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Viewing cable 06BAGHDAD211, 60-DAY ASSESSMENT OF PROVINCIAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BAGHDAD211 2006-01-26 03:25 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXRO2409
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHGB #0211/01 0260325
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 260325Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2281
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000211 
 
SIPDIS 
 
INFO MNFIM 
MNCI//00// 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/I 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR PINS ODIP OFDP PREL IZ
SUBJECT: 60-DAY ASSESSMENT OF PROVINCIAL 
RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 
 
REF: 05 BAGHDAD 4045 
 
1. (U) THIS IS A COORDINATED EMBASSY BAGHDAD AND MNF-I 
CABLE. 
 
2. (SBU) SUMMARY: The National Coordination Team (NCT) 
provided AMB Khalilzad and GEN Casey the 60-Day 
Assessment of the three operational Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) on January 19.  From this 
assessment, it remains clear the PRT concept is a 
crucial component of both our integrated counter- 
insurgency strategy and our national capacity building 
in the provinces; the PRTs add value across the 
political, economic, and governance lines of operation 
in Iraq.  Mission and MNF-I are prepared to roll out 
additional PRTs pending resourcing and security 
manning decisions by the Principals Committee.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
----------------- 
60-DAY ASSESSMENT 
----------------- 
 
3. (SBU) As directed by Ambassador and MNF-I 
Commanding General (CG) Casey, the NCT developed a 60- 
day joint assessment of the three proof-of-concept 
PRTs (Babil, Tamin, Ninawa) and of the PRT initiative 
overall.  (NOTE: Briefing slides sent separately to 
NEA/I.  END NOTE.)  The results of this assessment 
were briefed to Ambassador and CG on January 19. 
Overall, the initiative is assessed as on-track, with 
all PRTs functional and engaging provincial 
authorities. 
 
4. (SBU) Operational highlights of the PRT after 60- 
days include: 
 
-- All PRTs are functional and, with few exceptions, 
fully-staffed. 
 
-- Comprehensive work plans have been developed. 
These plans integrate efforts of USAID, IRMO, DOS, 
Civil Affairs, and the Local Governance Program, and 
focus on integration of MNF-I and Mission initiatives 
in the provinces. 
 
-- The PRTs have provided Mission with enhanced weekly 
reporting and situational awareness of political, 
economic, rule of law, and infrastructure 
developments. 
 
-- Local offices previously established under Local 
Governance Program-II have been integrated into PRTs. 
 
5. (U) Functional accomplishments of the PRTs after 
60-days include: 
 
-- In Babil, the PRT developed a joint Iraqi-US 90-day 
action plan that includes a prioritized list of small, 
high-impact projects to address constituents' 
immediate needs. 
 
-- In Kirkuk, the PRT assisted the Provincial Council 
(PC) in developing a solid waste management master 
plan to resolve critical public and environmental 
concerns.  The PRT also assisted in drafting a local 
law to transfer authority for weapons permits from 
Coalition to the PC and for establishing a Missing 
Persons/Detainees Working Group. 
 
-- In Ninawa, the PRT facilitated a human rights 
assessment of local prisons by the PC.  It also 
assisted the Provincial Reconstruction Development 
Committee (PRDC) Chairman in developing a 
comprehensive reconstruction plan for Tal Afar that 
resulted in an allocation of $37 million from the 
central government. 
 
------- 
ACTIONS 
------- 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00000211  002 OF 003 
 
 
6. (SBU) As a result of the review, Ambassador and CG 
agreed on a number of steps to enhance the 
effectiveness of the existing PRTs: 
 
-- To address an immediate need to support engagement 
by the first three PRTs until a permanent PRT 
arrangement is decided, additional movement security 
teams will be provided by MNF-I so that each existing 
PRT will have two military movement security teams to 
augment the DOS-contracted personal security detail 
(PSD) teams currently supporting PRTs. 
 
-- Ambassador and CG agreed to cost-sharing provisions 
by which Mission would take responsibility for 
logistical support for PRTs located on DOS facilities, 
and MNF-I would assume responsibility for logistical 
support of PRTs located on MNC-I facilities. 
 
------------------ 
OUTSTANDING ISSUES 
------------------ 
 
7. (SBU) Acceptance and recognition are still needed 
from all USG elements that PRTs are central to 
capacity building at the provincial level and in the 
counterinsurgency effort.  To that end, capable local 
governments that have the support of their populations 
significantly diminish anti-GOI activities while 
supporting the federalist structure defined by the 
Iraqi constitution. 
 
6. (SBU) Adequate movement security remains the 
largest area of concern for existing and future PRTs. 
Although the proof-of-concept PRTs have initiated 
their engagement successfully with the provincial 
governments and have met with notable success, DOS 
security restrictions have limited the ability of 
existing PRTs to interact fully with provincial 
governments.  Mission requires Washington to make a 
decision on whether dedicated movement security assets 
will be provided by Coalition forces, contracted 
private security companies, or a combination of the 
two.  Additionally, Post has asked for clarification 
on whether specific Washington authorization is needed 
(vice existing COM authority) to allow COM personnel 
to travel with non-COM PSD assets (e.g., Corp of 
Engineers or military contracted civilian PSDs) in 
order to increase flexibility of integrated PRT staff 
and to use resources efficiently. 
 
7. (SBU) USAID funding for the Local Governance 
Program (LGP) is the critical component for capacity 
development.  USAID has front-loaded existing LGP 
funds to stand up the PRTs.  If additional funds are 
not obtained, it is likely that the program will shut 
down during the third quarter of FY06. 
 
8. (SBU) The PRTs need supplemental funding or 
reallocation of IRRF funds dedicated to each team for 
reconstruction and development projects developed 
through the PCs. 
 
-------------------- 
COALITION ENGAGEMENT 
-------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) Mission has engaged with Coalition partners 
regarding the PRT initiative and has met with varying 
degrees of interest from the British, Danes, 
Salvadorans, Poles, Italians, Koreans, Japanese, and 
Australians.  Mission continues to work closely with 
the UK regarding their lead on southern PRTs and 
anticipates a formal proposal from them within the 
next two weeks.  We believe that the Italians and 
Koreans will step up and assume a major role in PRTs, 
and we anticipate that others will commit further 
following a formal USG decision to move forward. 
 
--------- 
WAY AHEAD 
--------- 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00000211  003 OF 003 
 
 
10. (SBU) The 60-Day Assessment has highlighted the 
value of PRTs to achieving success in our mission in 
Iraq.  The magnitude of the contribution that the PRT 
program can make depends upon the continued commitment 
of resources.  The issue of movement security and 
future funding for the LGP are the critical drivers. 
Continued staffing of PRTs with quality personnel with 
requisite skill-sets and dwell-time also is paramount. 
While these issues are being addressed, we have 
challenged our team to continue to examine PRT 
priority and location options that reflect the diverse 
regional security, Coalition, and battlespace 
dynamics. 
 
KHALILZAD