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Viewing cable 06AMMAN713, AMMAN FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGEMENT REPORT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06AMMAN713 2006-01-29 15:11 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Amman
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 000713 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR CA/FPP AND INL/HSTC 
DEPT ALSO PASS TO KCC 
ATHENS FOR DHS 
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGER 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CVIS CPAS KFRD KCRM CMGT ASEC JO IZ
SUBJECT: AMMAN FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGEMENT REPORT 
SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 2005 
 
REF: A) 2005 SECSTATE 205073  B) 2005 AMMAN 8117  C) 2005 
AMMAN 9956 
 
The following is submitted in response to the Department's 
request in REF A. 
 
Country Conditions 
================== 
 
1.  (SBU) Jordan is a small country with limited natural 
resources and high unemployment and poverty rates. While 
the economy has made significant gains in recent years, the 
poverty level remains at or near 30 percent and estimated 
unemployment ranges from 15 to 30 percent.  There are 
roughly 5.3 million Jordanians, 1.8 million registered 
Palestinian refugees (many holding Jordanian passports), 
and an estimated 600,000 Iraqis who have fled Iraq. The 
large Iraqi community in Jordan and the general ease of 
access for Iraqi nationals to Jordan have served to make 
Iraqi nationals a considerable portion of the consular 
workload, constituting one-fifth of NIV applicants and half 
of IV applicants in 2005.  While Jordanian documents can 
confidently be verified with the issuing authorities, the 
documents presented by Iraqi applicants pose a concern 
since it is difficult to determine their authenticity.  An 
overview of consular efforts to combat fraud was also 
provided in REF B. 
 
NIV Fraud 
========= 
 
2.  (SBU) For the calendar year of 2005, the overall NIV 
refusal rate for Jordanian nationals stood at 54.8 percent 
and at 66.5 percent for Iraqi nationals.  NIV fraud 
committed by Jordanian nationals is generally limited to 
poor quality documents used to establish stronger ties, 
typically bank statements and support letters.  Fraud by 
Iraqis is, generally speaking, equally unsophisticated. 
However, Post has found a recent trend of H1b fraud 
committed by Iraqis claiming Chaldean affiliation to work 
as accountants or financial analysts in the U.S. (REF C). 
These cases are presented with entirely false school 
certificates, fake letters of prior employment, and 
scripted answers to common interview questionS.  Post has 
identified the trend and developed enhanced interview 
procedures to disrupt it.  Turnarounds reported by the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) show that Jordanian 
nationals as a group continue to overstay at a high rate, 
normally to work illegally in the U.S.  Post and DHS have 
also noted a steady number of cases where Jordanians are 
traveling to the U.S. for the sole purpose of giving birth, 
often on public assistance.  Post has continued to take 
notice of this information and to alter interview 
techniques. 
 
IV Fraud and DV Fraud 
===================== 
 
3.  (SBU) On the immigration side, malafide cases often 
include sham divorces to facilitate marriages of 
convenience between Jordanian men and American women.  Post 
has found that the American citizen petitioner is often 
employed in the U.S. by a family member of the beneficiary 
(often a gas station or convenience store).  The family 
member in the U.S. usually pays for all of the expenses of 
the trip and allows unusually long periods of vacation for 
the employee to complete the months-long IV process in 
Jordan.  Post has also seen a rising number of arranged 
marriages between American and Iraqi Chaldeans for I-130 
filings, K-1 visas, and K-3 visas.  In these cases, Post 
has found identical individuals, jewelry, and apartments in 
photos from supposedly unrelated cases.  For example, the 
same elderly woman was found in three separate engagement 
ceremonies, which were all conducted in the same apartment. 
However, the beneficiaries in each one of these cases 
stated that this was their grandmother or aunt but would 
then claim not to know each other.  While Post does process 
Diversity Visas for Jordanian and Iraqi nationals, Post has 
not detected significant fraud, as most who apply have the 
equivalent of a high school diploma, reflecting the high 
levels of secondary education in both countries.  The 
Consular Section appreciates the assistance of the Regional 
Security Office in investigating and evaluating suspect 
documents, particularly Iraqi passports, and coordinating 
with local law enforcement.  Their assistance is invaluable 
in deterring and preventing immigration fraud. 
 
ACS and Passport Fraud 
====================== 
 
4.  (SBU) ACS fraud is low in Jordan.  The limited cases 
that pose concern are the ability of individuals to 
transmit citizenship and cases of first-time claim of 
citizenship utilizing very old documents.  These issues are 
dealt with thorough interviews and document verification 
when necessary. 
 
Asylum and DHS Benefit Fraud 
============================ 
 
5.  (SBU) Post does issue transportation letters in asylum 
following-to-join and refugee cases, but has no instances 
of fraud to report.  At the request of DHS, the FPU 
regularly and successfully investigates marriage and 
divorce decrees for change of status cases in the U.S.  In 
the majority of these cases, Post finds that Jordanian men 
have committed bigamy by remaining married or remarrying 
their Jordanian wives but claiming marriage to American 
citizens for immigration benefit.  In addition, through 
Post's work and relationships with officials at the 
airport, we have found a pattern of persons using fake 
"green cards"  or parole letters to attempt travel to the 
U.S.  The airlines, in particular, have become very good at 
detecting these documents, denying the passenger boarding, 
and referring them to the Embassy.  In many of these cases, 
the traveler refuses to appear at the Embassy with the 
suspect document. 
 
Cooperation with Host Government Authorities 
============================================ 
 
6.  (SBU) Post's relationship with the Government of Jordan 
is strong and is complemented with our active participation 
in the local Fraud Control Group, made up of European and 
North American embassies and airline liaison officers who 
share information on documents and fraud trends.  We have 
no difficulties in approaching Jordanian government offices 
to verify documents or to gain access to malafide travelers 
and their documents at the airport.  However, there are two 
developments of concern in the anti-fraud relationship 
which Post is monitoring.  First was the cancellation of 
the annual interdiction exercise at Queen Alia 
International Airport in 2005 due to a recent change in 
leadership of the immigration staff there.  Traditionally, 
Post has cooperated with European embassies and airline 
liaison officers in conducting this exercise to improve 
training and build rapport.  Second, the immigration 
officials continue to return fraudulent documents to the 
bearers to ease their deportation from Jordan.  In most 
cases, the respective Embassy is contacted and allowed to 
cancel the document; however, Post is aware of uncancelled 
documents being returned to malafide travelers to continue 
their travels.  To resolve this issue, Post is working with 
like-minded foreign missions on efforts to educate 
Jordanian immigration officials on the benefits and 
obligations of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization Convention, to which Jordan is a signatory. 
 
Areas of Particular Concern 
=========================== 
 
7.  (SBU) Jordan is a potential transit point in the Middle 
East for malafide passengers traveling to Europe and North 
America.  In 2005, the national carrier, Royal Jordanian 
Airlines, increased the destinations (New York, Chicago, 
and Detroit) and frequency of direct flights to the U.S. to 
meet passenger demand.  Fraud identified at Amman's Queen 
Alia International Airport consists of partially- 
counterfeit to completely counterfeit travel documents, as 
well as genuine passports used by imposters.  Most of these 
cases involve travelers who are not Jordanian but are of 
Iraqi, Pakistani, Indian, Chinese, and Sudanese nationality 
transiting the airport.  Many malafide travelers are 
attempting to take advantage of Visa Waiver Programs in the 
U.S. and Europe. Post's Fraud Prevention Unit has 
established close working relationships with the Jordanian 
authorities and the airlines. This has led to the 
interception of improperly documented passengers from 
various nationalities and has allowed Post to provide 
valuable information to DHS and the Department. 
 
Staffing and Training 
===================== 
 
8.  (SBU) Post's Fraud Prevention Unit is currently staffed 
by one second-tour consular officer, Matthew Eussen, who 
conducts full-time NIV interviews and serves as the 
program's manager, and one FSN investigator, Hussam Haddad, 
who also covers NIV duties.  The manager has not taken the 
Fraud Prevention Manager's course but has attended prior 
regional training provided by FPP in Chennai, India; he is 
in a rotational position and due to rotate out in April 
2006.  The FSN investigator has completed fraud prevention 
training at the Foreign Service Institute.  He regularly 
liaises with Royal Jordanian Airlines and Government of 
Jordan officials at Queen Alia International Airport on an 
overtime basis, with occasional visits by the American 
officer.  The Regional Security Officer and his four 
Assistant Regional Security Officers provide timely 
assistance in conducting fraud investigations and arranging 
arrests with local law enforcement when necessary.  Our 
anti-fraud operation has won praise from DHS Athens and DHS 
Rome, other posts, and USG offices in the U.S. 
 
HALE