Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 05TAIPEI4951, TAIWAN'S BIO-TERRORISM DEFENSE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05TAIPEI4951.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05TAIPEI4951 2005-12-22 07:53 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 004951 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP /TC AND OES/IHA 
HHS PLEASE PASS TO ERIKA ELVANDER 
GENEVA PLEASE PASS HEALTH ATTACHE DAVID HOHMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AMED AMGT CASC ECON SENV SOCI TBIO TW ESTH
SUBJECT:  TAIWAN'S BIO-TERRORISM DEFENSE 
 
1.  Summary. Taiwan's Department of Health (DOH) held a 
three-day International Conference on Bio-terrorism Defense 
in Taipei December 6 -8, with international experts on bio- 
terrorism and presentations on the economics, law, medicine, 
public health, emergency management, epidemiology and other 
fields.  On December 8, the Taipei city government conducted 
a bio-terrorism attack and response exercise.  End Summary. 
 
Taipei Int'l Conference on Bio-terrorism Defense 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
2.  AIT/T Science Officer and Regional Medical Officer 
attended the 2005 Taipei International Conference on Bio- 
terrorism Defense, held December 6 - 8, 2005 at the Grand 
Hotel in Taipei.  DOH and the Ministry of National Defense 
(MND) jointly organized the conference.  The conference 
presented an opportunity for exchanges on how to prepare for 
bio-terrorism.  Speakers included experts from the U.S., 
Japan, Poland, Singapore, Indonesia, France and other 
countries.  The conference was divided into three sessions: 
1. Governmental Preparedness for Bio-terrorism; 2. Response 
to Bio-terrorism Attack; and 3. Taiwan's Response Team 
reacting to a mock bio-terror attack in a subway (metro) 
station. 
 
How to deal with Bio-terrorism 
------------------------------ 
 
3. Taiwan Center for Disease Control (CDC) Director General 
Steve Kuo said Taiwan is relatively new to bio-terrorism 
defense and needs to coordinate with the global healthcare 
community.  Kuo stated that despite non-official status in 
WHO, Taiwan participated on the basis of the recently 
revised International Health Regulations (IHR) with 
"universal application."  He said DOH is in the process of 
drafting plans for launching Taiwan's "Bio-terrorism 
Preparedness Training Center," to be located in Taoyuan, 
jointly with the National Defense Military Medical Bureau. 
While bio-terrorism used to be considered a national 
security issue entirely within the purview of the military, 
Kuo said the DOH is now also actively involved.  Kuo said 
anthrax and smallpox are the most likely bio-terrorist 
threats to Taiwan. 
 
4. CDC Deputy DG Shih Wen-yi spoke on Taiwan's 
countermeasures to biological attack.  Shih said that Taiwan 
has made a slow start in the area of bio-terrorism defense. 
Shih described command and control structures, planning and 
drills held, and laboratory capacity for identification of 
biologic agents.  In outlining Taiwan's national goals, Shih 
said that priorities include completing a bio-terrorism 
emergency response system, enacting anti-bio-terrorism 
regulations and establishing a policy, recruiting personnel 
to staff anti-bio-terrorism organizations and selecting and 
procuring inspection and protection equipment.  In 1993, the 
Executive Yuan completed a draft plan to deal with 
bioterrorism. Since that time the plan has undergone 
multiple revisions including the July 2004 establishment of 
the "Council of Bio-terrorism and Unknown Communicable 
Disease Prevention and Control."  At present, Taiwan's 
national anti-terrorism system is modeled on a "3-3-1" 
system.  The first "3" refers to the different stages of 
crisis management: preventing it, dealing with it and 
recovering from it.  The second "3" refers to the different 
levels of risk associated with an incident: low, medium or 
high.  While the "1" refers to an emergency response system. 
 
Disaster Response: Learning From Past Experience 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
5.  Session II of the conference focused on responses to a 
bio-terrorism attack.  DOH Bureau of Medical Affairs 
Director-General Hsueh Jui-yuan reviewed disasters in Taiwan 
over last 100 years.  Health-related disasters have claimed 
3600 lives in SIX incidents.  Earthquakes have claimed 7900 
lives in 14 episodes and other disasters have claimed a 
total of 17000 lives over the past 100 years.  Taiwan's 
response system focuses on the role of the local and 
national fire brigades.  County authorities are the base 
level, activating the response system and alerting the 
national brigades.  The National Security System and 
Executive System would work in parallel in the event of a 
crisis.  Taiwan's vaccination, medicine stockpiles, law 
enforcement and training programs for bio-terrorism were 
also addressed in this session. 
 
6.  The experts stressed that surveillance, quarantine, 
laboratory testing, and immunization are important bio- 
medical defense measures against bio-terrorism.  TCDC 
pointed out that surveillance systems in Taiwan are active, 
and over 500 medical staff report to the government each 
week on medical developments.  Reviewing lessons learned 
from the SARS experience, Taiwan health experts highlighted 
the importance of protecting medical staff in the event of 
an outbreak. 
 
Drills: need for better press management 
---------------------------------------- 
 
7.  The conference ended with a demonstration drill of a bio- 
terror attack.  The scenario involved theft of lab samples 
of Avian Influenza from a hospital lab, politically 
motivated threats against the authorities, and a deliberate 
release of the Avian Influenza virus in a local subway 
(Metro) station.  This event was witnessed by bystanders who 
alerted the authorities, leading to a chain of events 
culminating in closure of the MRT station.  Simultaneously, 
the emergency response system was activated with a 
combination of forensic, public health, and medical teams. 
The response teams, wearing protective equipment, 
decontaminated victims in mobile units and moved them to 
medical facilities.  All went smoothly in the mock event, 
except that the press was not properly managed and barged in 
at every opportunity to take photos, causing delays. 
 
 
Can they respond to massive casualties? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
8. After the drill, American experts and TCDC personnel 
discussed the merits of the exercise. Dr. Allswede, head of 
the American delegation, commented that the conference was a 
good investment of time by the Taiwan authorities and that 
good progress had been made over the past year. 
 
9. The panel of experts raised many questions about the 
equipment, organization and capabilities of the response 
teams. For example, the response team at the scene of the 
alleged attack, while well equipped with sensors for bio- 
chem agents, did not carry radioactive detectors. If the 
attack had involved radioactive agents, the response team 
would have been unable to detect those agents. Further, 
there was no provision for dealing with an explosive device. 
 
10. The experts also questioned the police screening of 
people at the attack site. The quick apprehension of the 
alleged suspect was lauded but doubts were raised as to why 
the public at the site of the attack (subway station) were 
not screened for the possibility of additional attackers. 
 
11. In the scenario a dozen or so subway riders were put 
through an isolation tent and treated. However, in the event 
of massive casualties, it was not clear that the authorities 
have the ability to treat hundreds of patients and to test 
them for exposure to pathogens. There were also doubts about 
the one-hour response time capability claimed by the TCDC 
response team considering traffic, accessibility and 
interagency coordination issues. 
 
12. The panel concluded this was a good exercise, but work 
needs to be done to foster stronger interagency coordination 
among agencies responding to a bio-chem attack.  Currently, 
the Atomic Energy Commission is responsible for radioactive 
incidents, the Environmental Protection Agency for chemical 
attacks and the Center for Disease Control for bio-attacks. 
Ensuring that these different agencies cooperate in the 
event of a bio-chem attack is an issue that the next 
conference on bio-terrorism will need to address. 
PAAL