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Viewing cable 06MANAGUA212, NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS REGIONAL REPORTING: RAAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MANAGUA212 2006-01-27 23:30 2011-06-01 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758456.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758467.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758468.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758464.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4103/la-embusa-y-el-gabinete-de-ortega
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4104/d-rsquo-escoto-en-onu-ldquo-un-desafio-de-ortega-a-ee-uu-rdquo
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4102/estrada-y-la-ldquo-doble-cara-rdquo-ante-ee-uu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3966/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-ee-uu-en-el-2006
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2758764.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2758753.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4041/millones-de-dolares-sin-control-y-a-discrecion
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4040/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-venezuela-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4047/rodrigo-barreto-enviado-de-ldquo-vacaciones-rdquo
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2757239.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2746658.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2757244.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2746673.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3991/dra-yadira-centeno-desmiente-cable-diplomatico-eeuu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3968/pellas-pronostico-a-eeuu-victoria-de-ortega-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3967/barreto-era-ldquo-fuente-confiable-rdquo-para-eeuu
VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0212/01 0272330
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 272330Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5054
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000212 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM SOCI NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS REGIONAL REPORTING: RAAN 
 
REF: 05 MANAGUA 2938 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 (b and d) 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Emboffs visited the North Atlantic 
Autonomous Region (RAAN) on January 19 to discuss the 
upcoming March 5 regional elections with political, 
religious, and NGO officials.  Both partisan and independent 
authorities reported that Eduardo Montealegre is gaining 
strength in the region by draining support from the PLC and 
Yatama dissidents angry with their leaders, decision to ally 
with their historic enemy, the FSLN.  APRE leaders claimed 
that Jose Antonio Alvarado cultivated considerable good will 
on the Atlantic Coast during his time in government, though 
APRE did not seem to be as organized as the ALN-PC.  Party 
and NGO leaders again warned of irregularities with the local 
and regional electoral authorities.  End Summary. 
 
WHEN IN ROME: MONTEALEGRE COURTS COAST VOTERS WITH CONCERTS 
AND HAND OUTS 
 
2. (C) On January 19, Emboffs traveled to the RAAN to meet 
with local leaders and discuss the March regional elections. 
While visiting the ALN-PC headquarters as they were getting 
ready for their campaign launch )- the house was bustling 
with activity -- we saw piles of T-shirts and other 
paraphenalia.  We met more than a dozen ALN-PC council 
candidates drawn from the ranks of PLC dissidents, the 
Conservative Party and the Resistance Party.  Jaime Chow, 
coordinator for the ALN-PC in the RAAN and a former founder 
of the local PLC organization, claimed to have 4,500 poll 
watchers ready for the elections, or about 10 per voting 
location, 50% of whom are trained observers.  Chow said that 
he had received $800,000 to run the RAAN campaign, and that 
he had spent $30,000 to stage a performance of the popular 
musical group "Dimension Costena," which drew 10,000 people. 
When asked where his funding came from, he admitted that it 
was all from the national ALN-PC campaign coffers -- "the 
only local money is drug money," he asserted, and Chow did 
not want to risk the reputation of the ALN-PC campaign by 
raising funds in the RAAN.  Chow said that Montealegre has 
already toured the RAAN three times, the most of any 
presidential candidate. 
 
3. (C) Chow claimed that the ALN-PC is receiving considerable 
support and interest from indigenous Miskitos unhappy with 
the leadership of Yatama, the traditional indigenous party, 
who are allying with the FSLN for the national elections. 
When asked why the ALN-PC had not allied with Pamuc, an 
indigenous party formed by Yatama dissidents, Chow said that 
Pamuc leaders wanted the electoral campaign reimbursement 
funds (distributed by the Supreme Electoral Council after 
elections according to the percentage of the vote won by each 
party) for themselves, which they could not get by joining an 
alliance.  He noted, however, that Pamuc had agreed to 
support ALN-PC in the national elections. 
 
4. (C) Moravian Church superintendent Stedman Bent and 
Miskito human rights activist Adan Artola agreed that 
Montealegre has generated considerable support on the Coast. 
Bent noted the success of the "Dimension Costena" concert and 
stated that, in his estimation, Montealegre and the ALN-PC 
enjoy more support than Jose Antonio Alvarado and APRE and 
have possibly eclipsed even the corruption-tainted PLC.  On 
the other hand, Bent has not noticed that Herty Lewites has 
captured many Sandinista votes, noting poor turnout at 
Lewites' rallies.  He also recounted a rumor that Lewites was 
attacked by FSLN militants in the RAAS capital of Bluefields. 
 Artola agreed that Montealegre has won the "sympathy" of the 
people by handing out toys to children, hosting meals and 
staging concerts, while Lewites has failed to make inroads. 
Artola claimed that Montealegre had recruited the "best 
candidates" from the pool of Liberal politicians in the RAAN. 
 
5. (SBU) Local NGO leaders (see below) told Emboffs that they 
have noticed a new voter tendency to select candidates based 
on their individual track record rather than party 
affiliation.  IPADE director Maria Gradiz reported that 
Yatama has lost popularity since the municipal elections, 
while the ALN-PC has gained significant momentum over the 
last three months, especially following Montealegre's visit 
to Puerto Cabezas in December. 
 
APRE CAMPAIGN IN DISARRAY 
 
6. (C) The mood was very different at the APRE office (housed 
in a municipal building).  APRE leaders stated that they had 
emerged as the "third force" in the RAAN after the 2004 
municipal elections, but complained that they have no money 
for the current campaign.  When asked about poll watchers, 
legal advisor Uriel Vanegas replied that the candidates 
themselves would have to find their own fiscales.  When we 
pushed the issue, party officials admitted that many fiscales 
had deserted APRE as constituent parties abandoned the 
Alliance after the 2004 elections. 
 
ELECTORAL COUNCILS FAILING TO ISSUE CEDULAS 
 
7. (C) As usual, most of the people we spoke with professed a 
lack of confidence in the local and national electoral 
councils.  Jaime Chow reported that 20,000 citizens in the 
vicinity of Waspam (half the population) are without cedulas 
(national/voter ID card).  Chow described these Nicaraguans 
as "children of the war" who would naturally vote 
anti-Sandinista.  Adan Artola claimed that the regional and 
municipal electoral councils are "dominated by Sandinistas" 
and that cedula applicants must convince council bureaucrats 
that they are Sandinista sympathizers to obtain a cedula. 
Uriel Vanegas reported that municipal electoral councils 
(CEMs) have refused to admit APRE magistrates who earned CEM 
seats after the 2004 municipal elections.  (Note: Seats on 
the CEMs are allocated to political parties based on their 
percentage of the vote in the last elections.  When asked if 
APRE had presented evidence of discrimination to local or 
international NGOs, Vanegas admitted that they had not.  End 
Note.) 
 
LOCAL NGO OFFICIALS REGISTER CONCERN REGARDING VOTER ROLL 
VERIFICATION 
 
8. (SBU) Emboffs met with three NGO leaders in the RAAN to 
discuss the CSE-sponsored voter roll ("padron") verification 
process that took place November 24-27 and plans for 
observation missions for the March 5 regional elections. 
Maria Alina Gradiz, the regional coordinator for the 
Institute for Development and Democracy (IPADE), reported 
that IPADE had observed the padron verification in November 
and observed very low turnout.  In addition to voter apathy 
and fatigue, Gradiz attributed the poor showing to confusion 
resulting from a political party membership drive conducted 
shortly before the verification and a weak civic education 
campaign.  According to Gradiz, the Atlantic Coast CEMs have 
historically faced budgetary shortfalls, resulting in the 
closure of regional offices responsible for producing cedulas 
and poor training of poll watchers. 
 
9. (SBU) Juan Herbacio White, deputy head of the local 
chapter of Etica y Transparencia (ET), also reported that his 
group observed the padron verification process.  Herbacio 
agreed with Gradiz that voter apathy and a lack of civic 
education contributed to a low turnout, but he also noted 
irregularities, such as poll workers leaving the verification 
tables for 2-3 hour lunch breaks, a lack of information for 
voters in the Miskito and Creole languages (widely used on 
the Coast), and voters presenting two cedulas -- their own 
and one belonging to a dead friend or relative -- and then 
directed by the CEM officials to "go to the political 
parties" with the second cedula.  Herbacio confirmed 
allegations in the national press that FSLN candidates have 
expedited the cedulation process for party militants. 
 
10. (SBU) Debby Hodgson, the regional coordinator of the 
Center for Citizen and Autonomous Rights of the Atlantic 
Coast (CEDHECA), claimed that several parties, including the 
FSLN, PLC and Yatama, had facilitated cedulation for their 
party members.  Hodgson also asserted that voters were 
changing circumscriptions to vote for the candidate of their 
choice, specifically claiming that 300 FSLN voters changed 
voting venue to cast ballots for the Sandinista ex-mayor of 
Bilwi, Guillermo Espinosa.  (Comment: Hodgson made no secret 
of her support for the FSLN, but assured Emboffs that CEDHECA 
would operate in a non-partisan manner.  End Comment.) 
 
11. (U) All three groups, IPADE, ET, and CEDHECA, will be 
fielding teams of observers for the March 5 regional 
elections. 
 
COMMENT: WILL MONTEALEGRE'S POPULARITY HELP HIS PARTY? 
 
12. (C) Both partisan and presumably neutral observers 
reported growing support for Eduardo Montealegre in the RAAN. 
 This increasing recognition bodes well for Montealegre 
regarding his chances in the November national elections, but 
may not directly translate into support for ALN-PC regional 
council candidates in March.  If the ALN-PC fails to make a 
significant showing in the regional elections, regardless of 
Montealegre's personal popularity, PLC Liberals could spin 
the results to argue even more vociferously that the PLC is 
the only party that can defeat the FSLN -- a strategy that 
may drain support for Montealegre. 
TRIVELLI