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Viewing cable 05CHIANGMAI245, LARGE SHAN POPULATION LIVES IN LEGAL LIMBO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05CHIANGMAI245 2005-12-14 09:03 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Chiang Mai
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

140903Z Dec 05
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000245 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PREL PHUM PGOV TH SNAR
SUBJECT: LARGE SHAN POPULATION LIVES IN LEGAL LIMBO 
 
REF: A) BANGKOK 4028  B) CHIANG MAI 156 C) CHIANG MAI 150 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000245  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.(U)  Summary.   Shan activists based in Chiang Mai, including 
2005 Reebok Human Rights Award winner Charm Tong, have renewed appeals for the Thai government to recognize as refugees Shan 
fleeing from Burma.   With approximately 140,000 other refugees 
from Burma in camps along the border, the Thai government is not eager to add an estimated 300,000 Shan in northern Thailand to its burden.  The lack of refugee status increases the vulnerability of Shan displaced persons but allows greater 
mobility than is available to those in camps.    End summary 
 
2. (U) The Chiang Mai-based Shan Women's Action Network (SWAN) has redoubled efforts to convince the Royal Thai Government 
(RTG) to recognize Shan fleeing from Burma as asylum seekers and to provide safe refuge and humanitarian assistance.  The government has denied this status to the Shan, while granting it to the Karen and Karenni; under a 1998 agreement between the RTG and the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Shan are specifically excluded from the organization's activities. 
----------------------- 
ETHNIC COUSINS 
----------------------- 
3. (U) Although the RTG has not publicly stated its policy toward Shan asylum seekers, Thais generally argue that the Shan are different from other ethnic groups because they enter Thailand as migrant workers, they are ethnic cousins who can easily assimilate into Thai society, and the camps could be used to perpetuate the armed conflict in Burma.  The historical association of the Shan independence movement with the drug trade, epitomized by the notorious drug lord Khun Sa until 1996, further compounds an already tangled issue. 
---------------------------------------- 
EXPLOITATION, MISTREATMENT 
---------------------------------------- 
4.  (U)  The Shan contend that this lack of recognition leaves them in legal limbo, more vulnerable to labor exploitation and political mistreatment.  According to UNHCR and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), the lack of refugee status contributes significantly to the trafficking problem among the Shan.  Burma Relief Committee (BRC) coordinator Pippa Curven also noted that leaving the incoming Shan "non-camped" allows Thai businesses to tap labor on the cheap, such as the seasonal workers for the lychee and tangerine orchards of Chiang Mai province's Fang district. 
------------------------- 
TACIT ASSISTANCE 
-------------------------- 
5.  (SBU)  Thai security officials oppose the idea of Shan refugee camps, according to Janya Sramajcha, Director for Intelligence for the Office of Narcotics Control Board (ONCB) ONCB-North, on the debatable grounds that the Shan independence fight ended with the surrender of Khun Sa in 1996.  Perhaps more to the point, the RTG is sensitive to Burmese accusations that it is harboring "insurgents" (ref a).  Khun Janya pointed out that Thailand has always helped Shan fleeing fighting through a process of disarmament, providing temporary shelter, and sending them back when things turn normal.  Thailand, he said, has for years tacitly allowed Shan to enter despite knowing that most are economic migrants and many others are political activists. 
Finally, given the burden of caring for the Karen and Karenni groups, Thailand cannot afford refugee influxes from the Shan State. 
 
6. (SBU) Another Thai intelligence official who has been part of government discussions on this issue said that RTG reluctance to set up Shan camps is based on the huge number of Shan, the fear of encouraging an influx from Burma, and the concern that illegal migrants might seek access to secure assistance as well as resettlement .  Echoing Khun Janya, this official argued that safe sites for the displaced Shan at Doi Taileng and Mae Fa Luang serve as de facto Shan camps.  He claimed that the main Shan goal is inclusion under the UNHCR registration program, which would provide an official record for future use in reclaiming  rights to property or assets left behind in Burma. 
--------------------------------- 
AD HOC ARRANGEMENTS 
---------------------------------- 
7. (U)  According to SWAN, Shan refugees in Thailand fall into three main categories, with hundreds of thousands living as 
migrant workers throughout Thailand.   Another 4,000 displaced 
persons live in de facto camps set up along the Thai border during the past four years, sometimes shifting back and forth across the border opposite Chiang Rai's Mae Fa Luang district, at Doi Taileng opposite Mae Hong Son's Pang Ma Pha district, and at Doi Din Dam opposite Chiang Mai's Wiang Haeng district. 
These groups receive food aid from local Shan-Thai residents in the nearby Thai villages that have secured funding from BRC/BBC with the tacit approval from the Thai authorities. 
 
8.  (U)   A small group of 250 are sheltered in Karenni Camp 1 
in Mae Hong Son's Muang district and another 600 are registered 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000245  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
by the Thai Ministry of the Interior at a de facto camp in Chiang Mai's Wiang Haeng district.  While those in Wiang Haeng are not allowed access to UNHCR registration and protection, they receive assistance from relief organizations such as The Thai Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), BRC, and the Thai Red Cross Society. 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
TAKING THE MESSAGE TO THE WHITE HOUSE 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
9.  (U)  A number of Shan groups have pushed the issue of recognition over the last decade with little success, as sporadic heavy fighting caused hundreds more Shan civilians to 
flee to Thailand.   The call picked up new momentum after the 
worldwide release of "License to Rape" by SWAN and Shan Human 
Rights Foundation (SHRF) in 2002.    SWAN founding member and 
Reebok Human Rights Award winner Charm Tong told the Consul General she did not raise the specific Shan situation with President Bush in her October 31 meeting at the White House. 
During her 50 minutes in the Oval Office, however, the 23-year-old human rights activist talked with the President and top advisers about human rights, refugees, internally displaced persons, and sexual violence in Burma. 
 
10. (U)  In its efforts to influence RTG policy, SWAN sent an open letter to the attention of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra that has gone unanswered.  However, the group said that it is encouraged by efforts through such pro-human rights senators as Kraisak Chunhawan and Tuenjai Deetet, as well as with the National Human Rights Commission. 
-------------------------------------------- 
"PUSHED BACK INTO THE FLAMES" 
-------------------------------------------- 
11. (U)  In September 2005, SWAN published a pamphlet titled "Pushed back into the flames" to emphasize "the urgent need for protection of Shan refugees as the Burmese military regime fans the flames of war in Shan State."  According to this publication, "Shan refugees have continued to flow into Thailand, mainly from areas of Central and South Shan State where the Burmese military regime has carried out a massive forced relocation program since 1996. Meanwhile, developments in Shan State and along the Thai-Shan border during 2005 have caused a worsening security situation for villagers inside Shan State as well as for refugees sheltering along the Thai-Shan border." 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
REFUGEE STATUS A HELP OR HINDRANCE? 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
12. (U)   UNHCR Regional Representative Hasim Utkan confirmed 
that this issue, which has "been on my agenda for a long time", took on special intensity some months ago when the Thai military relocated a group of 400 Shan at Doi Taileng (refs b, c).  At the same time, Utkan pointed out that NGOs differ as to whether recognition as refugees would do more harm or good. "I'm not sure being a refugee enhances status," he notes, "but on the other hand if egregious things are happening we want to look into them." 
 
13.  (U)  COMMENT:   The actual number of Shan displaced persons 
is impossible to confirm, as neither the Thai government nor UNHCR has made efforts to count them.  Living outside of the established refugee camps that house some 140,000 other displaced persons from Burma, the Shan do not have access to the education and training opportunities or food assistance provided by international NGOs in the camps.  Their unofficial status in Thailand also makes for a precarious existence, as demonstrated by the ongoing concern about a group of 400 Shan straddling the border at Doi Taileng (ref b, c). 
 
14.  (U)  Comment continued:  Even SWAN, however, is not advocating refugee camps for 300,000 displaced Shan.  While not saying so explicitly, the Shan activist community would like to have it both ways: camps where the old, the very young, and the sick could receive protection and food while those better able to fend for themselves remained outside, albeit with better 
migrant labor protections.   Given the fact that a solution for 
one could be a problem for others, the tangled situation of the Shan in northern Thailand is unlikely to be resolved easily. 
However, discussions with the Thai government and UNHCR about the need for safe refugee and humanitarian assistance could open the door to more NGO involvement and expansion of already existing de facto assistance. 
CAMP