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Viewing cable 06LAPAZ84, IDB PREOCCUPIED BY UNCERTAINTY OF U.S. AND GOB

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06LAPAZ84 2006-01-13 20:06 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy La Paz
VZCZCXYZ0010
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLP #0084/01 0132006
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 132006Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7704
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 5508
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2772
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6638
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 3855
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1220
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 1112
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 3480
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 3858
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 8373
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS LA PAZ 000084 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/AND 
TREASURY FOR SGOOCH 
ENERGY FOR CDAY AND SLADISLAW 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID ECON EFIN BL
SUBJECT: IDB PREOCCUPIED BY UNCERTAINTY OF U.S. AND GOB 
ACTIONS 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
Resident Representative, Joel Branski, told the DCM and 
Econoffs on January 11 that IDB staff has not met with the 
MAS' transition team, but that an IDB delegation plans to 
visit Bolivia at the end of January after the Presidential 
inauguration.  Branski relayed concerns regarding use of 
previously approved IDB funds, up to one-third of which need 
to be reallocated to new projects, and approval of this 
year's estimated USD 200 million of proposed loans, which 
could be vetoed by the U.S. government.  Branski explained 
that the IDB debt relief proposal currently under 
consideration would cover five countries, including Bolivia, 
and may forgive up to one-half of Bolivia's USD 1.6 billion 
IDB debt.  As the proposal now stands, he said, debt relief 
would come as a package, being granted to all five countries 
or to none.  End summary. 
 
No Contact With The MAS 
----------------------- 
2. (SBU) IDB Resident Representative, Joel Branski, told us 
on January 11 that IDB staff has not met with members of the 
MAS since two months prior to the December 18 election.  He 
added that he currently has no counterpart in the still 
undefined future GOB and that the MAS transition team has not 
requested a meeting.  However, Jorge Crespo, Bolivia's 
representative to the IDB in Washington, recently met with 
leaders of the MAS transition team, including VP-elect Alvaro 
Garcia Linera, economic planner Carlos Villegas, and 
political adviser Juan Ramon Quintana to explain how the IDB 
functions.  Branski also mentioned that a technical team from 
IDB headquarters would visit Bolivia the last week in January 
to meet with the new administration. 
 
Operational Concerns Due To GOB 
------------------------------- 
3. (SBU) Branski is concerned that the IDB will have 
difficulty disbursing the more than USD 400 million of 
previously approved funds awaiting distribution, and 
receiving approval for and disbursing the approximately USD 
200 million of funds in the pipeline for 2006.  He explained 
that up to one-third of the previously approved funds would 
need to be re-oriented to new programs because they had been 
allocated to projects that were no longer valid.  He further 
noted that the reallocation process requires approval of both 
the IDB Board and the Bolivian legislature.  In addition to 
the potential difficulties associated with reallocation, 
Branski said, political uncertainties are making 
implementation of education, health, and services projects 
difficult.  In this context, he pointed out that education 
and health projects require dealing with departmental and 
municipal governments, but that the precise role and 
authority of the newly elected regional governors will remain 
ill-defined pending the conclusion of the Constituent 
Assembly.  Projects in the services/utilities area are also 
difficult to design, he said, given the MAS' pledge to 
eliminate the service sector regulators. 
 
Operational Concerns Due to USG 
------------------------------- 
4. (SBU) Branski acknowledged that U.S. contributions to the 
IDB and U.S. certification of Bolivia's cooperation on 
narcotics are vital and noted that he had explained to MAS 
members in October that the U.S. has veto power over IDB 
proposals.  (Note: The U.S. has 54% voting rights in the 
IDB's Fund for Special Operations, from which the GOB 
receives all its funds.)  He told us that when they meet with 
the MAS again at the end of January, IDB representatives will 
reiterate to the incoming administration the reality of U.S. 
influence over the bank's activities, including issuing new 
loans, reprogramming old loans, and going forward with debt 
relief.  We encouraged Branski to push for a press release 
after the late January meeting. 
 
IDB Debt Relief 
--------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Branski stated that up to one-half of Bolivia's USD 
1.6 billion debt with the IDB may be forgiven.  He explained 
that Bolivia, along with Haiti, Nicaragua, Guyana, and 
Honduras, have received their past disbursements from a 
special concessionary fund for low-income countries, to which 
the U.S. contributes 54%.  The IDB plans to eliminate this 
special fund, and in the future, make all loans from its 
regular capital fund.  Thus, he added, the debt forgiveness 
program is envisioned to come as a package -- covering all 
five countries or none. 
 
6. Comment: Whatever may be the perceptions at the IDB in 
Washington, locally the IDB believes their program to be at 
substantial risk pending U.S. policy decisions.  As Branski 
mentioned, U.S. influence over IDB project approval, fund 
reallocation, and debt relief provides important leverage to 
the U.S. in discussions with the incoming GOB.  However, if 
the final debt relief plan does in fact emerge as an all or 
nothing, five-country package, our leeway to use this as a 
bargaining chip with Bolivia to encourage the GOB to 
maintain/implement sound economic policies will be greatly 
limited.  End comment. 
GREENLEE