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Viewing cable 05PRAGUE1699, 16 YEARS AFTER THE END OF COMMUNIST RULE, CZECHS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05PRAGUE1699 2005-12-08 15:34 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Prague
VZCZCXYZ0007
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPG #1699/01 3421534
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 081534Z DEC 05
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6687
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
UNCLAS PRAGUE 001699 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EZ
SUBJECT: 16 YEARS AFTER THE END OF COMMUNIST RULE, CZECHS 
STILL DEBATING PROPRIETY OF COMMUNIST PARTY, BUT FEWER AND 
FEWER OBJECT. 
 
REF: PRAGUE 1575 
 
1. (U) SUMMARY. A recent unsuccessful initiative to ban the 
Czech Communist Party (KSCM), together with November's 
anniversary of the student protests that led to the eventual 
end of communist rule, and the general elections scheduled 
for next June, have focused public debate on the role of the 
largely unreformed Communist Party. Some leading politicians 
and analysts, including several former dissidents, now argue 
that the world has changed significantly since 1989 and that 
the Communist Party, even if it has not changed 
significantly, now represents little or no threat to 
democracy. The increasing official tolerance of the Communist 
Party, and the openness with which parliamentary cooperation 
is acknowledged by the governing coalition's senior partner, 
the Social Democrats (CSSD), is changing the dynamics of 
national politics, resulting in a diminished role for the 
current opposition, and more, though still limited, space for 
the Prime Minister and his party. END SUMMARY 
 
2. (U) Prime Minister Jiri Paroubek (CSSD) signed a petition 
drive to ban the Communists in the early 1990s. He now calls 
it "the stupidest thing I ever did," arguing that the effect 
was counterproductive and led to renewed unity within KSCM. 
Paroubek repeatedly makes the point that KSCM has 20% of the 
seats in parliament and that it is destabilizing to keep 
those votes outside the system. He argues that it would be 
better for the country to give those parliamentarians a 
chance to participate in normal political life. 
 
3.(U) In a speech November 17, commemorating the 16th 
anniversary of the start of the Velvet Revolution, Paroubek 
dismissed concerns about a communist comeback, saying, "There 
is no USSR. There is no red Army. There is no Comintern. KSCM 
is no threat to democracy."  Paroubek has recently relied on 
the Communists for support on several pieces of legislation 
affecting labor unions, student employees, and church-run 
charities. Statistics show the Communists supported the 
Social Democrats on 14 of 16 recent bills. The Prime 
Minsster's coalition partners, the Christian Democrats, have, 
unsuccessfully, tried to oppose him on some of these 
measures. It is not clear whether Paroubek felt sufficiently 
emboldened by this successful cooperation with the 
Communists, or perhaps instead felt an obligation to do 
something in exchange, but in late November, Paroubek floated 
a trial balloon, announcing that if he were a 
parliamentarian, he would support the cancellation of the 
lustration law that prevents former top officials and secret 
police agents from the Communist era from holding high 
office. The move provoked such a strong reaction that 
Paroubek backed down two days later, saying he was putting 
aside his personal views for the moment, in order to not 
destabilize the ruling coalition.  While some observers 
believe that Paroubek may have finally found a limit to how 
far he can go in working with KSCM; others interpret this as 
more of a tactical retreat. 
 
4.(U)) Paroubek is not alone in arguing that it is time to 
bring the Communist Party and its supporters out of the 
political wilderness. A number of important and influential 
political figures no longer support the ostracizing of the 
Communist Party. Former President Vaclav Havel has been 
blamed by some for not banning the Communists when he was 
president in the early 90's. Havel argued last month that 
there was little call for such a move in the early 90's. 
Havel instead feels that the opportunists within the old 
communist structures left the party in the early 90's, got 
fabulously wealthy, and are today exerting a far more 
dangerous and corrosive influence on Czech democracy than the 
ideological diehards who stayed behind.  Havel says it was 
the malfeasance of other parties, a shot at President Klaus's 
Civic Democrats (ODS), that made it possible for the KSCM to 
stay alive. 
 
5.(U) Senate President Petr Pithart (KDU-CSL, Christian 
Democrats), who is the son of a Communist-era Ambassador to 
France and former Communist himself, argues that the 
Communists should be allowed to participate in political 
life. "It is much better to beat them at the polls," he 
argues, though it is very unlikely his own party will come 
out ahead of KSCM. 
 
6. (SBU) Political analyst Jiri Pehe, who also advises 
Paroubek, argues that what made the communists so evil wasn't 
their desire to have free universal health care, free 
tuition, regulated rents, and strong labor unions. Instead, 
in Pehe's view, it was the communist control over the media, 
 
 
the judiciary and the educational curricula, limited freedom 
of movement, and so on. Pehe argues that the pre-1989 
Communist party was able to do all this because they were 
backed up by Moscow. Pehe points out that the situation is 
dramatically different today. The Czech media is today in the 
hands of Swiss and German press barons who exert commercial 
rather than political pressure. Regarding the liberty to 
travel, Pehe points out that most Czechs feel the greatest 
impediment is U.S. visa law. In a November 30 editorial in 
the national daily Mlada Fronta, Pehe writes, "Communism has 
ended and it will never return. The sooner all those who 
fight against it realize this, the sooner standard democracy 
will prevail in the Czech Republic." 
 
6. (U) Finance Minister and CSSD Chair Bohuslav Sobotka, 
considered the standard bearer for the moderate faction 
within the party, mentioned cooperation with the Communists 
this month, saying he would rely on their support, if 
necessary, to pass dozens of key bills before the election 
next June. Just this spring, during the political uncertainty 
surrounding then Prime Minister Gross, Sobotka had said that 
he would resign if Gross were to set up a minority government 
supported by the Communists. 
 
7. (U) President Klaus, who has said he would not attend a 
KSCM party congress because of the party's past, nevertheless 
disagrees with any attempt to ban communism now. Klaus 
reasons that communism was defeated in November of 1989. He 
says communism as a political movement doesn't exist anymore. 
 
8. (SBU) Vladimir Mlynar, former dissident, former journalist 
for the liberal weekly RESPEKT, former minister without 
portfolio and Minister of Informatics and member of the 
liberal party, the Freedom Union, is generally regarded as a 
life-long anti-Communist. Mlynar told the Embassy in November 
that he doesn't regard the Communist party as a threat and 
feels that, although he dislikes the party, it is a part of 
the political spectrum today and should be treated as such. 
 
9.  (SBU) COMMENT: The American polling firm, PSB, hired by 
CSSD for the 2006 election campaign, released the results of 
a survey November 30 showing that 55% of Czechs feel that 
KSCM should be treated like any other standard political 
party. Two thirds of those responding said the Communist 
Party should not be banned. Ironically, some of the most 
vocal opposition to the Communists is coming from young 
activists who would have only experienced communism in their 
infancy. On the other hand, some of the traditionally 
pro-U.S. voices in the country are saying that it no longer 
makes sense to outlaw, or even ostracize, the Communists. 
This is reducing the leverage of the opposition Civic 
Democrats, as well as CSSD's junior coalition partners, since 
the opposition Communists have already said they will support 
several key government bills.  It is also undercutting one of 
the main election themes of the Civic Democrats, namely that 
support for CSSD will lead to a reemergence of the 
Communists. Current opinion polls give left-of-center CSSD 
and KSCM combined a slight lead over right-of-center ODS and 
KDU-CSL. It's still too early to say for certain that this 
lead will be borne out in the voting next June.  But whatever 
the outcome of the 2006 vote, it seems only a matter of time 
before the Communist party is treated like all other 
political parties in the Czech Republic - mistrusted and 
disdained.  And that could be the toughest test KSCM has 
faced since 1989.  END COMMENT 
 
CABANISS