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Viewing cable 05LIMA5391, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT,
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 05LIMA5391 | 2005-12-21 20:30 | 2011-08-25 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Lima |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 LIMA 005391
SIPDIS
JUSTICE FOR OIA, AFMLS, AND NDDS
TREASURY FOR FINCEN
STATE FOR INL/LP, WHA
USAID FOR LAC/SAM
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SNAR PREL PE
SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT,
PERU, 2005-2006
REF: SECSTATE 209560
¶1. The following is Post's submission as Part I of the 2005-
2006 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
(INCSR), Drugs and Chemical Controls
¶2. Summary - In 2004-2005, the Peruvian government (GOP)
surpassed its coca eradication goals and conducted
operations on land and sea to disrupt the production and
transshipment of cocaine. Despite these efforts, the
Peruvian Government will not be able to fulfill the
assurance given by President Toledo in 2000 that illegal
coca would be eliminated during his administration. Since
that commitment was made, the price of coca leaf has risen
steadily and the number of hectares under cultivation has
grown in areas not under the GOP's control. Cocaleros have
become more violent and better organized within valleys.
Terrorist groups claiming to be affiliated with Sendero
Luminoso (SL) have also openly identified with coca growers
and drug traffickers and engaged in increasingly violent
ambushes of police and intimidation of alternative
development teams in coca growing areas. Traffickers are
adapting to counter-drug strategies to increase narcotics
production. There has been a significant shift in the
Peruvian public's views on widespread myths surrounding
coca. There is a much greater public understanding of the
close linkage between illegal coca cultivation and the
hugely negative impact of narco-trafficking on Peru and its
people.
¶3. The GOP surpassed its goal for coca eradication in 2005
but this effort may not have kept pace with expanding coca
cultivation. The Peruvian Government has made progress in
strengthening police capacity East of the Andes. Four
hundred police graduates dedicated to counter-narcotics
graduated from NAS-supported police academies in 2005.
Their entry on duty has allowed the Peruvian National Police
(PNP) to effect sustained interdiction in source zones and
to carry out eradication in valleys where coca farmers have
violently resisted forced eradication in the past. The
Government of Peru's Office of Drug Control (DEVIDA) has
adopted the United Nation's estimate released in June 2005
that there are 50,000 hectares of coca under cultivation in
Peru that produce a potential annual harvest of 110,000
metric tons of coca leaf. An estimated 9,000 tons of leaf
are consumed licitly. The UN estimates that the balance of
approximately 100,000 metric tons of coca leaf is available
to make up to an estimated 190 metric tons of cocaine
annually. A relatively small percent of Peruvians, 250,000
people (45,000 families) out of a population of 27 million,
are involved in growing, processing and trafficking coca.
¶4. The GOP showed steadfast resolution in carrying out
eradication in the Huallaga valley despite violent
opposition by coca growers and elements of the Sendero
Luminoso terrorist group. Eradicators returned to San Gaban
in 2005, an area of new and expanding coca cultivation, to
complete efforts begun last year. The GOP eradicated almost
9,000 hectares of coca in key producing zones of the
Huallaga Valley and San Gaban in Puno Department, and over
3,000 hectares more in voluntary eradication linked to
alternative development. Port programs directed at
interdicting maritime shipments of drugs have also begun to
pay-off. Over 11 metric tons of Peruvian cocaine was seized
in Peru or in transit to consumer destinations in CY 2005.
¶5. In October, the Constitutional Tribunal supported the
GOP's exclusive control over national drug policy,
overturning two regional ordinances that aimed to liberalize
coca cultivation. In Congress, over 20 legislative coca law
proposals have been put forward; however, with elections in
2006, passage of any coca law is uncertain. The proposed
laws run the gamut but generally favor liberalization with
the exception of the GOP proposal that establishes a ceiling
on licit coca. In November, Peruvian National police
arrested Fernando Zevallos, a U.S. Government designated
drug kingpin. One cause for concern is the growing evidence
of increasing links between the Sendero Luminoso and
cocaleros in the Upper Huallaga and Apurimac and Ene River
Valleys (Spanish acronym is VRAE). End Summary.
II. Status of Country
¶6. Illicit Cultivation - In 2005, the GOP planned and
mounted aggressive interdiction and eradication campaigns in
two key coca-growing regions - the Huallaga Valley and in
San Gaban in Puno Department. The primary reasons for the
continuing success in eradication campaigns are the resolve
of the police to hold their ground against cocalero threats
and the close coordination between different GOP
institutions (police and eradication corps, drug
prosecutors, among others). The Ministry of Interior's coca
eradication group eradicated almost 9,000 hectares of coca
by year's end in Peru, plus an additional 3,200 hectares
through voluntary eradication. This Ministry of Interior
office is known in Spanish as el Proyecto Especial de
Control y Reduccion de los Cultivos the Coca en el Alto
Huallaga (CORAH).
¶7. The GOP conducted eradication operations in the Huallaga
Valley in entrenched coca cultivation zones around the town
of Pizana that, previously, had been off limits because of
violent resistance by farmers. The PNP mounted extensive
interdiction campaigns to establish the illegality of the
coca production by destroying cocaine base laboratories
prior to initiating eradication. Attacks against PNP
helicopters carrying security forces and eradicators delayed
the start of eradication until police began inserting larger
numbers of troops to protect eradicators. The GOP was
remarkably steadfast in carrying out eradication in the
Huallaga valley despite violent opposition by coca growers
and elements of the Sendero Luminoso terrorist group. With
strong backing by senior GOP officials, these new tactics
have proven successful in this cocalero stronghold.
Eradicators pulled up a total of 5,429 hectares of coca in
the Huallaga Valley as well as 35,600 square meters of
seedbeds that could have planted an additional 2,373
hectares of coca.
¶8. Eradicators returned to San Gaban in Puno Department in
October 2005, an area of new and expanding coca cultivation,
to complete efforts begun in 2004 when it eradicated 1,500
hectares of coca. Eradication proceeded peacefully after
the PNP deployed a sizeable force of drug police.
Eradicators pulled up 1,475 hectares of densely planted coca
in San Gaban between October and December.
¶9. CORAH also eradicated small amounts of coca in areas
where coca growers were interfering with communities that
wished to participate in voluntary eradication as well as
others that failed to fulfill a commitment to voluntary
eradication under the PDAP (Participative Alternative
Development Program). This effort has helped clear the way
for the program's1 implementation in some new areas and, in
general, publicly reinforced the government of Peru's
commitment to enforcing coca eradication agreements.
¶10. As evidenced by attacks on NAS helicopters in April and
kidnapping of and threats to alternative development workers
in November, and two deadly ambushes of police in the Upper
Huallaga and VRAE in December, there are growing links
between the Sendero Luminoso and cocaleros. Generally,
cocalero organizations remain aggressively active but
divided. Some fifteen hundred cocaleros met in September at
the Fourth Congress of the National Confederation of
Agricultural Producers of the Coca Valleys of Peru. Though
some new alliances were made, representatives from the
Monzon and Cuzco did not attend, effectively thwarting
attempts to create a national cocalero movement. The
cocalero congress did elect new leadership that is
advocating more radical, confrontational tactics.
¶11. Trafficking organizations continue to use all available
methods to move coca products out of Peru via air, river,
land and maritime routes to Mexico, Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, Ecuador and Chile. Opium latex and morphine move
overland north into Ecuador and/or Colombia, where they are
collected and converted to heroin for subsequent export to
the U.S. and Europe. Maritime smuggling of larger cocaine
shipments is becoming increasingly dominant as a primary
method of transporting multi-ton loads of cocaine base and
HCl.
¶12. Cocaine base (locally referred to as PBC) was once
considered the traditional principal form of coca product
produced and trafficked in Peru. However, in 2005, as
evidenced by multi-ton and multi-kilogram seizures, cocaine
HCl rapidly became the principal product in Peruvian drug
trafficking. It is also evident from seizures that large-
production laboratories in Peru are being utilized to
prepare this product in coca growing regions as well as in
the coastal regions of Peru.
¶13. The presence of opium poppy cultivation in Peru is an
increasing international concern. Intelligence indicates
that opiate trafficking in Peru, to include opium poppy
cultivation, the production of opium latex, and suspected
morphine, is primarily concentrated in the northern and
central parts of the country, with poppy cultivation also
sited in the Huallaga and Apurimac Valleys although there
are no reliable estimates as to the number of hectares under
cultivation in remote areas. In April 2005, a PNP
investigation resulted in the seizure of 412 kilograms of
opium latex in Chiclayo Province, Peru. However, it is
unknown if these sizeable seizures are related to increased
opium poppy cultivation in Peru. Intelligence indicates
that opium products are shipped via land routes to Ecuador
and Colombia for conversion to morphine base and heroin.
III. Country Actions against Drugs in 2005
¶14. Law Enforcement Efforts - In 2005, the GOP made
significant strides in investigating and dismantling major
drug trafficking organizations and attacking drug-processing
sites in key source zone valleys of the Monzon and
Apurimac/Ene River Valleys (VRAE). The Peruvian National
Police Narcotics Directorate (DIRANDRO) mounted several
successful operations in the Monzon destroying over 621
metric tons of coca leaf and 522 cocaine base laboratories.
No eradication took place in the Monzon in 2005 where there
are approximately 11,000 hectares of coca.
¶15. The VRAE has approximately 14,000 hectares of coca
under cultivation. In recent times, it has become
increasingly dangerous for legitimate economic activity,
including alternative development, as narcotraffickers
linked to subversive groups rule in the absence of state
security. As they have done in the Monzon Valley, the PNP
are engaged in an interdiction campaign in the VRAE from the
newly constructed police base in Palmapampa. The GOP is
using Palmapampa to reestablish police presence and end a
climate of impunity in the VRAE. This year the PNP drug
police destroyed over 767 rustic cocaine base laboratories
and 1,200 metric tons of coca leaf in the VRAE. In May
2005, the PNP located a large, well-equipped cocaine HCl
laboratory in the region, seizing over 1 ton of cocaine and
seven tons of precursor chemicals. The PNP reports it was
the largest cocaine HCl laboratory ever found in Peru. As
part of this effort to disrupt drug trafficking in the
Ayacucho region adjacent to the VRAE, the PNP deployed a
mobile road interdiction group trained to detect contraband
from precursor chemicals to drugs using x-ray technology.
This team has been effective in deterring truckers from
transporting chemicals into the area.
¶16. The PNP established two new basic training academies in
2004 at the Santa Lucia and Mazamari police bases, located
in two coca-growing regions. The first two hundred students
graduated in May 2005. They are working in Peruvian drug
police units operating in the coca growing valleys. Their
availability was a key factor in enabling the drug police to
support simultaneous eradication and interdiction operations
in different coca valleys this year. A third academy was
established in October 2005. Another 200 students will
graduate in December 2005. The new graduates will all be
assigned to Dirandro for counter-drug operations.
¶17. Mexican drug cartels are appearing more frequently as
key players in directing the shipment of multi-kilogram and
multi-ton loads to Mexico and the Caribbean. Colombian drug
trafficking organizations are present to a lesser degree.
Continued aggressive investigation by the PNP is slowly
beginning to make headway against these Peru-based
organizations. DIRANDRO successfully identified and
disrupted major international cocaine trafficking
organizations responsible for maritime and air shipment of
metric tons of cocaine to U.S., South American and European
markets. Fernando Zevallos-Gonzales, an OFAC-designated
Kingpin and a Department of Justice OCDETF-designated
priority target, was taken into custody on November 19.
Zevallos was sentenced by a Peruvian court to 20 years in
jail in December. Two of his key lieutenants, Jorge CHAVEZ-
Montoya and Jesus Manuel FRANCIA-Pesaque were arrested
separately on charges including drug trafficking and witness
intimidation.
¶18. The USG and GOP have cooperated to improve port
security and to address increased maritime smuggling at
Peruvian ports. In 2005, U.S. and Peruvian law enforcement
efforts led to the seizure of over 11 tons of cocaine HCl.
See Para 23 for details.
¶19. Opium poppy - The PNP eradicated 92 hectares of opium
fields in CY2005. The GOP has estimated there are about
1,500 hectares of opium poppy under cultivation based on the
amount of hectares eradicated and opium latex seized in
¶2004. These figures cannot be corroborated. The GOP and
USG conducted a short-term aerial survey of suspected opium
poppy growing areas in northern Peru but found little
cultivation. Additional efforts to quantify the opium poppy
crop are underway. Although efforts to locate opium poppy
fields from the air have been unsuccessful, the PNP
continues to report multiple seizures and arrests related to
opium latex trafficking. Although most opium latex and
morphine base is transported overland from Peru to Ecuador
and Colombia, "mules" carrying opium latex have been
intercepted at the Jorge Chavez International Airport and in
packages sent through the Peruvian postal system to
destinations in Europe. DIRANDRO seized 573 kgs of opium
latex in the first five months of CY2005, up from 383 kgs in
all of CY 2004. Based on the poor quality of latex seized
to date, however, Peruvian producers seem unable to deliver
a product suitable for heroin production.
¶20. Judiciary, Congress and Legislation - The GOP
challenged the constitutionality of two regional ordinances
that sought to liberalize coca production. The
Constitutional Tribunal declared the ordinances
unconstitutional, but also criticized the GOP's coca
policies and their implementation. The decision effectively
ended pro-coca regional ordinance efforts, but spurred
public and Congressional discourse on the need for a new
coca law. Over 20 different coca law proposals were
introduced in Congress most of which argued for expansion of
coca cultivation and liberalization of GOP controls. The
GOP submitted its own draft law that seeks to limit coca
production to the 9,000 metric tons needed to supply the
legitimate domestic demand for coca leaf. At the end of
2005, Congress had passed no new coca law. To implement
last year's law to control precursor chemicals used in
cocaine processing, the GOP issued its regulations; however
putting the regulations into practice remains an ongoing
challenge.
¶21. A recent public opinion poll conducted in Lima and five
cities in coca-growing regions indicates that the Peruvian
public is greatly concerned about the extent of influence of
narco-traffickers over public institutions and authorities
believes that both the Peruvian government and Congress must
do more to defeat narco-trafficking. The poll surveyed
randomly selected persons in different socio-economic
classes between 18-65 years in Lima, Pucallpa, Aguaytia,
Huanuco, Ayacucho and Cusco. One major change from previous
surveys is the growing recognition of the role of coca
farmers in drug trafficking and the influence of narco-
traffickers over coca grower organizations. Over 77 percent
recognized that most coca leaf is destined for narco-
trafficking and 61 percent acknowledged that coca growers
are part of the drug supply chain. More surprisingly, over
71 percent of those surveyed opined that coca growers who
sell coca leaf to drug traffickers should be punished.
Peruvians surveyed also recognize that drug trafficking is
not a problem only for foreigners. Over 90 percent of
respondents thought that drug trafficking is a problem that
affects both Peru and other countries. Less than 8 percent
thought that it was only a problem for the United States.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs.
¶22. The change in Peruvian perceptions about coca growing
and the complicity of coca farmers in narco-trafficking is
to a great extent due to multiple U.S. and GOP efforts to
inform the public debate in the press, via television and
radio and among Peruvian government officials.
¶23. Bilateral Cooperation - The USG continues to encourage
the GOP to focus its counter-drug operations in the major
drug source zones in the Upper Huallaga Valley and
Apurimac/Ene Valley. The Peruvian National Police have been
able to increase police presence and their operational
productivity in these areas by using USG assistance to
fortify existing police bases, increase the number of drug
police working in the coca valleys, and enhance police
training and mobility. The USG is also providing assistance
to expand the GOP's anti-drug canine programs.
¶24. Peru's law enforcement organizations have participated
in joint operations and shared drug intelligence with
neighboring countries. In Operation Amazonas, the PNP
conducted a joint operation with Ecuadorian National Police.
Operation Northern Border began with a conference to address
drug trafficking along Peru's borders with Brazil, Colombia,
and Ecuador. A Mini IDEC conference brought together law
enforcement representatives from Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and
Venezuela as well as Brazil, Panama and the U.S. The group
reported on money laundering initiatives as well as growing
problems with narco-terrorism. Finally, Peru is actively
participating in a counter-narcotics officer exchange
program with Bolivia, Brazil and Ecuador to enhance cross-
border drug enforcement efforts.
¶25. Maritime/Airport Interdiction Programs - It is
estimated that 70 percent of all illicit drugs exported from
Peru are hidden in legitimate maritime cargo. DIRANDRO and
Peruvian Customs have established a joint interdiction group
at the Port of Callao to review all export documents of
containerized-freight and identify suspect cargo for further
inspection. The USG and GOP are increasing investigative
and intelligence resources targeted at the transportation of
cocaine products to the coastal regions for maritime
smuggling and to enhance the GOP's capability to identify
and inspect suspect cargo shipments passing through Peruvian
maritime ports and its international airports. The GOP has
made many arrests and multi-ton/multi-kilogram seizures
totaling over 11 metric tons of cocaine HCl in 2005. As an
example, in February 2005, a PNP investigation resulted in
the discovery of 1.2 metric tons of cocaine HCl hidden in
false compartments in a chemicals tanker at the Port of
Callao. In another case, the PNP identified and surveilled
a suspicious cargo vehicle destined for a fish export
company. Cocaine was found packed in frozen squid.
Subsequent investigations identified containers of frozen
squid from the fish export company that had been sent to
locations in the U.S. and Europe. The PNP alerted police in
destination countries of suspect drug shipments. These
warning alerts have resulted in multiple seizures in the
United States and Europe. We expect seizures to escalate as
the GOP expands its canine and technology (X-ray and Gamma-
ray) programs at several key sea and airports.
¶26. Precursor Chemicals - Peru produces some precursor
chemicals and imports large volumes of all essential
chemicals for cocaine production. In 2005, the PNP Chemical
Investigations Unit successfully executed operations against
Peruvian companies suspected of diverting tons of these
precursor chemicals from legitimate use. Targets included
companies in coca growing valleys that diverted sulfuric
acid, legitimately used in automobile battery maintenance,
to the illicit market. Police also seized 6.6 tons of
acetone and significant amounts of hydrochloric acid,
potassium permanganate and sulfuric acid at a major cocaine
HCl production laboratory. The Peruvian National Police
participated with neighboring countries and the U.S. in a
regional chemical control program known as Operation Six
Frontiers during which the PNP seized a record amount of 122
metric tons.
¶27. Regional aerial interdiction programs - Progress was
made in 2005 towards establishing a more detailed picture of
aerial trafficking in Peru. In September, the GOP signed a
Cooperating Nation Information Exchange System agreement
(CNIES) that will enable the USG and other cooperating
nations to share intelligence about trafficking of drugs by
air. The Peruvian Air Force formed an anti-drug squadron and
accepted two aircraft, one specially equipped, donated to
the Peruvian Air Force (Fuerza Aerea del Peru - FAP) by the
USG. These aircraft will be dedicated to counter-narcotics
missions. The US Department of Defense is working with the
FAP to study the feasibility of establishing radar coverage
over areas of Peru suspected to be over-flown by narco-
traffickers.
¶28. Operation Breakthrough - The GOP blocked the execution
of this DEA-financed scientific study to estimate cocaine
production through a cocaine base laboratory efficiency
study. The action came despite previous coordination
between U.S. and Peruvian law enforcement agencies. Efforts
are underway to reschedule Operation Breakthrough in 2006.
¶29. Money Laundering - The U.S. Treasury's Office for
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) continues to maintain Fernando
Zevallos Gonzales and Aero Continente Airlines on its OFAC
Kingpin list. Several former government officials continued
to be under investigation for money laundering, however the
Public Ministry has presented no case in court. Over 30
money-laundering cases researched by the GOP's Financial
Intelligence Unit have been forwarded to the national
prosecutor's office. The Public Prosecutor won two money-
laundering convictions in 2005. One case was related to
public corruption. The other involved money laundering of
drug proceeds. There are three cases currently underway in
the Peruvian court system.
¶30. Corruption - As a matter of policy, the GOP does not
encourage or facilitate the illicit production or
distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other
controlled substances, or the laundering of the proceeds
from illegal drug transactions. No senior official of the
GOP is known to engage in, encourage or facilitate the
illicit production or distribution of such drugs or
substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug
transactions. Alleged connections (including free airline
tickets and campaign contributions) between Fernando
Zevallos and GOP officials and other political leaders are
under investigation.
¶31. Extradition - In May 2005, Peruvian authorities
approved a request to extradite one narcotrafficker, Ernesto
Corral Sanchez, from Peru to the United States. He is
detained in a Peruvian prison, being tried on separate drug
trafficking charges. Jorge "Polaco" Chavez Montoya, a
priority narco-trafficker with an approved extradition
request who was enjoying parole, was detained in 2005 and is
now in jail under separate trafficking charges. The GOP has
assured the USG that both drug traffickers will be
extradited upon completion of their Peruvian judicial and
penal processes. A Department of Justice team visited Peru
in 2005 to discuss ongoing extradition requests and improve
the efficiency of the process.
¶32. Demand Reduction - Evidence continues to mount showing
that illegal drug use is increasing at all levels of
society. Marihuana is the most commonly used drug in Peru.
The most recent national survey (2003) found that among
people of ages 12-64, four percent have used cocaine HCL at
least once in their lives, up from two percent in 2002. In
an August 2004 survey of university students in Lima,
marihuana was considered the easiest drug to buy, followed
by ecstasy, cocaine-base and cocaine HCl. The data shows
that availability is contributing to the abuse of illegal
drugs among the future professionals and leaders of Peru.
¶33. With technical assistance from the U.S.-based NGO
Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America (CADCA), the U.S.
Embassy is funding the development of community anti-drug
coalitions (CAC) in lower-class communities in Lima. The
CAC, a highly successful program in the U.S., is being
adapted to the realities of Peruvian society (e.g., higher
levels of poverty, weaker institutions, corruption). The
CACs will involve people from all sectors of the community
in long-term, community financed, and sustainable activities
to reduce drug use and abuse.
¶34. Alternative Development Program (ADP)- The ADP
portfolio is a multi-sector approach to making coca
reduction sustainable through improving local governance,
strengthening rule of law and increasing the economic
competitiveness of coca-growing areas. At the close of its
third year, the voluntary eradication (VE) program has over
26,600 families living in compliant communities, marking an
important milestone to showing the potential for sustainable
coca eradication based on popular commitments to live coca-
free. In addition, over 9,000 more families have joined the
program in the past year, which will result in approximately
3,000 hectares of voluntary coca eradication during 2005,
and over 11,000 hectares since it began in October 2002.
¶35. The program rapidly accelerated the implementation of
infrastructure and productive activities in VE communities
throughout 2005, resulting in the completion of 231
infrastructure projects and the delivery of technical
assistance to 26,469 family farmers on over 31,000 hectares
of licit crops in this year alone. Assistance in increasing
licit business activity in alternative development areas
resulted in $ 4.4M of additional sales in districts where
voluntary eradication is taking place and $18.6M in the
seven regions where the ADP is active. In addition, USAID
completed the $30M rehabilitation of the Fernando Belaunde
Terry highway, reducing travel time and corresponding costs
from twelve to four hours, which is expected to improve
legal productivity in the former cocalero stronghold of the
Central Huallaga Valley.
¶36. The implementation of community agreements continues to
be challenged by organized, well-funded and often violent
opposition from politically active cocalero groups as well
as by increasingly active insurgent groups. Strikes and
threats of violence substantially slowed program
implementation this year, forcing the program implementer to
close regional offices on 21 different occasions for a
combined period of 119 days.
¶37. Synergies between the development and law enforcement
components of the coca reduction strategy helped to
consolidate coca-free areas throughout the coca growing
valleys of San Martin and Ucayali. Joint strategic planning
continued throughout the year and has resulted in plans for
a first-ever sustainable eradication activity that will
combine regular eradication efforts with alternative
development activities and increased government presence to
maintain cocalero strongholds in the Huallaga Valley coca-
free. The GOP carried out eradication in non-compliant
communities for the first time in FY2005, reaching six
communities that had maintained coca despite commitments to
eradicate.
¶38. Efforts to help the GOP establish more effective
precursor chemical and coca control systems yielded positive
results in an often negative and, at best, ambivalent
program environment. FONAFE, the GOP institution
responsible for managing parastatal enterprises, took the
lead in reforming the coca control system in the face of a
corrupt and inept state enterprise charged with coca
commercialization in Peru. Through FONAFE, the GOP
established the volume of coca going to narco-trafficking
and an empirical basis for differentiating between legal and
illegal coca production. Policy assistance to DEVIDA also
produced a plan for the use of the state tax agency's
information technology platform to manage a precursor
chemical database that will serve the institutions
responsible for chemical control. USAID and the Embassy
have concluded that the adoption of this proposal by the GOP
is so critical to the success of the control system that,
without the use of this platform, the impact of the new
precursor control law will be lost. The institutions
responsible for this system have recently agreed to adopt
this recommendation and appear to be starting on the path
towards an effective implementation of the control system.
Peru Statistics
(2003-2005)
2005 2004 2003
Coca
Net Cultivation (ha) * TBD
31,150
* 2005 numbers not yet final
Eradication (ha) 12,166 12,525
15,604
Forced 8,966 9,983
11,313
Voluntary 3,200 2,542
4,291
Cultivation (ha) TBD 31,150
42,466
Leaf (Potential Harvest) (ha) N/A
HCl (Potential) (mt)
Seizures 2005 2004 2003
Coca Leaf (mt) 1,424 845 134
Coca Paste (mt) N/A N/A N/A
Cocaine HCl (mt) 11.27 7.11
3.25
Cocaine Base (mt) 4.40 5.70 3.76
Total Cocaine (mt) 15.67 12.81
7.0
Opium latex (kgs) 500.7 285 182
Heroin (kg) 6.2 1.0 0
Aircraft (items) 0 0 0
NOTE: Statistics from Peruvian National Police, Anti-Drug
Office. 2005 figures cover period from Jan 1 - Nov 25.
STRUBLE
_______________________________
1It's too much of a stretch to say that the eradication in
VE communities caused others to reconsider the option since
we didn't really sign up with new communities in Huanuco
where this took place. In Ucayali, the Campo Verde
eradiaction in early 2005 helped clear the way for
implementation in communities that wanted to join but where
Los Angeles and Tunuya were causing security and social
problems.