Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06MANAGUA8, LEADING LIBERAL PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES AGREE ON

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06MANAGUA8.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MANAGUA8 2006-01-04 21:25 2011-06-01 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758456.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758467.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758468.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758464.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4103/la-embusa-y-el-gabinete-de-ortega
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4104/d-rsquo-escoto-en-onu-ldquo-un-desafio-de-ortega-a-ee-uu-rdquo
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4102/estrada-y-la-ldquo-doble-cara-rdquo-ante-ee-uu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3966/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-ee-uu-en-el-2006
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2758764.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2758753.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4041/millones-de-dolares-sin-control-y-a-discrecion
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4040/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-venezuela-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4047/rodrigo-barreto-enviado-de-ldquo-vacaciones-rdquo
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2757239.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2746658.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2757244.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2746673.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3991/dra-yadira-centeno-desmiente-cable-diplomatico-eeuu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3968/pellas-pronostico-a-eeuu-victoria-de-ortega-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3967/barreto-era-ldquo-fuente-confiable-rdquo-para-eeuu
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0008/01 0042125
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 042125Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4812
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000008 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM SOCI NU
SUBJECT: LEADING LIBERAL PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES AGREE ON 
NEED TO UNITE, DEBATE ROLE OF PLC 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 3246 
     B. MANAGUA 3230 
     C. MANAGUA 3172 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 (b and d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: During a cordial breakfast meeting with the 
Ambassador, leading Liberal presidential candidates Eduardo 
Montealegre, Jose Antonio Alvarado and Jose Rizo agreed in 
principle that the Liberals must unite to confront the FSLN 
in the 2006 elections and wrest the Liberal Constitutional 
Party (PLC) from convicted ex-President Arnoldo Aleman,s 
control.  The candidates, however, disagreed on how to 
undermine Aleman's influence.  Montealegre insisted that 
Aleman and his cronies will continue to dominate the party's 
leadership, while Alvarado and Rizo prefer to work with 
disaffected leaders to reform the party from the inside.  The 
candidates agreed that the outcome of the March regional 
elections on the Atlantic Coast is uncertain, and the 
electoral authority has not done its job to ensure voter 
registration.  Regarding the January 9 elections for the new 
Executive Board (Junta Directiva) for the National Assembly, 
the three were in accord that neither Enrique Quinonez nor 
Rene Nunez, two deputies sponsored by the PLC and FSLN 
respectively, should be elected president of the Junta.  End 
Summary. 
 
CANDIDATES AGREE ON NEED FOR UNITY, BUT NOT PLC STRATEGY 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2. (C) On January 3, the Ambassador, DCM and Polcouns met 
leading Liberal presidential candidates Eduardo Montealegre, 
Jose Antonio Alvarado and Jose Rizo for breakfast at the 
residence.  The meeting was cordial and subdued, with less 
friction between Montealegre and Alvarado than Emboffs have 
observed in the past.  The three agreed that Nicaragua's 
Liberals must forge an alliance to compete against the FSLN 
in the 2006 national elections and free the PLC from the 
damaging leadership of Arnoldo Aleman.  However, the 
candidates still disagree fundamentally on strategy. 
Montealegre believes that Aleman will maintain control over 
the PLC leadership and may even cede the election to FSLN 
leader Daniel Ortega in exchange for an amnesty vote in the 
National Assembly.  He stressed he could not agree to any 
arrangement that would appear like an accommodation with 
Aleman; to do so would risk losing 15 percentage points of 
public support.  The only viable option, he claimed, is to 
make a clear break from Aleman and his followers and continue 
to "siphon off" decent PLC members. 
 
3. (C) Rizo, while agreeing that Aleman represents a 
liability for Liberalism, insisted that he would not have a 
viable candidacy without the PLC and spoke of his long 
commitment to the party.  Rizo emphasized the importance of 
the PLC,s machinery and said he is not willing to 
participate in an open primary competition separate from the 
PLC.  He suggested bringing in an independent (external) 
polling firm to conduct a survey of Liberal supporters on the 
candidates, issues, etc. 
 
4. (C) Alvarado acknowledged that the PLC must be taken from 
Aleman, but agreed with Rizo that the move must be done from 
the inside.  He claimed that many party leaders are 
discontented with Aleman,s leadership and that the three 
candidates should put together a team to work on the details 
of an agreement to form an alliance acceptable to all. 
 
5. (C) The Ambassador suggested bringing their respective 
teams together to start working on mechanisms and hammering 
out details. Alvarado was in favor, but Rizo and Montealegre 
were more cautious.  Rizo indicated he is willing to talk, 
but did not commit completely, and Montealegre emphasized 
once again that he can not give the appearance of making a 
deal with Aleman's forces.  The Ambassador impressed upon the 
candidates the urgency and importance of uniting the 
democratic forces as soon as possible.  (Note: Following a 
meeting with the ALN-PC Executive Committee on January 3, 
Montealegre called the DCM to advise that they agreed in 
principle to participate in these discussions after the 
election of the new Junta Directiva in the National Assembly. 
 Montealegre asserted that if Aleman ends up in control of 
the Assembly leadership, however, "all bets may be off."  End 
Note.) 
 
ATLANTIC COAST OUTCOME UNCERTAIN 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
6. (C) The group held a brief discussion about the Atlantic 
Coast elections, in which all seemed to agree that the 
outcome is uncertain, turnout is likely to be low, and the 
CSE has not done its job to ensure the distribution of voter 
ID cards and voter registration.  Montealegre also claimed 
that, contrary to press reports, Herty Lewites, rallies have 
enjoyed little draw. 
 
CANDIDATES REJECT QUINONEZ AND NUNEZ TO LEAD ASSEMBLY 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
7. (C) Regarding the January 9 election of a new Junta 
Directiva for the National Assembly, the candidates all 
asserted that the presidency should not go to PLC-backed 
Enrique Quinonez or FSLN-supported Rene Nunez.  Though the 
candidates did not indicate support for any specific deputy 
for the position, Rizo stated that "someone like" moderate 
PLC deputies Oscar Moncada or Alfonso Ortega Urbina could 
fill the role.  (Note: The candidates' preferences are 
noteworthy because Montealegre controls six votes in the 
Assembly, four deputies are associated with Alvarado, and 
Rizo has the sympathy of several PLC deputies.  Neither the 
PLC nor the FSLN can secure a majority for the elections 
without these votes.  End Note.) 
 
COMMENT: STILL JOCKEYING FOR POSITION 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
8. (C) The leading Liberal candidates agree that the 
democratic forces must form an alliance to defeat the FSLN 
and that Arnoldo Aleman should not control this process, but 
their individual ambition still impedes an agreement. 
Alvarado and Rizo know they cannot defeat Montealegre in an 
open and fair competition without the support of the PLC 
machinery, so they continue to insist that the party can be 
reformed from within despite Aleman's enduring and, since his 
release from house arrest on medical parole, increasing 
domination of the leadership structure.  Unfortunately, 
without a strong and united "Third Way" alternative, many of 
the disaffected PLC members that Montealegre hopes to woo 
may, fearful of their own political survival, continue to 
tolerate Aleman and resist defection. 
TRIVELLI