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Viewing cable 05RANGOON1412, BURMA: 2005 INCSR PART II

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05RANGOON1412 2005-12-19 10:18 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Rangoon
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001412 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL, EAP/MLS, EB/ESC/TFS 
JUSTICE FOR OIA AND AFMLS 
TREASURY FOR FINCEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN KCRM PTER ECON KTFN BM
SUBJECT: BURMA: 2005 INCSR PART II 
 
REF: STATE 210351 
 
1. Following is the 2005-2006 revision of the International 
Narcotics Strategy Report, Part II: Financial Crimes and 
Money Laundering for Burma. 
 
2. Burma, a major drug producing and trafficking country, 
has a mixed economy with substantial state-controlled 
companies, mainly in energy and heavy industry, and with 
private business primarily in agriculture and light 
industry.  Burma's economy continues to be vulnerable to 
drug money laundering due to its under-regulated financial 
system, inadequate implementation of its anti-money 
laundering regime, and policies that facilitate the 
funneling of drug money into commercial enterprises and 
infrastructure investment.  The government has addressed key 
areas of concern identified by the international community 
by implementing some anti-money laundering measures, but 
Burma remains on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) list 
of Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT). 
 
3. Burma enacted a "Control of Money Laundering Law" in 
2002.  It also established the Central Control Board of 
Money Laundering in 2002 and a Financial Intelligence Unit 
(FIU) in 2003.  It set a threshold amount for reporting cash 
transactions by banks and real estate firms, albeit at a 
high level of 100 million kyat (approximately $100,000). 
Since adopting a "Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Law" 
in  2004, Burma has taken additional steps to address money 
laundering and to combat terrorist financing, including 
adding fraud to the list of predicate offenses and defining 
penalties for "tipping off" suspicious transaction reports. 
As a result, FATF lifted its countermeasures in October 
2004.  The GOB's recent anti-money laundering measures 
amended regulations originally instituted in 2003, which had 
set out 11 predicate offenses, including narcotics 
activities, human and arms trafficking, cyber crime, and 
"offenses committed by acts of terrorism," among others. The 
2003 regulations also called for suspicious transaction 
reports (STRs) by banks, the real estate sector, and customs 
officials, and imposed severe penalties for non-compliance. 
 
4. The GOB established a Department Against Transnational 
Crime in 2004 with a mandate that included anti-money 
laundering activities.  It is staffed by police officers and 
support personnel from banks, customs, budget, and other 
relevant government departments.  In response to a February 
2005 FATF request, the Government of Burma submitted an anti- 
money laundering implementation plan and progress reports. 
In 2005, the government also increased the size of the FIU 
from 10 to 40 members. In August 2005, the Central Bank of 
Myanmar issued guidelines for on-sight bank inspections and 
required reports reviewing banks' compliance with AML 
legislation. Since then, the Central Bank has disbursed 
teams to instruct on the new guidelines and to inspect 
banking operations for compliance. 
 
5. Despite the lifting of countermeasures, Burma remains on 
the FATF's list of non-cooperative countries and territories 
because it has not yet implemented all the required reforms 
in its anti-money laundering regime. As of December 2005, 
the United States maintains the countermeasures it adopted 
against Burma in 2004. At that time, the United States 
issued final rules finding the jurisdiction of Burma and two 
private Burmese banks, Myanmar Mayflower Bank and Asia 
Wealth Bank, to be "of primary money laundering concern," 
and requiring U.S. banks to take certain special measures 
with respect to all Burmese banks, but with respect to 
Myanmar Mayflower and Asia Wealth Bank in particular. These 
rules were issued by FinCEN of the Treasury Department 
pursuant to Section 311 of the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act. 
 
6. The rules prohibit most U.S. financial institutions from 
establishing or maintaining correspondent or payable-through 
accounts in the United States for, or on behalf of, Myanmar 
Mayflower and Asia Wealth Bank and, with narrow exceptions, 
for all other Burmese banks. Myanmar Mayflower and Asia 
Wealth Bank have been directly linked to narcotics- 
trafficking organizations in Southeast Asia. In March 2005, 
following a GOB investigation, the Central Bank of Myanmar 
revoked Myanmar Mayflower Bank's and Asia Wealth Bank's 
licenses to operate, citing infractions of the Financial 
Institutions of Myanmar Law.  As of December 2005, 
Government of Burma investigations into these two cases 
continue.  In August 2005, the Government of Burma seized 
the assets of another private institution, the Myanmar 
Universal Bank (MUB), and arrested the Bank's Chairman under 
the Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances Law, charging him 
with drug-related money laundering crimes.  As of December 
2005, the case was still in court. 
 
7. Burma remains under a separate U.S. Treasury Department 
advisory stating that U.S. financial institutions should 
give enhanced scrutiny to all financial transactions 
relating to Burma. The Section 311 rules complement the 2003 
Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act (renewed in July 2005) and 
an accompanying executive order. These laws imposed 
additional economic sanctions on Burma following the 
regime's May 2003 attack on pro-democracy leader Aung San 
Suu Kyi and her convoy. The sanctions prohibit the import of 
Burmese-produced goods into the United States, ban the 
provision of financial services to Burma by U.S. persons, 
freeze the assets of identified Burmese institutions, 
including those of the ruling junta, and expand visa 
restrictions to include managers of state-owned enterprises, 
in addition to senior government officials and family 
members associated with the regime.  In August 2005, U.S. 
Treasury amended and reissued the Burmese Sanctions 
Regulations in their entirety to implement the 2003 
Executive Order which placed new sanctions on Burma. 
 
8. Burma holds observer status in the Asia/Pacific Group on 
Money Laundering and is a party to the 1988 UN Drug 
Convention. Over the past several years, the Government of 
Burma (GOB) has extended its counter-narcotics cooperation 
with other states. The GOB has bilateral drug control 
agreements with India, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Russia, Laos, 
the Philippines, China, and Thailand that address 
cooperation on drug-related money laundering issues.  In 
July 2005, the Myanmar Central Control Board signed an MOU 
with Thailand's Anti-Money Laundering Office governing the 
exchange of information and financial intelligence.  In 
2005, Australia funded workshops in Burma on monitoring and 
investigating money laundering. 
 
9. Burma has signed, but not yet ratified, the UN 
International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism. In 2004, Burma ratified the UN 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.  Burma 
plans to sign the ASEAN Multilateral Assistance in Criminal 
Matters Agreement in early 2006. 
 
10. The GOB now has in place a framework to allow mutual 
legal assistance and cooperation with overseas jurisdictions 
in the investigation and prosecution of serious crimes. 
Burma must improve enforcement of regulation and oversight 
of its banking system, and end all policies that facilitate 
the investment of drug money into the legitimate economy. 
It also must discourage the widespread use of informal 
remittance or "hundi" networks. Burma should continue to 
work toward full implementation of a viable anti-money 
laundering regime, and should provide the necessary 
resources to administrative and judicial authorities that 
supervise the financial sector so they can successfully 
implement and enforce the government's latest regulations to 
fight money laundering. Burma should also become a party to 
the UN International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism and criminalize the funding of 
terrorism. 
VILLAROSA