Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 05LIMA5336, PERU: 2005 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05LIMA5336.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05LIMA5336 2005-12-16 22:22 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Lima
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 LIMA 005336 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR S/CT - RHONDA SHORE, S/CT - ED SALAZAR, AND NCTC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC KCRM SNAR PE
SUBJECT: PERU: 2005 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM 
 
REF: STATE 193439 
 
1. The following is Post's submission for the 2005 Annual 
Terrorism Report. 
 
Peru remained a strong supporter of U.S. counterterrorism 
efforts in 2005.  Peru has consistently supported the Global 
War on Terrorism, has actively participated in the United 
Nations and OAS Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism 
(CICTE), and has firmly supported Colombia against the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).  State 
officials regularly describe combating terrorism as one of 
Peru's top priorities both domestically and in multilateral 
fora such as the UN and the OAS. 
 
Even though Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso or SL) -- a 
U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization -- poses less 
of a danger to the Peruvian Government than in past decades, 
SL continues to threaten U.S. and Peruvian interests, 
conducting several deadly attacks in remote Peruvian areas in 
2005.  SL strength is estimated to be a few hundred armed 
members concentrated in the most remote areas of coca-growing 
valleys.  SL reportedly is expanding its involvement in the 
drug trade, including the production of coca paste by at 
least one SL group, and has become more aggressive in its 
attacks on counternarcotics efforts. 
 
SL has responded to successful counternarcotics operations 
with armed actions intended to intimidate authorities.  The 
SL attacks have been in defense of economic interests -- 
narcotrafficking -- in contrast with previous acts of 
violence carried out in support of revolutionary goals.  The 
lines between SL and narcotraffickers are blurring, and there 
is evidence of young community members becoming involved in 
attacks on counternarcotics operations.  The link with the 
drug trade provides the terrorists with a greater source of 
funding with which to conduct operations, improve relations 
with local communities and gain recruits.  Lack of government 
presence in these areas has complicated efforts to disrupt SL 
activity.  Reports suggest that SL is continuing attempts to 
rebuild support in the universities where they exercised 
considerable influence in the 1980,s. 
 
Significant attacks by SL occurred in February, April, July, 
November, and December targeting the Peruvian National Police 
(PNP) and the U.S.-Peru counternarcotics program.  In 
February, three highway police officers were ambushed and 
killed by alleged members of the SL in Huanuco Department. 
In April in the San Martin Department of the Upper Huallaga 
Valley, three helicopters conducting counternarcotics 
operations were ambushed with semiautomatic weapons and 
grenades; a subsequent raid on the attackers' base indicated 
they were linked with SL.  Also in San Martin, a PNP patrol 
squad was ambushed in July and attacked with an electrically 
detonated explosive device, killing three police officers; 
evidence indicates that SL was involved.  In November, a 
group of heavily armed SL members kidnapped 10 employees of a 
USAID alternative development contractor who had been invited 
by a community in the Huanuco Department to discuss a 
voluntary eradication program.  The abductors released the 
employees, but threatened to kill them if they returned to 
the area.  Later in November, SL remnants threatened five 
communities in Ucayali Department either to reject the 
voluntary alternative development program or suffer the 
consequences.  In December, two DIRANDRO (counternarcotics 
police) vehicles were ambushed in Ayacucho Department 
resulting in the murder of five anti-drug police officers and 
the wounding of other law enforcement officials including a 
prosecutor.  Reports indicate the attackers were SL members. 
Subsequent to the December ambush, police searching for the 
attackers on the ground and via the air were fired upon.  One 
PNP officer flying in a helicopter was shot in the leg. 
 
The continued SL threats and violent attacks have led to an 
internal Peruvian debate as to whether or not there is a 
resurgence in the terrorist threat to the GOP.  There is 
evidence that SL has increased its armed combatant strength 
in the the Ayacucho Department with up to 30 militants.  The 
security threats that exist where SL remnants are active will 
cause the USG to continually reassess its ability to carry 
out counternarcotics operations in these areas. 
The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) has also been 
significantly reduced in numbers, and does not pose a serious 
threat.  The MRTA has not conducted a significant terrorist 
attack since the December 1996 hostage taking at the Japanese 
Ambassador's residence in Lima.  A Peruvian member of the 
MRTA was detained in La Paz by Bolivian authorities; the 
detainee had grenades and arms in her vehicle.  The Peruvian 
Communist Party (Patria Roja) has not engaged in terrorist 
acts but is suspected of advocating confrontation with 
Peruvian security forces. 
 
Armed terrorist incidents increased to 47 in 2005 (through 
October) from 40 in 2004.  (Note: Armed terrorist incidents 
for this purpose are defined as attacks, confrontations, 
ambushes, harassments with gunfire, or roadblocks carried out 
by SL members armed with long range weapons.  It does not 
include the instances of painting subversive slogans, 
distributing subversive leaflets, anonymous telephone 
threats, threatening letters or simulated explosive devices.) 
 The Peruvian Government arrested 128 suspected SL and MRTA 
members (through October), including alleged key SL leader 
Toribio Castaneda Quijano (aka Comrade Pinto Pinto) and the 
last at-large original leader of the MRTA, Julio Cesar 
Vasquez. 
 
There is no evidence of Colombia,s National Liberation Army 
(ELN) operating inside Peru, and only limited evidence of the 
FARC operating inside Peru.  (Note: FARC operations in Peru 
have been limited to using remote land for rest areas and 
arms purchases.  According to the PNP, indigenous groups in 
the jungle areas of the Loreto Department in Peru were being 
forced by the FARC to cultivate coca crops.)   In January, 
the Peruvian Foreign Minister played a critical role in 
diffusing a conflict between Venezuela and Colombia over 
forced rendition of a FARC spokesperson from Venezuela to 
Colombia.  Peru, Colombia, and Brazil are party to a border 
security agreement, signed in 2004, to enhance cooperation to 
combat terrorism and arms trafficking. 
 
President Toledo has pledged increased funding for security 
forces and social development projects in areas where SL and 
other terrorist groups operate.  The Peruvian Congress 
approved the President,s request to create a National 
Defense and Security Fund, totaling $40 million for 2005. 
The Peruvian Congress created a national security system 
designed to improve inter-governmental cooperation and 
strengthen prosecutors.  The PNP Directorate of 
Counterterrorism (DIRCOTE) is the primary Peruvian agency 
carrying out counterterrorism efforts, along with the 
Peruvian Army.  DIRANDRO has been the target of many of the 
attacks due to the increasing links between terrorist 
remnants and the narcotics trade. 
 
President Toledo has repeatedly extended a State of 
Emergency, which suspends some civil liberties and gives the 
Armed Forces authority to maintain order, for successive 
periods of up to 60 days in parts of Peru's five departments 
where SL is believed to still have armed members.   The 
Peruvian Government and civil society are working to 
formulate implementation of the 2002 recommendations of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission to heal wounds from the 
terrorist conflict of the 1990's.  President Toledo also 
formed Peace and Development Commissions in 2002 to promote 
cooperation between police, military, and residents in the 
areas where SL and MRTA conflicts had been the greatest. 
 
The GOP has aggressively prosecuted terrorist suspects, led 
by special antiterrorism prosecutors in the Attorney 
General,s office and an antiterrorism State Attorney in the 
Interior Ministry.   In January 2003, the Constitutional 
Tribunal, in conformance with the findings of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights  (IACHR), overturned the 
convictions of some 1,900 SL and MRTA defendants who had been 
tried on Fujimori-era decree laws on terrorism.  Peru's 
special antiterrorism court is retrying approximately 750 
cases.  A retrial of SL founder Abimael Guzman and 20 
co-defendants got off to a shaky start in 2004, but is 
proceeding satisfactorily and expected to conclude in early 
2006.   The retrial of 13 MRTA leaders, including founder 
Victor Polay, continues.  One SL leader was convicted of 
participation in the planning of the 2002 bombing at El Polo 
shopping center (across the street from the U.S. Embassy) and 
sentenced to 30 years in prison.  Seven SL co-defendants were 
acquitted of involvement in the El Polo bombing, but three 
were found guilty of belonging to SL and sentenced to 20-25 
year prison terms. 
 
Peru's April 2002 Law No. 27693 established a Financial 
Intelligence Unit (FIU) to collect, analyze and disseminate 
information on money laundering and other financial crimes. 
Peru strengthened its anti-money laundering legislation in 
July 2004 with the passage of Law No. 28306.  The law 
included counterterrorist finance activities among the FIU's 
functions; greatly expanded the FIU's capacity to engage in 
joint investigations and information-sharing with foreign 
FIU's; enhanced the FIU's capacity to exchange information 
and pursue joint cases with other agencies of the Peruvian 
Government; and required that individuals and entities 
transporting more than $10,000 in currency or monetary 
instruments into or out of Peru file reports with Peruvian 
Customs. 
 
All of Peru,s major seaports achieved UN and private sector 
security certifications. The USG supports a port security 
program focused on providing infrastructure and training 
Peruvian officials to identify cargo suspected to contain 
illegal narcotics and other contraband.  These efforts also 
are directed at countering terrorist threats and arms 
smuggling. 
 
Peru has ratified all 12 UN conventions and protocols 
relating to terrorism, as well as the Inter-American 
Convention Against Terrorism.  Peru has also signed the 
August 2003 Asuncion Declaration, in which several South 
American nations committed themselves to support the 
Colombian Government in its ongoing struggle against 
terrorism and drug trafficking. 
 
2. Embassy point of contact for this report is Pablo Valdez, 
valdezpm2@state.gov, valdezpm@state.sgov.gov, telephone 51-1 
618-2514. 
STRUBLE