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Viewing cable 05BOGOTA11700, REGULATING MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BOGOTA11700 2005-12-16 20:13 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bogota
VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #1700/01 3502013
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 162013Z DEC 05
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0565
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RUEAWJC/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
UNCLAS BOGOTA 011700 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KPAO CO
SUBJECT: REGULATING MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN 
 
REF: A. BOGOTA 11460 
     B. BOGOTA 10892 
     C. BOGOTA 10686 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  On November 27, President Uribe announced 
his intention to run for reelection.  Uribe's 90-minute radio 
interview on November 29 caused debate, as National Electoral 
Council (CNE) head Guillermo Mejia questioned equality of 
access for opposition candidates.  A separate CNE magistrate 
and regular contact, Guillermo Reyes, told us the CNE is 
still debating press coverage rules and guidelines, and that 
Mejia's remarks caused an unnecessary stir, as no opposition 
candidate had formally complained about Uribe's interview. 
The CNE cannot sanction candidates for breaking electoral 
rules; the Council of State would handle complaints after the 
election is held.  We expect to see constant back-and-forth 
in the media over whether the opposition can compete on a 
level playing field against Uribe.  However, major opposition 
parties receive a decent amount of major media coverage, and 
perhaps even more than would be expected given their 
relatively weak polling standing.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (U) As required under the Electoral Guarantees Law (see 
Refs B and C), President Uribe formally announced his 
intention to run for reelection on November 27.  The formal 
Presidential campaign will run from January 28 until election 
day, May 28.  Uribe is collecting signatures for his 
candidacy (rather than running as candidate of a particular 
party).  He requires valid signatures from approximately 
350,000 voting age Colombians, or four percent of the total 
number of votes cast for President in the 2002 elections. 
Uribe will have no trouble attaining the required number of 
signatures. 
 
3.  (SBU) A first media flare-up occurred the week of 
November 28, after Caracol Radio ran a 90-minute interview of 
Uribe, by then a declared Presidential candidate.  National 
Electoral Council (CNE) Chief Magistrate Guillermo Mejia 
criticized both Uribe and Caracol for running the interview, 
which Mejia called excessive in length.  Mejia also faulted 
Caracol for not giving equal response time (called for, in 
the case of TV and radio, by the Electoral Guarantees Law) to 
opposition Presidential aspirants.  While Mejia himself 
admitted publicly to having committed an error by pre-judging 
the issue, his remarks remain at the center of the debate. 
 
4.  (SBU) In a subsequent meeting with a regular CNE contact, 
Guillermo Reyes (who presided over the CNE during the October 
2003 state and local elections and Uribe's national 
referendum) told poloff that Mejia had created a controversy 
where none had existed.  First, according to Reyes, no member 
of the opposition had formally complained about the 
interview.  Second, no opposition nominee could be given 
equal response time, as the formal launch date of the 
campaign is January 28 and only Uribe, at present, is a 
declared candidate.  Reyes told us that the CNE as a body 
would be issuing a directive in the near term calling upon 
media to offer adequate "rebuttal" opportunity to opposition 
Presidential nominees.  Reyes felt, however, that the CNE 
would not insist on exact equality (minutes for TV/radio or 
lines for print media) of rebuttal coverage.  Reyes stressed 
that the CNE cannot enforce sanctions against candidates, and 
noted that the Council of State (Consejo de Estado; one of 
three roughly co-equal Colombian high courts) will decide the 
merits of electoral complaints, but only after the elections. 
 
5.  (U) Major media outlets have expressed concern over their 
own ability to appropriately determine coverage for Uribe as 
President versus Uribe as candidate.  However, on December 
14, Constitutional Court President Manuel Jose Cepeda, 
responding to a request by several media outlets for a 
clarification of media coverage issues in the Electoral 
Guarantees Law, stated that the CNE could not demand exact 
minute-for-minute TV and/or radio coverage for all 
candidates.  Cepeda did state that the media should guarantee 
access, however, to all candidates. 
 
6.  (SBU) Comment:  The debate caused by Mejia was only the 
first of many we expect as Colombia charts new waters under 
the scenario of immediate Presidential reelection.  Uribe 
maintains a commanding lead in all polls and the opposition 
will likely continue to state publicly that he maintains an 
inherent and unfair advantage owing to incumbency.  However, 
major opposition parties such as the Liberals (PLC) and Polo 
Democratico Alternativo (PDA) receive prominent coverage in 
the daily newspaper El Tiempo, the weekly newspaper El 
Espectador, and the weekly news magazines. 
WOOD