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Viewing cable 05TAIPEI4980, MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05TAIPEI4980 2005-12-27 22:40 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 004980 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - ERIC 
BARBORIAK 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS 
 
1. Summary: Major Chinese-language Taiwan dailies focused 
their coverage December 24-27 on moves by pan-Blue 
legislators to reject review of the long-stalled U.S. arms 
procurement bill, the meeting between KMT Legislative Yuan 
President Wang Jin-pyng and PFP Chairman James Soong, the 
passing away of China's Association for Relations Across the 
Taiwan Strait (ARATS) Chairman Wang Daohan, and the 
government's failure to meet a legal deadline to release its 
holdings in key media outlets.  The pro-independence 
"Liberty Times," Taiwan's biggest daily, ran a banner 
headline on its front page December 24 that read: "[U.S.] 
Arms Procurement Bill Now Back to Its Starting Point; Bian: 
the Question Lies in National Identity."  The newspaper also 
quoted an anonymous U.S. official on its page three as 
saying the United States hopes to see the pan-Blue camp 
propose feasible alternatives as to how Taiwan will 
strengthen its national defense capabilities.  The "Liberty 
Times" carried a news story on its page four December 27 
that quoted a senior Taiwan official as saying it will be 
more difficult for Taiwan to purchase the items listed in 
the U.S. arms procurement bill if Taiwan does not make the 
decision to procure them by 2008.  The newspaper also 
reported that President Chen Shui-bian will likely meet with 
KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou in February 2006 to find a 
solution for the stalled arms procurement bill. 
 
2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, an editorial in 
the centrist "China Times" discussed the death of ARATS 
Chairman Wang Daohan and cross-Strait relations; the 
editorial said President Chen Shui-bian has basically handed 
in a blank examination paper with regard to cross-Strait 
policy over the past five years and cross-Strait relations 
have now embarked on a whole new period of adjustments. 
National Taiwan University Professor Chu Yun-han said in a 
separate commentary in the "China Times" that "the doubts of 
Taiwan's mainstream public view toward the legitimacy and 
necessity of the [U.S.] arms procurements reveals that 
opinion leaders in Taiwan's private sector have begun to 
sense that even the United States has yet to uncover its 
best strategy in the face of the rise of China."  End 
summary. 
 
A) "A Few Strokes in Memory of the Passing Era of C.F. Koo 
and Wang Daohan" 
 
The centrist, pro-status quo "China Times" [circulation: 
400,000] editorialized (12/26): 
 
"China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait 
(ARATS) Chairman Wang Daohan passed away last Saturday 
within less than a year of the death of the former chairman 
of Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation, C. F. Koo.  Wang's 
death symbolizes the end of an era in which cross-Strait 
relations were marked by meetings between Koo and Wang. 
Cross-Strait relations have now embarked on a whole new 
period of adjustments, along with changes in the situation 
inside Taiwan and China, respectively. . 
 
"Over the past five years, since the DPP came into power, 
Taiwan's cross-Strait policy has tended to focus more on 
preaching rather than on practicing.  President Chen 
forecasted from time to time that both sides of the Taiwan 
Strait would soon start the Three Links and that he wanted 
to invite Beijing's leaders to come to Taiwan for a drink; 
he also constantly extended olive branches [to Beijing] 
during addresses he made on traditional Chinese holidays. 
But then again, he would make [provocative] remarks such as 
calling for the writing of a new constitution or initiating 
a referendum for Taiwan [that would] get on Beijing's 
nerves; the language he used during [political] campaigns 
could be even more provocative.  As a result, the cross- 
Strait impasse remained unchanged over time, and the Taiwan 
people started to think that it would be good news so long 
as cross-Strait relations did not deteriorate.  No matter 
whether President Chen and the DPP want to admit it, 
Taiwan's ruling party has in fact handed in a blank 
examination paper with regard to its cross-Strait policy 
over the past five years. 
 
"The truth is that over the past few years, cross-Strait 
relations have been cool in the public sector but heating up 
in the private sector.  The ruling party has remained 
motionless while opposition parties have been eagerly 
seeking to build new platforms for dialogue.  The DPP did 
almost nothing [to improve cross-Strait relations] except 
for putting on the brakes. .  Given the fact that Taiwan's 
opposition leaders' visits to China [last summer] have 
successfully shaped the `win-win discourse' of peace and 
reconciliation to have it become Taiwan's mainstream public 
view, [the DPP's] label of `selling out Taiwan' has 
gradually lost its effectiveness, as evidenced in the rising 
reputation for the KMT.  . It is thus no wonder that many 
critics no longer anticipate that Chen will be able to break 
the cross-Strait-relations deadlock during his remaining 
time in office. ." 
 
B) "Getting Through a Critical Period" 
 
Chu Yun-han, professor of political science at National 
Taiwan University, noted in the "Weekly Commentary" column 
of the centrist, pro-status quo "China Times" [circulation: 
400,000] (12/26): 
 
"Also during the past six years, a new thirst has been 
growing inside Taiwan, the strong desire that Taiwan could 
break away from its predicament and come out new and 
improved.  Local intellectuals and the private sector have 
started to fear less the examination of `political 
correctness,' [and have] begun to locate again their ability 
to judge and imagine.  As a result, a new thinking with 
regard to cross-Straits relations and Taiwan's future has 
begun to bud.  The doubts of Taiwan's mainstream public view 
toward the legitimacy and necessity of the [U.S.] arms 
procurements revealed that opinion leaders in Taiwan's 
private sector began to sense that even the United States 
has yet to uncover its best strategy in the face of China's 
rise.  [They also saw that] Washington's China policy will 
continue to swing between the two extremes of engagement and 
containment and that as a result, Washington can only put 
Taiwan in a state of strategic suspension, blocking Taiwan 
the opportunities to find a better way out.  The new 
thinking now being developed [in Taiwan] called upon the 
island to try to get rid of its puppet role and not to play 
the game according to the strategic schemes of any side. 
All the more, there is no need for Taiwan to become the rope 
that sustains pressure from all sides in the strategic tug 
of war between the United States, Japan and China. 
 
"In the wake of Taiwan opposition leaders' visits to China, 
not only the fighting inside the pan-Blue camp about which 
route it should take has evidently subdued, but there are 
also mounting voices inside the pan-Green camp calling for a 
more pragmatic attitude in dealing with cross-Strait 
relations.  The pragmatists inside the pan-Green camp have 
come to realize that only when President Chen takes the 
initiative in pushing for cross-Strait economic and trade 
normalization during his remaining term of office can the 
DPP avoid a possible major defeat in the Legislative Yuan 
elections slated for the end of 2007 and thus give itself a 
chance to fight in the [2008] presidential election.  If 
[Chen or DPP fail to do so,] they might have to hand over 
their administration authority at the end of 2007 and let 
the pan-Blue camp harvest the political fruit of three links 
after the 2008 election.  ." 
 
PAAL