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Viewing cable 05QUITO2854, 2005-2006 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05QUITO2854 2005-12-15 19:57 2011-05-02 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Quito
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 002854 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR INL, INL/LP, WHA/AND 
JUSTICE FOR OIA AND AFMLS 
TREASURY FOR FINCEN AND EB/ESC/TFS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR PGOV EFIN KJUS KCRM KHLS KTFN EC
SUBJECT:  2005-2006 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY 
REPORT (INCSR) - ECUADOR - MONEY LAUNDERING SECTION 
 
REF: STATE 210351 
 
Ecuador's new comprehensive law against money laundering was 
published in the Official Register on October 18, 2005.  The new 
law criminalizes the laundering of illicit funds from any source 
and penalizes the undeclared entry of more than $10,000 in cash. 
The law calls for the creation of a financial intelligence unit 
(FIU) under the purview of the Superintendency of Banks. 
Regulations for application of the law and establishment of the 
FIU have not yet been developed. 
With a dollar economy and a geographical situation between two 
major drug producing countries, Ecuador is highly vulnerable to 
money laundering but is not considered an important regional 
financial center.  Because there has been no effective control of 
money laundering until now, there is no way to judge confidently 
the magnitude of such activity in the country.  In addition to 
concerns about illicit transactions through financial 
institutions, there are some indications that money laundering is 
taking place through "normal" commercial activity.  Recurrent 
detections of large amounts of unexplained currency entering and 
leaving Ecuador indicate that transit and laundering of illicit 
cash are also significant activities.  Though smuggled goods are 
regularly brought into the country, there is no evidence that 
they are significantly funded by drug proceeds. 
A free trade zone law was passed in 1991 in order to promote 
exports, foreign investment and employment.  The law provides for 
the import of raw materials and machinery free of duty and tax; 
the export of finished and semi-processed goods free of duty and 
tax; and tax exemptions for business activities in the government- 
established zones.  Free trade zones have been established in 
Esmeraldas, Manabi and Pichincha provinces, and a new zone is 
planned for the site of the new Quito airport.  There is no known 
evidence to indicate that the free trade zones are being used in 
trade-based money laundering. 
The Narcotics and Psychotropic Substance Act of 1990 (Law 108) 
criminalized money laundering activities only in connection with 
illicit drug trafficking.  Regulations issued pursuant to Law 
108, the 1994 Financial System Law, and a 1996 Banking 
Superintendency Resolution require financial institutions to 
report to the National Drug Council (CONSEP) any transaction in 
cash or stocks over $5,000, as well as suspicious financial 
transactions. Mutual societies are required to report 
transactions of $5,000 and above. Financial cooperatives must 
report transactions of $2,000 and higher. Electronic reporting of 
this information was implemented in 1999. Banks operating in 
Ecuador are required to maintain financial transaction records 
for six years. There are no due diligence or banker negligence 
laws that hold individual bankers responsible if their 
institutions launder money. However, a bank's board of directors 
can be held legally responsible if drug money laundering occurs 
in their institution. 
Some existing laws may conflict with the detection and 
prosecution of money laundering. For example, the Bank Secrecy 
Law severely limits the information that can be released by a 
financial institution directly to the police as part of any 
investigation, and the Banking Procedures Law reserves 
information on private bank accounts to the Banking 
Superintendency. In addition, the Criminal Defamation Law 
sanctions banks and other financial institutions that provide 
information about accounts to police or advise the police of 
suspicious transactions if no criminal activity is proven. 
As a result of this contradictory legal framework, cooperation 
between other Government of Ecuador (GOE) agencies and the police 
has fallen short of the level needed for effective enforcement of 
money laundering statutes. Other problems conflicting with an 
anti-money laundering regime include the absence of regulations 
requiring financial institutions to exercise due diligence and 
the weak regulation of currency exchange businesses (casas de 
cambio). 
As a result of these shortcomings, during the past five years 
there have been no serious investigations of drug money 
laundering in Ecuador.  Without solid financial intelligence, it 
is impossible to estimate accurately the extent and nature of a 
money laundering problem in Ecuador.  It is not known to what 
extent money laundering may be related to narcotics proceeds, or 
may be generated by other crimes such as contraband smuggling, 
illegal migration, corruption, bank fraud, or terrorism. 
The need to develop regulations and establish agencies to 
implement the new money laundering law implies that it will be 
several months, at least, before effective action can be taken to 
remedy this situation. 
Several Ecuadorian banks maintain offshore offices. The 
Superintendency of Banks is responsible for oversight of both 
offshore and onshore financial institutions. Regulations are 
essentially the same for onshore and offshore banks, with the 
exception that offshore deposits no longer qualify for the 
government's deposit guarantee. Anonymous directors are not 
permitted. Licensing requirements are the same for offshore and 
onshore financial institutions. However, offshore banks are 
required to contract external auditors pre-qualified by the 
banking Superintendency. These private accounting firms perform 
the standard audits on offshore banks that would generally be 
undertaken by the Superintendency in Ecuador. Bearer shares are 
not permitted for banks or companies in Ecuador. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Superintendency of Banks and the 
Association of Private Banks formed a working group in December 
2004 to draft a law against terrorist financing.  By year-end 
2005, a draft law had been completed and sent to the Presidency 
for review.  Pending promulgation of a new law, terrorist 
financing has not been criminalized in Ecuador. The Banking 
Superintendency has cooperated with the USG in requesting 
financial institutions to report transactions involving known 
terrorists, as designated by the United States as Specially 
Designated Global Terrorists pursuant to E.O. 13224 (on terrorist 
financing) or by the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee. No terrorist 
finance assets have been identified to date in Ecuador. The 
Superintendency would have to obtain a court order to freeze or 
seize such assets in the event they were identified in Ecuador. 
Ecuador has ratified (26 June 2004) the UN International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. 
No steps have been taken to prevent the use of gold and precious 
metals to launder terrorist assets. Currently, there are no 
measures in place to prevent the misuse of charitable or non- 
profitable entities to finance terrorist activities. 
Ecuador is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and has 
ratified (September 17, 2002) the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime. Ecuador is a member of the OAS 
Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts 
Group to Control Money Laundering. Ecuador is also a member of 
the South American Financial Action Task Force (GAFISUD). Ecuador 
and the United States have an Agreement for the Prevention and 
Control of Narcotic Related Money Laundering that entered into 
force in 1994 and an Agreement to Implement the United Nations 
Convention Against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances of December 1988, as it relates to the 
transfer of confiscated property, securities and 
instrumentalities. There is also a Financial Information Exchange 
Agreement (FIEA) between the Government of Ecuador (GOE) and the 
U.S. to share information on currency transactions. 
JEWELL