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Viewing cable 06HARARE59, HARARE BFIF PROJECT PROPOSAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06HARARE59 2006-01-20 04:46 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Harare
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000059 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
AF/S FOR B. NEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR M. COPSON AND E.LOKEN 
TREASURY FOR J. RALYEA AND B. CUSHMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ABUD AMGT BEXP BTIO ECON ETRD ZI
SUBJECT: HARARE BFIF PROJECT PROPOSAL 
 
REF: STATE 215954 
 
1.  (U) Embassy Harare proposes to draw on the Business 
Facilitation and Incentive Fund (BFIF)(reftel) to sponsor a 
business/economic policy forum on "A Foundation for Economic 
Turnaround: Private Sector Perspectives." 
 
2.  (SBU) With Zimbabwe's GDP having contracted by more than 
a third in just six years, the private sector here is on the 
ropes.  GOZ mismanagement has been a case study in how to 
stifle an economy: eviscerate security of land tenure; 
undermine sanctity of contract; compromise court integrity, 
capacity and competence; control foreign exchange; constantly 
shift regulatory overlays; engage in profligate government 
spending.  The result has been deep shortages of fuel and 
other critical inputs, scarcity of foreign exchange, and the 
world's highest inflation rate, to name just a few 
characteristics of this most difficult business operating 
environment. 
 
3.  (SBU) Despite chilly bilateral relations, American brand 
names and products remain popular among Zimbabwean consumers, 
and our exports to Zimbabwe actually grew in value in 2004 
before apparently declining last year (final figures are yet 
to be released).  Zimbabwe has not seen meaningful new 
American invesment for years.  For American companies here, 
the biggest business impediments are not prejudicial barriers 
to entry or cutting edge distorting trade practices, but the 
government's comprehensive mismanagement of the economy. 
 
4.  (SBU) A first step necessary to begin to overcome such a 
fundamental obstacle is to generate public debate and 
pressure on the government for economic reform. 
Encouragingly, the Zimbabwean private sector and civil 
service well know the basic reforms needed to turn things 
around.  What is missing is a venue at which debate can be 
meaningfully aired when the upper echelons of the GOZ and 
ruling party are so openly hostile to criticism.  For its 
part, the private sector has been very tentative in publicly 
criticizing GOZ policy, although it has pressed its 
prescriptions behind the scenes.  Academia has similarly 
avoided initiatives to publicly air the debates in which they 
engage outside the public glare.  The independent press has 
aired criticism and debate, but is generally reactive, 
cautious, self-censored or outright intimidated by the GOZ. 
 
5.  (SBU) The outpouring of assent and debate that followed 
the Ambassador's November speech in Mutare, in which he 
dismissed GOZ excuses for economic failure and attributed 
Zimbabwe's misery to GOZ mismanagement and corruption, 
suggests the eagerness Zimbabwean audiences have for real 
debate.  Importantly, a debate on economic policy is 
relatively new ground on which the regime is very 
uncomfortable.  It had manipulated traditional criticisms 
about human rights and democracy to its advantage with 
"nationalist" audiences in Zimbabwe and Africa; however, the 
country's economic implosion holds little room for the regime 
to maneuver rhetorically.  Accordingly, fomenting debate on 
economic policy will embolden domestic critics and citizen 
activists, thus supporting our principal MPP goal: supporting 
democracy and human rights. 
 
6.  (SBU) Our proposed event would bring together private 
sector leaders and thinkers, supplemented by academics, 
business journalists and selected government figures, to 
identify and to deliberate over the key measures needed to 
right Zimbabwe's course.  Among the participants and desired 
beneficiaries would be the American Business Association of 
Zimbabwe, a networking organization interested in getting 
into the lobbying arena. 
7.  (SBU) We envision two segments to the forum: a smaller, 
closed door, off the record gathering of dynamic opinion 
makers to talk in a frank setting; followed by a public 
segment in which panels from the smaller gathering make 
presentations or discuss selected topics before larger public 
audiences.  Forum topics will need to be fleshed out in 
consultation with prospective participants and audiences, but 
we would expect the event would spotlight property rights, 
regulatory consistency, foreign exchange policy, GOZ 
inflationary practices, and government/municipal services, 
among others. 
 
8.  (SBU) We fully anticipate that the government would not 
participate, but we would invite media coverage to take the 
event's substance public.  Inviting speakers from countries 
that have undergone post-conflict recovery would stimulate 
local interest, draw broader lessons, and accentuate a 
mindset that we are trying to instill here: that Zimbabwe 
already is in the post-Mugabe era emotionally and needs to 
start planning for it in fact.  In any event, we believe the 
forum would helpfully put the GOZ into a lose-lose position - 
participate and hear constructive prescriptions that it lacks 
political will to implement, or not participate and embolden 
participants with a robust debate that would encourage 
broader public dialogue through follow-on media coverage. 
 
9.  (U) Planning would involve venue reservation and 
arrangements; narrowing topics; stimulating communication 
among participants in advance to develop themes and positions 
before the event; developing invitation lists; identifying 
and securing speakers, making travel arrangements for 
speakers coming from outside the country; developing media 
strategies for the pre- and post-event periods. 
 
10.  (SBU) Desired outcomes include enhanced confidence and 
lobbying capacity of ABAZ and other private sector 
associations, enhanced communication on policy issues among 
private sector players and the media, and media coverage and 
follow-on private sector activity that would provoke public 
pressure on the GOZ. 
 
11.  (U) Initial estimated costs include venue/refreshments 
for day and a half ($2500), transportation and per diem for 
outside speakers ($2500), pre-event publicity/communications 
($1000) and follow-on media coverage/publications ($5000), 
for a total of $11,000. 
 
12.  (U) Post point of contact is econoff Frances Chisholm, 
263-4-250-595, ext. 206, chisholmfm@state.gov. 
DELL