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Viewing cable 06NAIROBI106, KENYA: 2005 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT (CORRECTED)

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06NAIROBI106 2006-01-10 05:48 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Nairobi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 000106 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR S/CT - RHONDA SHORE, S/CT - ED SALAZAR, NCTC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC MARR EFIN KE
SUBJECT: KENYA: 2005 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT (CORRECTED) 
 
REF: A. A) 05 SECSTATE 193439 
     B. B) 05 NAIROBI 5180 
 
(U) This corrects reftel B. Classification downgraded to SBU, 
note changes in paragraph 10. 
 
1.  (U) This is post's submission for the 2005 Annual 
Terrorism Report.  The first section updates the 2004 
Patterns of Global Terrorism section on Kenya.  The second 
section provides supplemental information. 
 
Proposed Text for Patterns of Global Terrorism Report 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
2.  (SBU) Kenya remains an active partner in the war on 
terrorism and continues to provide assistance targeting 
terrorist groups operating within Kenya.  The government 
established the National Counter Terrorism Center in January 
2004 as well as a National Security Advisory Committee to 
oversee its operations. However, in 2005, Kenya registered 
little to no progress towards the overall strengthening of 
its capabilities to combat terrorism, prosecute terror 
suspects, or respond to emergency situations. In 2005, the 
GOK disbanded the U.S.-supported Joint Terrorism Task Force 
(JTTF), set up in 2004 to improve police and prosecutors, 
ability to cooperate on CT issues. The government did not 
engage in a national discussion to sensitize the public to 
terrorism issues, and it has not yet finalized a national 
counter terrorism strategy.  In April 2003, Kenya published a 
draft "Suppression of Terrorism" bill, only to withdraw it 
due to harsh criticism from human rights groups and Kenyan 
Muslim communities.  The GOK wrote a new draft in 2005 but 
did not officially publish the document or submit it to 
parliament. In a similar fashion, Kenya has drafted, but not 
yet submitted to Parliament, the  anti-money laundering and 
CT finance legislation needed to bring the country into 
compliance with relevant UN resolutions. 
 
3.  (SBU) Kenya and the United States continue to share 
information on suspected terrorists, including those 
associated with or supportive of al-Qaida.  The Kenyan 
government has taken the initiative in arresting terrorist 
suspects and disrupting terrorist operations.  In November 
2005, three transit passengers were arrested at Jomo Kenyatta 
International Airport for wearing shoes with electronic 
switches, four men were arrested in October 2005 for 
allegedly funding terror activities, and one man was arrested 
in December in Northeastern province for possession of a 
rocket launcher and RPGs with the alleged intent of smuggling 
them to Mombasa.  The seven terror suspects -- arrested in 
November 2003 on charges related to the Kikambala hotel 
bombing and attempted shoot-down of an Israeli airplane in 
November 2002, the 1998 attack on the U.S. Embassy in 
Nairobi, and a 2003 plot to attack the new U.S. Embassy -- 
were acquitted in June 2005. To date, nobody has been 
successfully prosecuted in relation to these terrorist acts. 
Kenya continues to be an active participant in the Terrorist 
Interdiction Program (TIP/PISCES), and in 2004 and 2005 made 
security improvements at airports and hotels, particularly in 
Mombasa. The government,s ineffective response to the 
explosion at Wilson airport in October, 2004 however, 
indicates the need for improved security as well as a 
mechanism to coordinate government CT efforts. 
 
4.  (SBU)  Kenya has ratified all 12 international 
counterterrorism conventions and protocols but has yet to 
incorporate many of the requirements into national law or a 
comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. Kenya does not have 
a comprehensive counterterrorism law, as required by UNSCR 
1373. 
 
Supplementary Information 
------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) The GOK promised the Embassy it would provide an 
integrated, inter-ministerial national security strategy by 
March 2004.  A draft was prepared, but it was not discussed 
at inter-ministerial level or at Parliament, and it is 
unclear if it was ever finalized.  The Kenyan Department of 
Defense (KDOD) drafted a national defense strategy &White 
Paper8 that stresses the need for a comprehensive, 
joint-service/interagency approach to coastal and border 
security to counter terrorism, but it must be put in context 
of an overall national security strategy.  Since 2004, the 
Kenyan Navy has participated in 10 iterations of combined 
Maritime Operations and Training along the coast of Kenya 
with US Navy elements.  This helped train the Kenyan Navy on 
coastal security operations. The USG will give the Kenyan 
Navy six coastal security boats by March 2006, permitting 
them to conduct MAROPS on their own boats. These are funded 
under the Coastal Security component of the East Africa 
Counter Terrorism Initiative (EACTI). In addition, a company 
from the Kenya Army 20th Para Battalion was trained in 2005 
as a pre-emptive, cross border strike force company under 
U.S. Foreign Military Financing. 
 
 
6.  (SBU) The Kenyan Government continued to improve aviation 
security in 2005 through the Kenya Airport Authority (KAA) 
and the Kenya Civil Aviation Authority (KCAA).  FAA and TSA 
trained managers and inspectors to better oversee and 
maintain security procedures and planning.  However, 
consistent enforcement of security procedures and planning 
remains a challenge.  Under the Safe Skies program, FAA is 
helping Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania update and harmonize their 
safety regulations to create a regional Civil Aviation Safety 
structure and a regional Civil Aviation Security Structure. 
However, future funding for Safe Skies in Kenya is in 
jeopardy in FY 2006 and beyond because of U.S. legal 
restriction on assistance to governments which are parties to 
the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal 
Court but which have not signed Article 98 non-surrender 
agreements with the U.S.  The World Bank is also moving 
forward on projects to improve access controls, perimeter 
fencing and the terminal building structure.  Kenya's civil 
aviation officials also want to improve pilot registrations, 
flight plan recording, and terminal security for the 
country's general aviation sector. 
 
7.  (SBU)  2005 has not been a strong year for Kenyan CT 
efforts from the consular section,s perspective.  Numerous 
cases continue to come to consular,s attention of Kenyans, 
previously denied visas, who returned with new passports in 
new identities in an effort to circumvent the name-check 
system.  Fortunately, the number of such cases has decreased 
significantly in the last three months. While these cases 
appeared to be limited to desperate visa applicants, the ease 
with which they could obtain new identities and passports was 
alarming and caused concern about who else could do so.  The 
Kenyans blamed the problem 
on lack of resources, an inadequate late-birth registration 
procedure, and the influx of Somalis across porous borders. A 
major source of the problem is as likely official corruption. 
 
 
8.  (SBU)  The Government of Kenya has increased its usage of 
the TIP/PISCES system to a national average of 93% in the 
period covered by this report.  Three airports currently 
operate the system:  Nairobi's Jomo Kenyatta International 
Airport (JKIA), Eldoret and Moi International Airport in 
Mombasa.  The fourth software installation was damaged during 
the October 18 explosion at Nairobi's Wilson 
Airport and is currently offline. It is due to come back 
online in early 2006.  Although the buildup to 
present-day usage was slow in coming, the system has yielded 
impressive results thus far.  The stop-list has resulted in 
several suspect turnovers, to include a Korean national 
suspected of human trafficking and various individuals wanted 
on narcotics trafficking charges. The stop-list has been 
equally helpful in ongoing bilateral CT efforts. DHS trained 
200 more immigration officers in 2005. 
 
9.  (SBU) Kenya lacks counterterrorism legislation, and the 
current laws make it difficult to prosecute terror suspects. 
For example, the Evidence Act of 2002 says that any 
confessions not made before a magistrate are inadmissible. 
Because of this law, the concrete evidence against the seven 
terror suspects on trial was ruled inadmissible by the lower 
courts because it resulted indirectly from information given 
by an &illegal8 confession. The government passed a 
&Miscellaneous Bill8 in 2005, which amended the Evidence 
Act. The new law states a confession can be made in front of 
a judge, magistrate or senior police officer. The GOK 
redrafted the Suppression of Terrorism Bill in 2005 after a 
two-year hiatus, following the failure of the initial draft 
in 2003.  However, the government did not table the new bill 
in Parliament in 2005. 
 
10.  (SBU) Currently, there is insufficient coordination 
among police, prosecutors, and other relevant 
government ministries which deal with terrorism issues.  This 
was evident immediately after October 2004 explosion at 
Wilson airport.  It was unclear who was in charge of the 
response and investigation.  The police, security services 
and other government agencies offered conflicting opinions as 
to the cause of the explosion; the government has yet to 
release a report on the incident. Embassy RSO, in conjunction 
with the DS Anti-Terrorism Assistance program, continues to 
focus on increasing the Kenyan Government's 
capacity to effectively investigate and prosecute terrorism. 
 
11.  (U) Embassy POC for CT:  Yael Eisenstat, 
Eisenstatyd@state.sgov.gov (classified), Eisenstayd@state.gov 
(unclass). 
BELLAMY