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Viewing cable 06HOCHIMINHCITY87, ANALYSIS OF PROVINCIAL PARTY CONGRESSES IN CENTRAL AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06HOCHIMINHCITY87 2006-01-25 08:58 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

250858Z Jan 06

ACTION EAP-00   

INFO  LOG-00   AID-00   CIAE-00  INL-00   DODE-00  DOTE-00  DS-00    
      EB-00    OIGO-00  FAAE-00  FBIE-00  UTED-00  VCI-00   H-00     
      TEDE-00  INR-00   LAB-01   L-00     VCIE-00  DCP-00   NSAE-00  
      ISN-00   NSCE-00  OMB-00   NIMA-00  PA-00    PM-00    GIWI-00  
      PRS-00   P-00     ISNE-00  SP-00    IRM-00   SSO-00   SS-00    
      TRSE-00  FMP-00   BBG-00   IIP-00   PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   
      DRL-00   G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00   SWCI-00    /001W
                  ------------------851D5E  250907Z /38    
FM AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0327
INFO ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY HANOI 
AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY
UNCLAS  HO CHI MINH CITY 000087 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL SOCI KIRF PHUM VM DPOL
SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF PROVINCIAL PARTY CONGRESSES IN CENTRAL AND 
SOUTHERN VIETNAM 
 
REF: HCMC 29 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  In late 2005, provincial Communist Party 
Committees in southern and central Vietnam conducted their Party 
Congresses to select the new crop of provincial leaders for the 
2006-2010 term.  The results may offer some indication of the 
thinking and direction of the Party as it prepares for the 
national 10th Party Congress this April.  Stability, local roots 
and longevity were watchwords of the congresses, with only 23 of 
96 leadership posts changing.  (There may be additional changes 
in the offing, particularly in HCMC, as key provincial leaders 
get tapped for central-level Party and government posts during 
the 10th Party Congress.)  Functionaries linked to security, 
ideology and organizational affairs appeared to gain, especially 
in provinces hit by corruption scandals.  Notable personnel 
changes in the Central Highlands include the removal of the 
ultra-hardline Party Secretary of Dak Lak Province and the 
promotion to a key central-level Party slot of the Party 
Secretary of Gia Lai Province.  The current cohort is the last 
 
SIPDIS 
generation of provincial Party leaders with common formative 
roots in the "American War."  End Summary. 
 
Stability, Parochialism and Longevity 
------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) In November and December 2005, 33 provinces in southern 
and central Vietnam held Party Congresses to select leaders for 
the 2006-2010 term, review and set local policy and development 
goals, and provide input to the Party in preparation for the 
national 10th Party Congress, slated for the second quarter of 
2006.  Excluding HCMC, only eight of 32 provincial Party 
Secretary positions and 15 of 64 provincial Deputy Secretary 
 
SIPDIS 
positions changed.  (The eight are:  Can Tho, Long An, Tien 
Giang, An Giang, Vinh Long, Binh Thuan, Dak Lak, and Gia Lai.) 
The Party Secretaries are required to be members of the Central 
Committee.  Those newly elected Secretaries, if not presently 
members of the Party's Central Committee, must be selected at 
the 10th National Party Congress or face replacement. 
 
3. (SBU) Our contacts tell us that the proposal to merge of the 
positions of Party General Secretary and State President was not 
discussed at the provincial Party Congresses.  This, they 
explain, likely would preclude the Party from taking such a step 
at the 10th Party Congress as the Party normally would vet a 
major policy change at lower levels before taking it up at the 
national level.  In contrast, the proposal to allow Party 
members to participate in private business -- another possible 
reform -- apparently was debated at the provincial Party 
Congresses. 
 
4. (SBU) The provinces largely appear to be ignoring the January 
2002 Politburo decree encouraging the transfer of party cadre 
between provinces and the Central Government and Party.  With 
two exceptions, all the Party Secretaries and the Deputies rose 
through their local party apparatuses to take the top slots in 
their provinces.  Nguyen Tuan Khanh, former Secretary of the Gia 
Lai Province Party Committee, was appointed Deputy Chief of the 
Central Commission on Home Security, replacing Nguyen Tan Quyen. 
 Quyen, in turn, was appointed Secretary of the Can Tho Party 
Committee.  Quyen's appointment to Can Tho is a homeward 
journey.  He was elected Can Tho Party Secretary after three 
years as Deputy Chief of the Central Commission on Home Security 
 (the Commission oversees internal security and law enforcement 
organizations including the police and  prosecutor's office). 
Prior to that, Quyen was Party Secretary of Soc Trang Province 
in the Mekong Delta. 
 
Education and Career 
--------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) University-level education is not a prerequisite for 
provincial leadership, but ideological grounding is.  Of the 33 
provincial Party Secretaries, less than a third have 
higher-level education.  (Five -- in An Giang, Tay Ninh, Binh 
Thuan, Khanh Hoa, and Ba Ria-Vung Tau -- have BAs;, two - - in 
Lam Dong and Dong Nai -- have MAs; and three -- in Danang, Quang 
Nam and Ninh Thuan -- have PhDs.)   However, all Party 
Secretaries and their deputies must have an "advanced degree" in 
 
SIPDIS 
politics.  The majority of the current Secretaries and Deputy 
Secretaries obtained this certificate by taking courses offered 
 
SIPDIS 
at the provincial political schools where visiting professors 
from the Ho Chi Minh Political Academy are sent to teach.  As a 
rule, the Deputy Director of a provincial government department 
or the Vice-Chairman of a District People's Committee must have 
an advanced degree in politics to be appointed to their post. 
 
6. (SBU) The job histories of the current cohort of Secretaries 
and Deputy Secretaries shows that the Party prefers to promote 
those involved in organization, security and ideology over those 
focusing on economics and development.  The vast majority once 
headed provincial Departments of Public Security or Military 
Commands, or served as heads of the provincial Committees for 
 
 
Party Control, Organizational Affairs, Home Security, ore 
Culture and Ideology.  For example, the Party Secretaries of Ca 
Mau and Dong Thap provinces previously headed their provincial 
Military Commands.  The two current Deputy Secretaries of Lam 
Dong headed the provincial Public Security Department and 
Military Command, respectively.  Kien Giang's new Standing 
Deputy Secretary, Bui Quang Ben, was the Director of the 
province's Public Security Department.  Dak Lak's new Deputy 
Secretary, Lu Ngoc Cu, was Director of the province's Public 
 
SIPDIS 
Security Department, as was Gia Lai's new Deputy Party 
Secretary, Ksor Nham. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
The Southern School Club 
------------------------ 
 
7. (SBU) Although obtaining biographic material on Party leaders 
is difficult, a significant number of current provincial leaders 
appear to belong to the "Southern School" cohort.  These are 
students identified by the Party as future leaders and sent 
during the "American War" to a special school in the North. 
Members of this group include An Giang Secretary Nguyen Hoang 
Viet, former Gia Lai Party Secretary Nguyen Tuan Khanh (who was 
recently promoted to a central-level Party job in Hanoi -- see 
paragraph 8), Ba Ria Vung Tau Secretary Nguyen Tuan Minh, Danang 
Secretary Nguyen Ba Thanh, Danang Deputy Secretary Hoang Tuan 
 
SIPDIS 
Anh, Quang Nam Secretary Va Ngoc Hoang, and Quang Nam Deputy 
Secretary Nguyen Xuan Phuc.  Prime Minister Phan Van Khai 
 
SIPDIS 
reportedly also is a graduate of the "Southern School." 
 
Seniority matters; Women and Minorities Underrepresented 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
8. (SBU) The Party does not appear to have a mechanism to allow 
talented young officials to advance quickly to leadership 
positions.  All but three deputy secretaries of the 2006-2010 
cohort are in their mid-fifties or older.  Of the roughly 100 
possible senior Party leadership positions, women and ethnic 
minorities hold only six.  Tra Vinh Province appointed an ethnic 
Khmer Deputy Secretary, Dak Lak an ethnic Ede Secretary, Gia Lai 
an ethnic Jarai Deputy Secretary, and Kontum an ethnic Sedang 
woman Party Secretary.  Tien Giang and Tay Ninh provinces also 
have female Party Secretaries. 
 
Persons to Watch 
---------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) Nguyen Tuan Khanh has emerged as a rising political 
star.  He was Deputy Party Secretary of An Giang Province before 
his promotion to Secretary of Gia Lai in 2002.  Khanh, who is 
reportedly linked to Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, is 
credited for overcoming the opposition of hardliners in Gia Lai, 
facilitating greater socio-economic development for ethnic 
minorities and easing restrictions on Protestant groups.  A 
contact from An Giang told us that Khanh will be promoted to 
Chief of the Central Commission on Home Security after the 
National Party Congress.  Quang Nam Deputy Party Secretary and 
Chairman of the People's Committee Nguyen Xuan Phuc is rumored 
to be a contender for an economic-sector Ministerial position in 
the GVN; Phuc, a graduate of the Fulbright Economic Teaching 
Program, is widely credited for being one of the prime movers 
behind the emergence of Quang Nam's tourism sector. 
 
Mostly Desultory Media Coverage 
------------------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) Media coverage of the provincial Party Congresses 
largely was rote and dry.  There was no substantive reporting on 
issues raised in the conclaves, no biographic information on 
newly-elected members, and no real detail on tasks and 
provincial targets  during the upcoming five-year plan cycle 
(2006-2010).  HCMC's Party Congress was a relative exception, 
with speeches by HCMC Party Secretary Triet emphasizing the 
Party's need to attract fresh blood, fight corruption, and 
improve the training of Party cadres to retain its credibility. 
Former Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet's address to the HCMC Party 
Congress received heavy HCMC press coverage.  In a pitch for 
comprehensive reform and introspection, Kiet called for the HCMC 
Party Congress -- as well as all other provincial congresses -- 
to review both achievements and failures in the thirty years 
since reunification.  (Note:  The first ten years after 
unification saw the imposition of Marxist orthodoxy and the 
collapse of the economy.  Socio-economic mismanagement led to 
the GVN's policy of Doi Moi or economic liberalization in 1986. 
End Note.) 
 
11. (SBU)  With the exception of neighboring Dong Nai Province, 
which also conducted a 30-year review, other Provincial 
Congresses fudged the issue or explicitly covered 20 years. 
Speakers at the provincial Party Congresses in the sensitive 
Central Highlands were reported to have urged local leaders to 
ensure that "security and stability" remain paramount even as 
 
 
they focus on socio-economic development. 
 
HCMC: Anticipating Major Change in mid-2006 
------------------------------------------- 
 
12.  (SBU) Although HCMC's November 2005 Party Congress left 
virtually intact the entire senior HCMC Party personnel roster, 
major changes are anticipated after the national 10th Party 
Congress.  Insiders tell us that HCMC Party Secretary and 
Politburo member Nguyen Minh Triet will be transferred to Hanoi, 
although the exact job he will hold is unclear.  Some say he is 
slated to become Vietnam's next President, replacing the 
retiring Tran Duc Luong; others say he will replace Tran Dinh 
Hoan as Chief of the Party Organization Committee.  In either 
case, Triet will retain his Politburo status.  Triet reportedly 
is pushing for his protege, Deputy HCMC Party Secretary Le Hoang 
Quan, to replace him as HCMC Party Secretary (Party tradition 
calls for the HCMC Party Secretary to be a Politburo member). 
However, Truong Vinh Trong, the current Chief of the Central 
Commission on Home Security, may be assigned to HCMC and Quan 
tapped to replace HCMC People's Committee Chairman Le Thanh Hai, 
whose future is clouded because of an emerging road-building 
corruption scandal linked to his family.  Hai's political 
position is reported to be further weakened by the retirement of 
Vice-President Truong My Hoa, to whom he is related by marriage. 
 
 
13.  (SBU) Pham Phuong Thao, Deputy HCMC Party Secretary and 
current head of the HCMC People's Council, is slated to be the 
new Vice-President.  Thao is a protege of former Prime Minister 
Vo Van Kiet.  Current HCMC People's Committee Vice-Chairman 
Nguyen Van Dua also is a rising star within the HCMC Party 
apparatus and a favorite of Triet's.  The Standing Vice-Chairman 
of the People's Committee, Dr. Nguyen Thien Nhan, may be tapped 
for a Vice-Ministerial position in Hanoi, but is reported not to 
have the support of the Party apparatus in HCMC for a more 
senior job in the city. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
14.  (SBU) Reformers within the Party had been advocating for 
personnel change in Dak Lak; the removal of the provincial Party 
Secretary could be important for U.S. religious freedom and 
 
SIPDIS 
human rights interests in the Central Highlands.  The outgoing 
Dak Lak Party Secretary was a third-generation revolutionary and 
ethnic minority member who vehemently opposed efforts to ease 
pressure on Protestants and to issue passports in family 
reunification (Visas 93) cases involving ethnic minority 
persons.  Provincial officials openly (and with some relief) 
characterized the new Party Secretary as "much more moderate" 
during our visit to the province in early January.  Similarly, 
his newly appointed Deputy, and possible new People's Committee 
Chairman, Senior MPS Colonel Cu, struck us as tough but 
open-minded.  In the month since the Dak Lak Party Congress, 
there has been encouraging movement on religious freedom and 
Visas 93 issues (reftel). 
 
15. (SBU) Corruption also appears to be a key factor in shaping 
the Party's provincial personnel decisions.  Can Tho, Dak Lak, 
and Kien Giang provinces uncovered major land and financial 
misappropriation scandals in 2005.  All three provinces removed 
their leaders and promoted individuals with security backgrounds 
to leadership positions.   The apparent deliberations within the 
Party on the removal of HCMC People's Committee Chairman Hai and 
his replacement with the Chief of the Party's Central Committee 
for Home Security is consistent with this trend. 
 
16. (SBU) The current crop of provincial leaders is the last 
generation to have any active connection to the "American War," 
which still helps shape the mindset of some within the Party. 
Their successors -- the next generation of provincial leaders 
(and Central Committee members) -- will have more diverse 
backgrounds, better training, and international exposure.  End 
Comment. 
CHERN 
 
 
NNNN