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Viewing cable 06DAMASCUS68, APPLYING TARGETED SANCTIONS TO SYRIA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06DAMASCUS68 2006-01-04 14:08 2011-08-03 20:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Damascus
Appears in these articles:
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/08/03/119333/wikileaks-bush-obama-passed-on.html
VZCZCXRO2381
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHDM #0068/01 0041408
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041408Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6460
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0694
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0055
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000068 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA/ELA 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH 
TREASURY FOR GLASER/LEBENSON 
EB/ESC/TFS FOR SALOOM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2015 
TAGS: EAIR ECON ETTC SY SANC
SUBJECT: APPLYING TARGETED SANCTIONS TO SYRIA 
 
REF: A. A: DAMASCUS 5567 
     B. REF B: DAMASCUS 6224 
 
Classified By: CDA: Stephen Seche for Reasons 1.5 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  As post has reported previously, the 
average Syrian would welcome targeted sanctions that focus on 
regressive elements within the Asad regime.  The best mix in 
our judgement would be sanctions that are phased, 
multi-lateral, and widely publicized.  Most of our Syrian 
interlocutors concur that if done correctly, these sanctions 
would delegitimize those elements within the SARG perceived 
to be obstacles to change, strengthen progressive elements 
both within the regime and the wider society, and increase 
pressure on the SARG to substantively change its 
destabilizing behavior.  End summary. 
 
2.  (C) Financial and travel sanctions that target 
individuals remain popular with the majority of our Syrian 
interlocutors (ref A, B).  They argue that targeting 
individuals would make clear for the average Syrian that the 
international community opposes the regime and its policies, 
but does not wish to punish the Syrian people.  At the same 
time, targeted sanctions would also help delegitimize those 
individuals who pose the greatest internal and external 
threat to progress.  Additionally, if designated individuals 
could neither travel nor conduct legitimate business, they 
would become an increasing liability for President Bashar 
al-Asad,s regime.  Popular resentment against the sanctioned 
individuals would add to the pressure to change. 
 
3.  (C) Syrians we speak with argue that future designations 
should be multi-lateral.  Some tools for doing so already 
exist.  UNSCR 1636 makes provision for designation of 
individuals named under the Hariri investigation.  A case 
should be made for additional designations under existing or 
new UNSC resolutions.  The USG designated Dhu al Himma 
as-Shaleesh and Asif Issa as-Shalesh, cousins of President 
Asad, under E.O. 13315 ) a derivative of UNSCR 1483 - for 
their role in procuring defense-related items for Saddam 
Hussein.  We should lobby our allies to pursue similar 
designations, under the umbrella of new or existing UNSC 
resolutions of both the Shaleeshes and any new Syrians we 
designate concerning Lebanon, Iraq, WMD, and the peace 
process.  Though it is unlikely that any significant 
financial resources would be frozen by these designations 
(ref B), the naming and shaming of the most recalcitrant 
elements within the regime would delegitimize them 
internationally, which in turn, would work to undermine the 
hardliners domestically. 
 
4.  (C) Pursuing multilateral designations would greatly 
multiply the effectiveness of targeted sanctions, but a 
carefully timed campaign to widely publicize the designations 
is equally important.  Without media coverage and publicity 
to raise the profile of designations, the effort would lose 
its most effective element - &name and shame.8  The 
Shaleesh case mentioned above is a case in point.  Despite 
the Shaleesh family having a high profile within Syria, very 
few Syrians at any level are aware the USG imposed financial 
sanctions on them.  The head of one of the leading Sunni 
business families in Damascus approached us recently to ask 
why the USG did not aggressively pursue sanctioning criminal 
elements within the regime.  When asked for examples of who 
should be sanctioned, our contact pointed to Dhu al Himma 
as-Shaleesh who, he asserted, took much of the 580 million 
USD in Iraqi funds the Commercial Bank of Syria illegally 
paid out in 2003 and has yet to reconcile with the Iraqis. 
Needless to say, our contact was surprised to find out Dhu al 
Himma as well as his nephew, Asif Issa Shaleesh, were already 
sanctioned. 
 
5.  (C) Phasing in future targeted sanctions can maximize 
their impact.  The first phase could start with those most 
clearly the architects of objectionable SARG policies 
relating to Iraq, Lebanon, WMD, and support for the 
Palestinian rejectionist groups, and then extend to those 
continuing to support the original group in an ever widening 
circle.  In addition to all of the Mehlis suspects, the first 
batch of new designees might include a core group of eight to 
ten, such as Asif Shawkat (Asad,s brother-in-law and head of 
Syrian Military Intelligence), Maher Asad (President Asad,s 
brother and commander of the Republican Guard), Rami Makhlouf 
(Asad,s first cousin and Syria,s poster boy for 
corruption), Mohammad Makhlouf (Rami,s father), Riyad Issa 
Shaleesh (principal director of SES International ) an 
entity already designated under E.O. 13315; in addition, we 
should push our allies to sanction the other two Shaleeshes 
mentioned above), Hisham Ikhtiyar (chairman of the Regional 
Command's National Security Bureau), Abdel Fatah Qudsia 
(Presidential advisor on Palestinian issues), and Mohammad 
Suleiman (Presidential advisor responsible for procurement). 
A second tranch of designations could then move on to this 
group's lieutenants and business partners. 
 
6.  (C) Most Syrians we talk to believe that President Asad 
still represents their best hope for change without 
instability.  It is their fear of instability that stops the 
majority of Syrians from pushing harder for internal change. 
For this reason, they argue that sanctions focusing on 
individuals would help empower Asad to scuttle the regime,s 
pariahs.  According to this school of thought, Bashar himself 
should not be designated at this point as it would limit our 
options and signal that the USG is intent on regime change, 
greatly limiting the number of Syrians willing to join us in 
pressuring the SARG for change. 
 
7.  (C) Comment.  Pursuing targeted sanctions would send a 
powerful message to the regime and those associated with it: 
"if you are perceived to be proponents of the policies 
causing regional instability, you will be designated.  If you 
provide aid and assistance to those designated, you risk 
designation yourself."  Both internal and external pressure 
on the regime to change would likewise increase incrementally 
as the number of designations increased.  If conventional 
Syrian wisdom is correct, the obstacles stopping Bashar from 
doing the right thing would proportionally decrease as 
targeted sanctions progressed.  Even if that view is wrong, 
the same result will occur, as the supports of Bashar,s 
failed policies are eroded.  In the end, the USG will advance 
its policy objectives by undermining the regime,s ability to 
pursue policies at odds with regional stability. 
SECHE