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Viewing cable 05HANOI3358, VIETNAM: 2005-2006 INCSR RESPONSE PART II FINANCIAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05HANOI3358 2005-12-23 08:42 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Hanoi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 003358 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL AND EAP/MLS AND EB/ESC/TFS 
JUSTICE FOR OIA, AFMLS 
TREASURY FOR FINCEN AND OASIA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN KCRM KTFN PTER SNAR VM CNARC FINREF CTERR
SUBJECT: VIETNAM: 2005-2006 INCSR RESPONSE PART II FINANCIAL 
CRIMES AND MONEY LAUNDERING 
 
REF:  STATE 210324 
 
1. (U) This cable is in response to an action request 
(reftel). 
 
2. (U) Summary: In addition to Vietnam's underdeveloped 
financial sector, its large black market economy, weak 
customs controls, and substantial remittances make it an 
easy place to launder money.  While the Government of 
Vietnam has made some steps towards improving the situation, 
increasing their cooperation with other nations and passing 
anti-moneylaundering legislation, this issue will continue 
to be a problem in Vietnam for some time to come.  End 
Summary. 
 
3. (U) Vietnam is not an important regional financial 
center.  The Vietnamese banking sector is underdeveloped and 
the Government of Vietnam (GVN) controls the flow of all 
U.S. dollars in official channels.  The nature of the 
banking system makes it unlikely that major money laundering 
or terrorist financing is currently occurring in financial 
institutions.  However, a "drug economy" does exist in 
Vietnam's informal financial system.  Vietnam has a large 
"shadow economy" in which U.S dollars and gold are the 
preferred currency.  Due to the limited size of Vietnam's 
banking system and currency exchange controls, even 
legitimate businesses carry on transactions in this "shadow 
economy".  In addition, Vietnamese regularly use   gold 
shops and other informal mechanisms to remit or receive 
funds from overseas.  Official inward remittances in 2005 
were estimated to be USD 3.8 billion while estimates are 
that double that amount came through unofficial channels. 
Foreign embassies and UNODC, among others, believe that a 
percentage of transactions in the informal remittance 
systems may come from narcotics proceeds. 
 
4. (U) Article 251 of the Amended Penal Code criminalizes 
money laundering.  The Counter-narcotics Law, which took 
effect June 1, 2001, makes two narrow references to money 
laundering in relation to drug offenses: it prohibits the 
"legalizing" (i.e. laundering) of monies and/or property 
acquired by committing drug offenses (article 3.5); and, it 
gives the Ministry of Public Security's specialized counter 
narcotics agency the authority to require disclosure of 
financial and banking records when there is a suspected 
violation of the law.  The Penal Code governs money 
laundering related offenses. 
 
5. (U) In June 2005, GVN issued Decree 74/2005/ND-CP on 
Prevention and Combat of Money Laundering.  The Decree 
covers acts committed by individuals or organizations to 
legitimize money or property acquired from criminal 
activities.  The Decree applies to banks and non-banking 
financial institutions.  The State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) and 
the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) take primary 
responsibility for preventing and combating money 
laundering.  The decree does not cover counter-terrorist 
finance. 
 
6. (U) SBV supervises and examines financial institutions 
for compliance with anti-money laundering/counter terrorist 
financing regulations.  Financial institutions are 
responsible for knowing and recording the identity of their 
customers.  They are required to report cash transactions 
conducted in one day with aggregate value of VND 200 million 
(around USD 13,000) or more, or equivalent amount in foreign 
currency or gold.  The threshold for savings transactions is 
VND 500 million (around USD 31,000).  Furthermore, financial 
institutions are required to report all suspicious 
transactions.  Banks are also required to maintain records 
for seven years or more.  Banks are responsible for keeping 
information on their customers secret, but they are required 
to provide necessary information to law enforcement agencies 
for investigation purposes. 
 
7. (U) Foreign currency (including notes, coins and 
traveler's checks) in excess of USD 7,000 and gold of more 
than 300 grams must be declared at customs upon arrival and 
departure.  There is no limitation on either the export or 
import of U.S. dollars or other foreign currency provided 
that all currency in excess of USD 7,000 (or its equivalent 
in other foreign currencies) is declared upon arrival and 
departure, and supported by appropriate documentation.  If 
excess cash is not declared, it is confiscated at the port 
of entry/exit and the passenger may be fined. 
 
8. (U) The 2005 Decree on Prevention and Combat of Money 
Laundering provides for provisional measures to be applied 
to prevent and combat money laundering.  Those measures 
include 1) suspending transactions; 2) blocking accounts; 3) 
sealing or seizing property; 4) seizing violators of the 
law; and, 5) taking other preventive measures allowed under 
the law. 
 
9. (U) The 2005 Decree also provides for the establishment 
of an Anti-Money Laundering Information Center under the 
State Bank of Vietnam (SBV).  This center will function as 
the sole body to receive and process information.  It will 
have the right to request concerned agencies to provide 
information and records for suspected transactions.  Senior 
officials of the center will be appointed by the Governor of 
the SBV.  The center is awaiting final approval from the 
Government before it can be formally established. 
 
10. (U) MPS is responsible for investigating money 
laundering related offences.  There is no information 
available on arrests and/or prosecutions for money 
laundering or terrorist financing since January 1, 2005. 
 
11. (U) SBV acts as the sole agency responsible for 
negotiating, concluding and implementing international 
treaties and agreements on exchange of information on 
transactions related to money laundering.  SBV is seeking 
donors' assistance to strengthen its supervision 
capabilities in the context of Vietnam integrating into the 
world economy. 
 
12. (U) MPS is responsible for negotiating and concluding 
international treaties on judicial assistance, cooperation 
and extradition in the prevention and combat of money 
laundering related offenses. 
 
13. (U) Vietnam is a party to the 1999 International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism.  Vietnam plans to draft separate legislation 
governing counter terrorist financing, though they will not 
set a specific time frame for this drafting.  Currently SBV 
circulates to its financial institutions the list of 
individuals and entities that have been included on the UN 
1267 sanctions committee's consolidated list as being linked 
to Usama bin Laden, members of the Al Qaida organization or 
the Taliban, or that the USG has designated under relevant 
authorities.  To date no related assets have been 
identified. 
 
14. (U) Vietnam has been a party to the UN International 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (Vienna Convention) since 1997. 
Under existing Vietnamese legislation, there are provisions 
for seizing assets linked to drug trafficking.  In the 
course of its drug investigations, MPS has seized vehicles, 
property and cash, though the seizures are usually directly 
linked to drug crimes.  Final confiscation requires a court 
finding.  Reportedly, MPS can notify a bank that an account 
is "seized" and that is sufficient to have the account 
frozen.  However, MPS is not allowed to seize assets in 
order to investigate them; they must receive separate 
information that confirms and/or proves the money is 
laundered before it can be frozen.  A further restriction of 
their investigative powers is that Vietnam authorities 
cannot act on information or investigative findings provided 
by outside agencies. 
 
15. (U) The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) is engaged in 
a number of investigations targeting significant MDMA 
(Ecstasy) and marijuana trafficking organizations, composed 
primarily of Viet Kieu (overseas Vietnamese), in both the 
United States and Canada.  These drug trafficking networks 
are capable of laundering tens of millions of dollars per 
month back to Vietnam, exploiting U.S. financial 
institutions to wire or transfer money to Vietnamese bank 
and remittance accounts, as well as engaging in the 
smuggling of bulk amounts of U.S. currency from the United 
States into Vietnam.  The DEA has provided the Economic 
Police Unit of the MPS with information detailing the 
methods as well as identifying the bank accounts in Vietnam, 
which drug organizations have used to launder drug proceeds. 
Even with this information, the MPS stated that unless they 
have statements from the money remitters and the recipients 
of the money acknowledging its illegitimacy, they are unable 
to seize that money.  Recently, the DEA Hanoi office 
received unprecedented cooperation from MPS on two 
undercover money laundering transactions where the MPS 
provided an undercover officer to receive alleged drug 
proceeds in Vietnam from the United States.  However, 
despite requests made by DEA, MPS provided no investigative 
information on the businesses, bank accounts, or people that 
facilitated this illegal money remittance to Vietnam.  These 
actions emphasize the lack of willingness and/or legal 
ability of MPS to support cooperative anti-money laundering 
efforts.  MPS has denied the requests from DEA Hanoi office 
for assistance in identifying instances in which U.S. 
citizens have entered Vietnam in possession of $10,000 or 
more in cash, which by U.S. law should have been declared 
prior to exiting the United States.  Furthermore, MPS 
continues to stonewall on requests for the results of MPS' 
investigation into bank accounts and individuals (and their 
assets) in Vietnam identified by DEA investigation as 
complicit in the laundering of drug proceeds from the United 
States. 
MARINE