Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 05DHAKA6043, BANGLADESH INCSR DRAFT - PART I

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05DHAKA6043.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05DHAKA6043 2005-12-11 01:11 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Dhaka
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DHAKA 006043 
 
SIPDIS 
 
JUSTICE FOR OIA, AFMLS AND NDDS, 
TREASURY FOR FINCEN 
DEA FOR OILS AND OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL 
STATE FOR INL, SA 
NEW DEHLI FOR DEA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR BG
SUBJECT: BANGLADESH INCSR DRAFT - PART I 
 
REF: STATE 209558 
 
Bangladesh 
 
ΒΆI. Summary 
 
Because of its geographic location in the midst of major drug 
producing and exporting countries, Bangladesh is used by 
trafficking organizations as a transit point. Seizures of 
heroin, phensidyl (a codeine-based, highly addictive cough 
syrup produced in India), and pathedine (an injectable opiate 
with medical application as an anesthesia) point to growing 
narcotics abuse in Bangladesh. Phensidyl is popular because 
of its low price and widespread availability. While 
unconfirmed reports circulate of opium and cannabis 
cultivation along the border with Burma and cannabis 
cultivation in the southern delta region, there is no 
evidence that Bangladesh is a significant producer or 
exporter of narcotics. The Bangladesh government (BDG) 
officials charged with controlling and preventing illegal 
substance trafficking lack training, equipment, continuity of 
leadership and other resources to detect and interdict the 
flow of drugs. Moreover, there is minimal coordination among 
these agencies. Corruption at all levels of government, and 
in particular law enforcement, hampers the country's drug 
interdiction efforts. Bangladesh is a party to the 1988 UN 
Drug Convention. 
 
II. Status of Country 
 
There are unsubstantiated allegations of opium and cannabis 
production in the Bandarban District along the Burmese border 
and cannabis production in the southern silt-island ("char") 
region. The country's porous borders make Bangladesh an 
attractive transfer point for drugs transiting the region. 
There are no reports of production, trading or transit of 
precursor chemicals in Bangladesh. 
 
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2004 
 
Policy Initiatives. The Department of Narcotics Control's 
(DNC) counternarcotics policy initiatives and program 
activities are seriously hampered by the ineffectiveness of 
the National Narcotics Control Board (NNCB), the highest 
governmental body, to fulfill the objectives of the Narcotics 
Control Act (NCA). Article 5 of the NCA directs the Board to 
formulate policies and monitor the production, supply, and 
use of illegal drugs in Bangladesh. The 19-member NNCB, made 
of up of 11 ministers, seven appointed members, and the DNC 
Director General, is charged to meet quarterly: but only a 
single meeting was held in 2005, the first since 2003.  There 
is still no master plan for combating drug trafficking and 
abuse in Bangladesh. 
 
The BDG and USG signed a Letter of Agreement (LOA) in 
September 2002 to provide equipment and forensic technical 
assistance to the DNC and its central chemical laboratory. 
This training and technical assistance is complete.  The LOA 
also provided for training, via the U.S. DOJ, to law 
enforcement personnel involved in counternarcotics 
activities. An amendment to the LOA for an increase in funds 
for training and equipment was signed in 2004. 
 
Accomplishments. The Department of Narcotics Control is the 
BDG agency most responsible for counternarcotics efforts in 
Bangladesh. It is housed within the Ministry of Home Affairs 
and is currently under the leadership of an acting Director 
General who has been in office for less than a year. The 
organization is chronically under-funded, understaffed, 
under-trained, and suffers from frequent personnel turnover. 
The BDG completed construction of the first drug treatment 
and rehabilitation facility, a 250 bed hospital funded 
entirely by the BDG. A 2005 law introduced quality of care 
requirements governing staffing and facilities for addiction 
treatment centers.  The BDG also targeted demand reduction, 
increasing anti-drug public service messages. 
Law Enforcement Efforts. Law enforcement units engaged in 
counternarcotics operations include the police, the DNC, the 
border defense forces known as the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), 
customs, the navy, the coast guard, and local magistrates. 
Although there are only 19 legal land boarder crossings, 
Bangladesh's borders are generally considered porous. 
Elements of the BDR, responsible for land border security 
within twelve-miles of the boarder, are widely believed to 
abet the smuggling of goods, including narcotics, into 
Bangladesh. Customs, the navy, the coast guard and the DNC 
are under-funded, poorly equipped and staffed, and lack 
training. Customs officials also lack arrest authority. At 
ports of entry where customs officials are not stationed with 
police units, they have no capacity to detain suspected 
traffickers. Instead, they can only retain the contraband 
items found. There is no DNC presence at the country's second 
largest airport, in Chittagong, which has direct flights to 
Burma and Thailand. To date, no random searches of crews, 
ships, boats, vehicles, or containers are being performed at 
the country's largest seaport in Chittagong. These obstacles 
significantly undermine overall BDG counternarcotics efforts. 
 
The Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), established in 2004, 
targets organized criminal activity, including narcotics 
offenses.  Increased narcotics seizures, principally 
attributed to the RAB, have resulted in higher street prices 
for popular opiates like phensidyl and pathedine.  Seizures 
in 2005 included 3,000 bottles of phensidyl. 
 
There is no centralized record of narcotics seizures by law 
enforcement agencies.  The most current figures available are 
compiled by the Criminal Investigation Division (CID).  These 
records vary significantly from the DNC data included in the 
2005 report.  These data indicate that drug quantities seized 
by Bangladesh authorities from January through July 2005 are 
as follows: 36.8 kilograms of heroin (seizures for the entire 
year of 2004, according to the CID were at 43.4 kilograms); 
3322.6 kilograms of marijuana (3514.4 kg seized during all of 
2004); 7387.5 liters of phensidyl (6342.3 liters seized 
during all of 2004); and 1902 ampules of pathedine injection 
(5976 ampules seized during all of 2004). It is important to 
note that these statistics do not reflect all seizures made 
by all agencies in Bangladesh, as evidenced by the comparison 
to DNC data last year., Post, however, believes them to be 
reflective of general trends in Bangladesh. 
 
Corruption. Corruption is endemic at all levels of society 
and government in Bangladesh. Authorities involved in jobs 
that have an affect on the drug trade facilitate the 
smuggling of narcotics. Corrupt officials can be found 
throughout the chain of command. If caught, prosecuted, and 
convicted, most officials receive a reprimand at best and 
termination from government service at worst. Adjudicating 
authorities do not take these cases seriously. 
 
An Anti-Corruption Commission was officially formed in 
November 2004 with a mandate to investigate corruption and 
file cases against government officials. The ACC has been 
hampered by disputes over staffing and organization and has 
yet to operate effectively or demonstrate the ability to act 
independently. The BDG does not, as a matter of government 
policy, encourage or facilitate illicit production or 
distribution of drugs or controlled substances or launder 
proceeds from their transactions. No senior official has been 
identified as engaging in, encouraging, or facilitating the 
production or distribution of drugs or controlled substances. 
 
Agreements and Treaties. Bangladesh is a party to the 1988 UN 
Drug Convention. It has a memorandum of understanding on 
narcotics cooperation with Iran, an extradition treaty with 
Thailand, and it participates in information sharing with the 
government of Burma.  It is a signatory to the 1990 SAARC 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.  It 
is negotiating a bilateral agreement with India. 
Cultivation/Production. The DNC strongly denies 
unsubstantiated reports from several NGO and local government 
officials that opium production takes place in the Bandarban 
district along the border with Burma. The DNC reports, 
however, that it has destroyed a few "small" poppy crops in 
the hill tracts near Chittagong and in the northwest it says 
were cultivated for seeds cooking spices for local 
consumption.  The DNC also reports limited amounts of 
cannabis are cultivated for local consumption in the hill 
tracts, in the southern silt islands, and in the northeastern 
region.  The DNC, working with law enforcement agencies, 
reportedly destroys any cannabis crops it discovers 
 
Drug Flow/Transit. Bangladesh is situated between the Golden 
Crescent to the west and the Golden Triangle to the east. 
Porous boarders, weak law enforcement institutions, and 
corruption leave Bangladesh vulnerable to smuggling of opium 
based pharmaceuticals and other medicinal drugs from India 
and white heroin from Burma. 
 
Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction). There is no consensus 
estimate of the number of drug addicts in Bangladesh. A 
recent DNC study estimated the addict population at two 
million and growing. Other BDG estimates put the figure as 
low as 250,000. The total number of drug cases and accused 
drug offenders doubled between 1999 and 2001 and continues to 
rise. Media and anecdotal reports suggest that drug abuse, 
while previously a problem among the ultra-poor, is becoming 
a major problem among the wealthy and well-educated young, 
and increasingly among educated, well-off young women, some 
of whom are turning to prostitution to support their habits. 
The BDG sponsors rudimentary educational programs aimed at 
youth in schools and mosques, and has modestly increased 
funding for these programs in 2005, although there is no 
clear indication of their impact.  NGOs have expressed 
concerns about the quality of these messages. 
 
The BDG currently runs outpatient and detoxification centers 
in Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna, and Rajshahi. These are not 
treatment centers and thus have limited success addressing 
the underlying addiction.  The BDG opened the first 250 bed 
drug treatment and rehabilitation facility in 2005.  There 
are other, non-governmental centers with a variety of 
treatment therapies available. Unfortunately, most of these 
are quite expensive by Bangladeshi standards and therefore 
beyond the reach of most drug addicts. There is, however, a 
drug addicts' rehabilitation organization, APON, that 
operates five long-term residential rehabilitation centers, 
including the first center in Bangladesh for the 
rehabilitation of female drug-users, which opened in 2005. 
These are the only such facilities in Bangladesh, 
 
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs 
 
Policy Initiatives. The USG continues to support Bangladesh's 
counternarcotics efforts through various commodities and 
training assistance programs. Pursuant to the 2002 U.S. LOA, 
equipment and law enforcement courses were provided in 2005, 
primarily to the police, but also to DNC laboratory 
technicians and officers, and members of the BDR. U.S. 
technical assistance in 2005 identified significant 
management issues at a DNC lab, which the DNC has addressed. 
Other initiatives under consideration include the 
modernization of law enforcement training facilities in 
Bangladesh and further development of anticorruption programs 
within the government. 
 
The Road Ahead. The USG will continue to provide law 
enforcement and forensic training for BDG officials and work 
with the BDG to construct a comprehensive strategic plan to 
develop, professionalize, and institutionalize Bangladesh 
counternarcotics efforts. This will include working with the 
BDG to stem drug trafficking before it reaches Bangladesh, 
primarily by improving maritime security but also by 
improving land border patrolling. 
CHAMMAS