lamy's track record was good. 
Another area that would require more attention in coming 
months was Trade in Services, progress on which, according to 
Kondo, had been uneven. 
 
METI: Plodding Ahead 
-------------------- 
 
5.  (U) There were few surprises in Hong Kong, according to 
Shigehiro Tanaka, Director of METI's Multilateral Trade 
System Department.  Claiming to be speaking in his personal 
capacity, Tanaka told the audience that the Hong Kong 
Ministerial did not produce any surprises.  The METI official 
made a point of praising Brazil and India for their consent 
 
TOKYO 00000077  002 OF 002 
 
 
to the Swiss Formula for non-agricultural market access 
(NAMA).  He was also pleased with sectoral negotiations in 
services, such as those for telecom.  They had been carried 
out unofficially between member countries and announced 
officially in Hong Kong. 
 
MAFF: Agriculture Gets Too Much Attention 
----------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (U) Kaoru Yoshimura, the Director-General of the 
International Affairs Bureau at the Agriculture Ministry, 
told the symposium that the media -- Japanese and 
international -- put too much focus on agriculture 
negotiations, which have dominated the Doha Round so far.  He 
praised Agriculture Minister Nakagawa -- his boss -- for 
pushing to include Japan in G-4 talks.  He added that it was 
in Japan's interest to include capacity building for 
developing countries in its agenda of priorities, as well as 
pushing for more progress in NAMA and services talks at the 
same time as agriculture.  Yoshimura was confident that 
agriculture negotiations, although still stymied on market 
access, had accomplished a lot on domestic support and export 
subsidies.  Much negotiating remained before the April 30 
deadline. 
 
MOF: Fixating on Anti-dumping Rules 
----------------------------------- 
 
7.  (U) Akira Kamitobe, the Director of the Finance 
Ministry's Customs and Tariff Bureau, gave a brief 
presentation on MOF,s role in the discussion on WTO trade 
rules.  His focus was on anti-dumping and safeguard 
agreements, subsidies, and countervailing measures.  If the 
Doha Round produced an agreement that made trade rules 
clearer and more predictable, he said, this was good for 
everybody.  Japanese business would benefit from better 
anti-dumping rules, including he singled out, better sunset 
provisions; anti-dumping duties should be phased out after a 
fixed period.  Kamitobe stressed also the importance of 
improving trade facilitation and all its aspects -- this 
would be good for developing countries and rich ones alike as 
they move forward. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8.  (U) Although Japan has been a fairly passive player in 
advancing the Doha talks so far, this conference demonstrates 
that the government at least sees the need to put a positive 
public spin on the importance of reaching a successful 
agreement.  GOJ officials participating in the Aoyama Gakuin 
University symposium on the Doha Round were not the first 
ones to be out making the public case that successful trade 
talks are good for Japan.  Owing to the sensitivities of the 
talks politically, officials have not been clear about how 
they intend to push them toward a successful conclusion.  But 
officials have been out making the public case -- at least on 
a general level, trying to explain to a skeptical public the 
advantages of a strong international trade agreement. 
DONOVAN