Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 05TELAVIV7003, ISRAEL: 2005 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05TELAVIV7003.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05TELAVIV7003 2005-12-19 13:21 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tel Aviv
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 007003 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT (RHONDA SHORE AND ED SALAZAR) 
STATE PASS TO NCTC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC COUNTERTERRORISM GOI INTERNAL GOI EXTERNAL ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: ISRAEL:  2005 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 
 
REF: STATE 193439 
 
1. In response to reftel, Embassy Tel Aviv submits the 
following proposed draft for the Israel section of the 2005 
Country Reports on Terrorism.  This draft has been cleared 
with ConGen Jerusalem, which is producing a report on the 
Palestinian Authority (septel). 
 
------------------ 
GENERAL ASSESSMENT 
------------------ 
 
2. The terrorism landscape in Israel changed significantly in 
2005 for three reasons: 
 
A. THE TAHDIYA -- In February 2005, HAMAS, the Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade agreed 
to a "Tahdiya" (calm, or truce) brokered by the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) with help from Cairo.  The Tahdiya has not 
been uniformly accepted by Palestinian militant groups, and 
its observance has been intermittent even among those which 
have accepted it.  But to the extent that HAMAS, the largest 
group, has generally upheld the Tahdiya, it has resulted in a 
significant reduction in terrorist activity in Israel. 
 
B. DISENGAGEMENT -- From August 15--22. Israel withdrew 
approximately 8,000 settlers and the IDF units protecting 
them from the Gaza Strip and four northern West Bank 
settlements, fulfilling Prime Minister Sharon's disengagement 
plan, and turning over responsibility for the Gaza Strip to 
the PA.  Before and during the withdrawal, IDF and PA 
Security Forces (PASF) coordinated some aspects of the 
evacuation and PASF deployments.  IDF officials favorably 
assessed the coordination on the ground, even though 
Palestinian militants opened fire on IDF positions and 
Israeli communities numerous times with small arms, Qassam 
rockets and mortar shells. 
 
C. EGYPT'S DEPLOYMENT ALONG THE GAZA-EGYPT BORDER -- As 
follow-up to disengagement, Egypt deployed 750 border guard 
forces along the Egypt-Gaza border following the IDF's 
withdrawal from that border on September 15.  Egypt also 
dispatched a force of security advisers to the Gaza Strip to 
advise the PASF in carrying out its new security role along 
the border.  IDF sources report that since the withdrawal 
from Gaza, there has been an increase in the number of 
explosive devices planted by terrorists along the security 
fence separating the Gaza Strip from Israel.  Incidents of 
small arms and rocket fire, mortar and Qassam launches, and 
clashes with terrorists planting explosives along the 
security fence continued after the Egyptian deployment. 
 
3. ISRAEL'S MAJOR CT EFFORTS, INCLUDING STEPS TAKEN IN 
INTERNATIONAL FORA:  Israel maintained staunch support for 
US-led counterterrorism efforts in 2005.  After the November 
9 al-Qaida bombings in Amman, Prime Minister Sharon declared 
Israel's preparedness to render immediate assistance to 
Jordan.  At the UN and in other public fora, Prime Minister 
Sharon and other GOI officials repeatedly called on the PA to 
dismantle terrorist groups as a necessary step in 
implementing President Bush's roadmap for a two-state 
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
 
4. THE RESPONSE OF ISRAEL'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM RELATING TO 
TERRORISM AFFECTING U.S. CITIZENS OR FACILITIES THAT HAVE A 
SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON U.S. CT EFFORTS, INCLUDING RESPONSES TO 
EXTRADITION REQUESTS:  Israel's judicial system has not taken 
any action related to terrorism that notably affects US 
citizens or facilities and/or has a significant impact on US 
counterterrorism (CT) efforts.  No terrorism-related 
extradition requests were submitted by the US to Israel in 
2005. 
 
5. SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:  Israel 
does not support international terrorism. 
 
---------------------------------- 
SANCTUARY (SAFE HAVENS) ASSESSMENT 
---------------------------------- 
 
6. THE EXTENT OF KNOWLEDGE BY THE GOI WITH RESPECT TO 
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF ISRAEL; AND ISRAEL'S 
ACTIONS TO ELIMINATE TERRORISTS, COOPERATE WITH U.S. CT 
EFFORTS, AND PREVENT THE PROLIFERATION AND TRAFFICKING OF WMD 
THROUGH ISRAEL: 
 
A. In 2005, Israel employed a variety of military operations 
in its counterterrorism efforts.  IDF and security forces 
launched frequent arrest and apprehension raids throughout 
the West Bank and Gaza, conducted targeted killings of 
suspected Palestinian terrorists, imposed strict and 
widespread closures and curfews in Palestinian areas, 
conducted airborne rocket attacks on buildings affiliated 
with Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) in the Gaza 
Strip, and continued construction of an extensive separation 
barrier in the West Bank.  Israel did not destroy any homes 
of suicide bombers or their families in 2005, but is 
re-considering the tactic in light of the December 5 suicide 
bombing in Netanya.  Israeli counterterrorism measures appear 
to have reduced the frequency and lethality of attacks. 
Continuing attacks and credible threats of attacks, however, 
show that the terrorist groups remain committed to attacking 
Israeli targets. 
 
B. In response to terrorist attacks perpetrated after 
Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, the IDF deployed 
forces along the perimeter of the Gaza Strip to prevent 
rocket and mortar attacks, delayed the expected transfer of 
West Bank towns to PA control, postponed planned meetings 
with Palestinian negotiators, used aircraft to set off sonic 
booms over Gaza, and launched rockets and artillery fire into 
Qassam and mortar launch areas in Gaza. 
 
C. Israeli security forces and customs authorities seized 
containers at the port of Ashdod that contained thousands of 
dollars worth of merchandise suspected of having been 
purchased by PIJ for resale.  GOI sources report that they 
saw an upsurge in PIJ's purchase and resale of goods in 2005, 
and that PIJ is using the funds raised to establish its 
military and civilian infrastructure in Palestinian areas. 
IDF and Civil Administration forces also shut down two 
illegal "Daawa" charity organizations in the West Bank to 
prevent their possible use as conduits for terror finance. 
 
---------------- 
TERRORIST GROUPS 
---------------- 
 
7. ACTIVITIES OF TERRORIST GROUPS IN 2005: 
 
A. Palestinian terrorist groups operating from the West Bank, 
and Gaza continue to focus their attention on the 
Palestinians' historical conflict with Israel, attacking 
Israel and Israeli interests within Israel and the 
Palestinian territories, rather than engaging in operations 
worldwide.  Palestinian terrorist groups conducted a 
significant number of attacks in Israel, the West Bank, and 
Gaza Strip in 2005.  PIJ, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, HAMAS, 
and the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) were responsible 
for most of the attacks, which included suicide bombings, 
shootings, and mortar and rocket firings against civilian and 
military targets.  Within the Gaza Strip, Palestinian 
militants engaged in occasional skirmishes with PA police and 
security service officials, and periodically shot at polling 
stations, electoral offices, and PA security complexes. 
Terrorist attacks in 2005 killed almost 50 people, a decrease 
from the almost 100 people killed in 2004. 
 
B. According to claims by HAMAS, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, 
and the PRC, a number of terrorist attacks in 2005 were 
perpetrated by one or more organizations acting together, 
including the January 13 truck bombing of the Qarni cargo 
crossing terminal on the Israel-Gaza border, which killed six 
Israeli civilians and wounded another five.  An al-Aqsa 
Martyrs Brigade member detained by the IDF in October claimed 
Lebanese Hizballah was operating him through a handler in the 
Gaza Strip. 
 
C. The PIJ claimed credit for the major terrorist attacks 
that occurred in Israel in 2005, including: 
 
-- the February 25 bombing of a Tel Aviv nightclub that 
killed five Israeli civilians and injured another 55; 
-- a July suicide bombing near a mall in Netanya that killed 
five civilians; 
-- the October 26 suicide bombing in a market in Hadera, 
which killed six Israelis and wounded 55; and 
-- the December 5 suicide bombing at a shopping mall in 
Netanya, which killed five Israelis and wounded over 50. 
 
While the PIJ joined the Tahdiya, it has not upheld it, 
publicly justifying these attacks as exceptional responses to 
Israeli provocations (e.g., IDF arrests and targeted killings 
executed with the aim of preventing terror attacks.)  In 
2005, PIJ operatives continued to attempt to manufacture and 
launch projectile weapons; carried out armed attacks against 
Jewish settlers and IDF forces; planned to abduct and murder 
Israeli civilians; gathered weapons and explosive materials 
for use in bombs; collected intelligence information on 
potential targets; and dug tunnels under Israeli-occupied 
areas for bomb detonation operations. 
 
D. HAMAS activity dropped significantly in 2005, in part 
because of its adherence to the Tahdiya, but also because 
much of its leadership in the West Bank has been arrested or 
killed.  HAMAS claimed credit for the pre-Tahdiya, January 18 
suicide bombing in Gaza that killed an Israeli security 
officer and injured 8 other soldiers and security agents. 
Individuals linked to HAMAS were involved in the September 21 
kidnapping and murder in the West Bank of an Israeli resident 
of Jerusalem.  Like PIJ, HAMAS justified "exceptional" 
attacks it perpetrated after agreeing to the Tahdiya as 
responses to Israeli "crimes" against Palestinian civilians 
and "holy warriors."  Although HAMAS has indicated that it 
will not renew the Tahdiya when it expires at the end of 
2005, it is likely to tacitly observe the cease-fire at least 
until after January 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council 
elections.  HAMAS declared its intent to run candidates in 
the elections.  In response, GOI officials have publicly 
declared that Israel will neither interfere in, nor 
facilitate, the elections with the Palestinians.  From 
September through mid-December, the IDF arrested hundreds of 
Palestinian activists, some of whom were members of HAMAS's 
political wing. 
 
E. Fatah's militant wing, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, 
claimed credit for the following terrorist attacks in 2005, 
even after agreeing to the Tahdiya: 
 
-- the October 16 drive-by shooting attack at the Gush Etzion 
junction south of Jerusalem, in which two Israeli civilians 
were killed and three wounded; and a shooting attack on the 
same day in the West Bank, in which an Israeli teenager was 
wounded; and 
-- several Qassam rocket launches from the Gaza Strip into 
the western Negev desert that destroyed property and injured 
Israeli civilians and soldiers. 
 
F. The PRC carried out a substantial number of terrorist 
attacks in late 2005 from the Rafah area on the Gaza-Egypt 
border, notably rocket attacks on Israel.  The PRC was also 
responsible for armed attacks against construction teams and 
IDF forces in Gaza during disengagement. 
 
G. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 
made no claims to perpetrating any terror attacks in 2005. 
It continued to coordinate with other FTOs to carry out 
attacks. 
 
H. Lebanese Hizballah continued to provide material support 
to Palestinian terrorist groups to augment their capacity and 
lethality in conducting attacks against Israel.  Hizballah 
continued to fund and provide logistical support to PIJ cells 
in the West Bank.  IDF sources claim Hizballah set up an 
advanced post in Gaza to serve as a liaison between Hizballah 
handlers in Lebanon and operatives in the Occupied 
Territories. and transfer funds and directives for carrying 
out terrorist attacks.  Hizballah continued to call for the 
destruction of Israel and use Lebanese territory as a staging 
ground for terrorist operations.  On November 21, Hizballah 
fighters -- covered by a rocket barrage against border 
communities and IDF outposts -- crossed into Israel in an 
effort to kidnap Israelis.  The IDF stopped the incursion, 
killing four Hizballah fighters and hitting Hizballah targets 
in Lebanon with combat aircraft and artillery. 
 
I. On August 4, an AWOL Israeli soldier opened fire on a bus 
and killed four Israeli-Arabs and injured 10.  During the 
attack, he was killed by the angry crowd.  Prime Minister 
Sharon publicly condemned the shooting as an act of terrorism. 
 
------------------------------ 
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT COOPERATION 
------------------------------ 
 
7. THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE GOI IS COOPERATING IN 
APPREHENDING, CONVICTING, AND PUNISHING INDIVIDUALS 
RESPONSIBLE FOR TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS SINCE 
2000:  The GOI aggressively pursues through legal and 
military action the perpetrators of terrorist attacks which 
occur in Israel.  With a few notable exceptions, terrorist 
attacks in Israel have not been actively directed against 
Americans.  The GOI has not sanctioned independent FBI 
investigations or cooperative U.S.-Israeli investigations of 
terrorist attacks inside Israel, but allows the FBI to 
monitor Israeli and PA investigations into attacks involving 
Americans in accordance with the U.S.-Israeli Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaty.  Some terrorist suspects who are subjects 
of FBI cases have been convicted and sentenced in Israel. 
Several others have died in suicide bombings or as a result 
of other incidents subsequent to terrorist attacks that 
involved Americans. 
 
8. THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE GOI IS COOPERATING TO PREVENT 
FURTHER ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS IN THE 
COUNTRY:  GOI security and law enforcement services work 
closely with the USG to prevent acts of terrorism against 
U.S. citizens by sharing possible terrorist threat 
information and protecting USG properties in Israel.  This is 
done while services like the Israeli National Police face 
manpower shortages, and have to deal with threats to the 
Israeli population from Palestinian terrorist organizations, 
Israelis determined to upset the peace process, and organized 
crime. 
********************************************* ******************** 
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv 
 
You can also access this site through the State Department's 
Classified SIPRNET website. 
********************************************* ******************** 
CRETZ