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Viewing cable 06DAMASCUS149, CIVIL SOCIETY MULLS KHADDAM'S STATEMENTS, SARG'S

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06DAMASCUS149 2006-01-09 15:18 2011-05-04 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Damascus
Appears in these articles:
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10402
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10403
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10404
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10405
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10406
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11322
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11323
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11324
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11325
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11326
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11327
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11328
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11329
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11330
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11331
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11332
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11333
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11336
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11337
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11338
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11339
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11340
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11341
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11342
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11343
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11344
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11345
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11346
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11348
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11349
VZCZCXYZ0006
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDM #0149/01 0091518
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091518Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6556
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0577
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000149 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SY
SUBJECT: CIVIL SOCIETY MULLS KHADDAM'S STATEMENTS, SARG'S 
REACTION 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4 b/d 
 
 1.  (C): SUMMARY: Civil-society activists continue to 
discuss recent statements by former Vice-President Abdul 
Halim Khaddam, particularly those related to any aspirations 
for a leading role in the Syrian opposition.  Most activists 
acknowledge Khaddam's real ties to the opposition, noting 
that some opposition figures are already making overtures to 
Khaddam. Meanwhile, activists noted new SARG measures 
designed to press opposition figures into the anti-Khaddam 
camp.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C):  KHADDAM,S TIES TO OPPOSITION DO EXIST:  A number 
of civil-society activists noted that Khaddam does indeed 
have the connection to the opposition which he has been 
touting publicly.  Human rights activist XXXXXXXXXXXX noted 
that Khaddam had been floating his plans to go public over 
the last three months and had contacted opposition figures by 
letter, trying to gauge potential support.  Sometimes 
critical XXXXXXXXXXXX cited his own ties to a 
Khaddam family member who had told XXXXXXXXXXXX that many Ba,thists 
open to reform had traveled to visit Khaddam in Paris 
throughout the fall, utilizing indirect travel routes to 
avoid Syrian intelligence scrutiny. 
 
3.  (C):  According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Khaddam's strongest opposition 
tie is to leading opposition figure XXXXXXXXXXXX. 
Khaddam and XXXXXXXXXXXX have a long history together, says XXXXXXXXXXXX, 
dating back to Khaddam's arrival in Damascus as a student in 
the 1950s.  XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that Khaddam had encouraged XXXXXXXXXXXX to 
form his own party during the Damascus Spring of 2001 XXXXXXXXXXXX. 
 
4.  (C)  CIVIL SOCIETY MULLS ITS POSITION TOWARDS KHADDAM 
PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY:  Civil-society figures are continuing 
to evaluate Khaddam's statements.   XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOff that discussion with Khaddam is in 
line with the Damascus Declaration, as the Declaration makes 
clear that engagement with the regime is desirable, even with 
former senior figures like Khaddam. 
 
5.  (C)  XXXXXXXXXXXX praised Khaddam's "change in opinion" and 
clear critique of the SARG, but at the same time said that XXXXXXXXXXXX 
does not believe that Khaddam should be granted "automatic 
forgiveness" for past sins.  However, XXXXXXXXXXXX is convinced that 
politics will trump human rights concerns within the 
opposition, noting that with his recent statements, "Khaddam 
has done more for the opposition and has moved for change 
more than other opposition members." 
 
6.  (C)  Not all civil-society activists are willing to 
believe Khaddam's new democratic, anti-corruption position. 
Human rights activist and Damascus Declaration signatory 
XXXXXXXXXXXX called Khaddam's reformist statements "lies" 
and considers Khaddam -- despite overwhelming evidence to the 
contrary -- to still be part of the regime. 
 
7.  (C)  Activists are also discussing public statements made 
by a number of Syrian opposition figures setting out 
conditions for dialogue with Khaddam.  XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that 
senior opposition figure Riad al-Turk had made press 
statements in Germany that he would accept Khaddam in the 
opposition if he apologizes for his misdeeds.  XXXXXXXXXXXX also 
alluded to Khaddam's appearance on al-Mustaqil TV with Muslim 
Brotherhood leader Ali Sadreddin Bayanouni on January 8 from 
two remote locations as a sign of dialogue between the two 
camps.  (Note:  XXXXXXXXXXXX hinted to Polchief 
January 9 that Khaddam met privately with Bayanouni prior to 
his December 30 Al-Arabiyya interview to coordinate their 
positions.) 
 
8.  (C)  MEANWHILE, REGIME OFFERS CARROTS TO OPPOSITION 
FIGURES:  Civil-society activists also noted that the regime 
is reaching out to some opposition members, cajoling and 
pressuring, to shore up support in the Khaddam crisis. 
According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, opposition figure and spokesman for the 
National Democratic Front umbrella organization, Hassan Abdul 
Azeem, has been approached by the regime (specifically 
Regional Command National Security Office head Hisham 
Ikhtiyar) to discuss the "opening of a dialogue."  According 
to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the leaders of the five National Democratic Front 
member parties will convene in a number of days to take this 
suggestion under advisement, indicating a willingness to 
entertain the offer. 
 
9.  (C)  The regime is also reaching out to political 
prisoners in order to shore up its anti-Khaddam platform. 
According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX has been approached 
twice by individuals with regime ties urging him to publicly 
come out against Khaddam in exchange for "help" in his case. 
XXXXXXXXXXXX indicated that XXXXXXXXXXXX is not willing to make such 
statements. (NOTE: XXXXXXXXXXXX also indicated that the SARG is 
utilizing sticks against possible Khaddam supporters, citing 
a report that 82 Khaddam associates whom XXXXXXXXXXXX described as 
'old guard' were detained by security services in and around 
Damascus on January 7, including at least one former Syrian 
ambassador. Poloff has been unable to confirm this report 
with human rights organizations). 
 
10.  (C)  Civil-society activists are also discussing the 
implications of President Bashar al-Asad,s January 3 
comments to al-Usbua newspaper regarding the potential for a 
human rights ministry.  Activists were especially surprised 
at Asad's acknowledgment of the existence and unofficial 
tolerance of unlicensed civil-society organizations and his 
noting that the government is contemplating a "mechanism that 
is more legal" for such NGOs.   While skeptical that Asad is 
seriously contemplating such a move, XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX both 
noted that the statement was significant and may be an 
attempt to signal a willingness for reform in the midst of 
renewed pressure. 
SECHE