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Viewing cable 05TAIPEI5035, KMT CHAIRMAN MA YING-JEOU FORGING A NEW

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05TAIPEI5035 2005-12-30 00:38 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

300038Z Dec 05
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 005035 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - ERIC 
BARBORIAK 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KPAO TW
SUBJECT: KMT CHAIRMAN MA YING-JEOU FORGING A NEW 
LEADERSHIP STYLE FOLLOWING THE DECEMBER 3 ELECTIONS 
 
 
1.  The following cable is an analysis of public 
opinion written by one of AIT's senior local employees 
in the Press Section.  She wrote it based on several 
weeks of monitoring talk shows, newspapers and 
conversations among her contacts and friends.  Rather 
than edit it into a traditional reporting cable, we 
found it an interesting reflection of opinions 
currently held by a large sector of Taiwan's 
population. 
 
2.  Summary: Opposition KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou, who 
took over the helm of the century-old "ossified" party 
four months ago, has demonstrated a new and distinct 
leadership style since he started campaigning for the 
December 3 "3-in-1 elections" of mayors and magistrates 
in Taiwan, in which the KMT won a landslide victory. 
In contrast to President Chen Shui-bian's mercurial 
leadership, Ma's political style is in general gentle, 
sober and orthodox; he tends to believe in precedents 
and procedures rather than ad hoc arrangements.  But 
while campaigning for the December 3 elections, the 
charismatic "Mr. Nice-guy" adopted some surprising and 
unprecedented campaign strategies, which have not only 
distinguished him from his KMT predecessors but also 
turned him into the toughest challenger to the ruling 
DPP.  End summary. 
 
3.  Despite President Chen's denial that the December 3 
"3-in-1" elections were a vote of no-confidence in the 
Cabinet or a harbinger of the 2008 presidential 
elections, Taiwan's media and observers generally 
viewed the elections as a "mid-term report" for 
President Chen Shui-bian.  Some pro-pan-Blue newspapers 
also termed the island-wide elections as a "qualifying 
examination" for KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou, since it 
was Ma's first battle since he took up the reins 
leading the KMT.  The KMT's landslide triumph in the 
elections indicated Ma had not only passed the exam, 
but he had also become the most popular political 
heavyweight in Taiwan politics. 
 
4.  Ma, a graduate of Harvard Law School, received a 
legal education like President Chen.  But unlike Chen, 
whose lawyerly characteristics are clearly manifested 
in his witty reactions, eloquent rhetoric, and the 
belief that winning comes above all things, Ma, despite 
his popularity, has never been a passionate leader or 
good at stimulating the public's fervor.  "His speeches 
are always safe and stable, seldom inspiring, even when 
he addresses people at the grassroots level," a "China 
Times" reporter said.  Ma's law-abiding character, 
clinging to high moral standards, and insistence on 
doing things the right way make him an extraordinary 
figure in Taiwan's often scandalous political culture. 
On the other hand, Ma is often criticized, even by his 
now deceased father, for his lack of flexibility and 
innovation. 
 
5.  Ma has often been labeled "political Teflon" since 
his days as the justice minister in the mid-1990s, 
meaning he has often managed to stay above the fray in 
Taiwan's back-biting political world.  Even though he 
now works closely with several staff members, whom the 
media call "Ma's army," he is seldom found to be 
closely associated with any local business tycoons like 
his predecessor former KMT Chairman Lee Teng-hui, or 
with any KMT factions, like KMT Legislative Yuan 
President Wang Jin-pyng, whom Ma defeated in an open 
election for the party chairmanship in July.  Ma's 
sobriety and reputation for virtue, however, have 
generated doubts about whether he has the people and 
organizational skills to pull factions together, 
motivate supporters at the grass-roots level, and win 
island-wide elections. 
 
6.  The results of the December 3 elections, however, 
gave the public the perception that Ma can be flexible 
and even creative if he wants.  "Ma's performance has 
been quite surprising the entire way since he began 
campaigning for the elections," Hsiao Hsu-chen, a 
"China Times" reporter said, "because he almost single- 
handedly initiated and determined all KMT campaign 
strategies."  Though it was reportedly not his own 
initiative, Ma's announcement a few days prior to the 
election that he would step down if the KMT failed to 
win a majority of mayoral and magistrate posts 
astounded the entire pan-Blue camp, as it has never 
been the KMT's tradition to make such a bold move. 
 
7.  Ma's willingness to bet his political career and 
test his popularity despite the objections of his aides 
showed that he has started to forge the daring and 
spirited leadership style expected of a party head.  Of 
greater significance was that this move by Ma changed 
the race in Keelung City overnight, in which the two 
pan-Blue candidates - KMT and PFP - were originally 
running neck-and-neck with each other.  Ma's 
announcement resulted in a sweeping victory for the KMT 
candidate in Keelung City (a 16% difference in votes) 
and thereby generated fundamental changes in the 
partnership between the KMT and the PFP.  Ma has never 
been as keen on the merger between the KMT and PFP as 
his predecessor former KMT Chairman Lien Chan was.  His 
insistence on following the institution and making `no 
concession to and no swapping with' the PFP during the 
campaigns, combined with his soaring popularity 
following the KMT's triumph in the December 3 
elections, may add clarity to the hazy KMT-PFP 
relationship.  Ma and PFP Chairman James Soong met 
December 12 and reached an agreement to boost 
cooperation of the pan-Blue alliance before the two 
parties formally merge. 
 
8.  Ma's mild image and measured style have given 
people, including some DPP officials, the illusion that 
he might be easier to deal with than the grim-faced 
former KMT Chairman Lien Chan.  When Ma was elected KMT 
head in August, both President Chen and former DPP 
Chairman Su Tseng-chang thought they might be able to 
work with the KMT more easily to push for the passage 
of certain stalled bills in the Legislative Yuan, 
particularly the Special Defense Budget Bill.  However, 
they were disappointed as they soon discovered that Ma 
can be very stubborn, almost to the point of obsession, 
regarding procedures. 
 
9.  Beijing, too, has found Ma a tough counterpart to 
talk with as Ma said firmly in an interview with a Hong 
Kong-based media outlet in early November that "both 
sides of the Taiwan Strait will not talk about future 
re-unification as long as Beijing fails to repent for 
its actions in the June 4 1989 Tiananmen Square 
massacre."  In a separate interview with "Newsweek" in 
December, Ma did not mention the Tiananmen Square 
incident but said "at the moment, we don't believe that 
either side is prepared for unification.  The 
conditions are really not ripe yet" though, for his 
party, "the eventual goal is reunification." 
 
10.  Ma has maintained a certain distance from both 
former KMT Chairman Lien Chan and PFP Chairman James 
Soong, as demonstrated in his insistence on following 
the law and refusing to join Lien, Soong and other 
outraged pan-Blue supporters in protest outside the 
Presidential Office in the wake of the pre-2004 March 
20 presidential election shooting, in which Chen 
narrowly defeated Lien.  His neutral image attracted 
centrist voters in Taiwan who despise nasty mud- 
slinging between political parties. 
 
11.  The fact that Ma continues to show respect to 
former President Lee Teng-hui, the spiritual leader of 
the Taiwan Solidarity Union, has also made him 
attractive to some light-green voters.  On the night of 
the KMT's victory in the December 3 elections, Ma's 
immediate request that pan-Blue voters take the KMT's 
victory in stride and his pledge to set up an 
"incorruptibility committee" to monitor the elected KMT 
mayors and magistrates also helped the KMT's image, 
which has often been labeled "ossified" and corrupt in 
the past. 
 
12.  DPP Premier Frank Hsieh attributed the DPP's major 
setbacks in the December 3 elections to the "Ma Ying- 
jeou phenomenon" or "Ma Ying-jeou charisma," as some 
observers call it.  Sisy Chen, a well-known TV talk 
show hostess and political commentator in Taiwan, once 
compared Ma to Michael Jordan, the former NBA star. 
According to Sisy Chen, Taiwan's elections closely 
resemble NBA basketball games in the way that voters, 
like basketball fans, anticipate seeing heroes or 
stars.  Ma is such a star. 
 
13.  However, Ma faces some potential crises as a party 
leader.  For one thing, Ma's popularity is mainly about 
his personal charisma; it has yet to be transformed 
into collective action or teamwork.  Ever since Ma 
assumed his post as Taipei City mayor, there has been a 
constant gap between Ma's approval rating and the 
approval rating for the whole city government.  Some 
critics interpret this gap as indicating Ma needs to 
work harder on his management and personnel issues. 
 
14.  The KMT party machine remains basically unchanged, 
and some doubt whether Ma will be able to carry out his 
plans to truly make the party democratic and 
transparent or to effect reforms such as disposing of 
controversial KMT party assets.  If the KMT fails to 
reform under Ma's leadership, he may quickly descend 
from his current pedestal.  Ma also faces the 
challenges of ridding the KMT of its corrupt, "black- 
gold" image, truly mobilizing the grassroots pan-Blue 
supporters, and unifying the entire pan-Blue camp, 
especially the older generation of KMT members who may 
be less inclined to support party reforms.  Also, as 
Mainland Affairs Council Joseph Wu pointed out in 
Washington in early December, Ma has yet to clearly 
state his position with regard to some major national 
issues, such as Taiwan's sovereignty and self-defense. 
As a rising star expected to represent the pan-Blue 
camp in the 2008 presidential election, Ma's true tests 
may still lie ahead. 
 
PAAL