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Viewing cable 05BOGOTA11615, COLOMBIA'S REACTION TO U.S.-PERU FTA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BOGOTA11615 2005-12-14 21:00 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Bogota
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 011615 
 
SIPDIS 
 
********************************************* ****** 
C O R R E C T E D - C O P Y (CHANGE TO TEXT PAR 8) 
********************************************* ****** 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD ECON ECON CO COETRD FTA
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA'S REACTION TO U.S.-PERU FTA 
 
1.  Summary:  GOC policy makers are putting a positive 
public spin on Peru's decision to sign a Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) with the U.S. on December 7.  With the Peru 
agreement, Colombia now has a clear understanding of the way 
forward to completion of its own FTA.  Critics are 
suggesting the GOC delay further negotiations, while the GOC 
seems determined to close as soon as possible.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------------ 
No Surprise, but Some Disappointment 
------------------------------------ 
 
2.  Soon after the announcement that Peru and the U.S. had 
agreed to an FTA, GOC ministers, including Trade and 
Commerce Minister Jorge Humberto Botero, reported to the 
press that Colombia was not surprised by Peru's faster 
closing.  The GOC lead FTA negotiator, Hernando Jose Gomez 
pointed out in public reports that the Peruvian economy is 
less complex with fewer products to defend.  As a result, he 
said, the GOC has expected for some time that Peru would be 
able to move forward quicker than Colombia. 
 
3.  Although the GOC expected Peru to sign with the U.S., 
the government held out some hope that it could keep the 
Andean negotiating block together.  The split will now force 
Colombia to accept in public certain FTA terms that it would 
have preferred to negotiate in private.  In the Colombian 
press, the GOC referred several times to their desire avoid 
signing on to a "tratado de adhesion" (translated as docking 
onto an existing agreement). Before even reading press 
releases about the U.S.-Peru agreement, Gomez acknowledged 
his approval.  He was quoted saying, "we have received 
verbal assurances from the Peruvians that our common area of 
concern - intellectual property - met our general 
interests."  Gomez also stated that Peru's signing was not a 
solitary act, but rather due to the coordinated efforts of 
all Andean nations over several months. 
 
-------------------------- 
A New Roadmap for Colombia 
-------------------------- 
 
4.  The U.S.-Peru agreement includes concessions on 
important principles that Colombia will use as a roadmap 
toward the completion of its own FTA.  While there is some 
pressure to try and get a "better deal" (something that 
happened in Colombia's negotiations with Mercosur), the GOC 
realizes that it must accept the U.S. redlines without much 
room for deviation from the Peru agreement.  Colombia's 
intransigent position on certain agriculture issues, such as 
permanent protection for chicken leg quarters and rice, has 
been considerably weakened and should be off the table in 
subsequent discussions. 
 
------------------- 
Concern over ATPDEA 
------------------- 
 
5. Considerable debate in the press concerning the possible 
extension of unilateral trade preferences under the Andean 
Trade Preference and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) has 
focused on the waning prospects for renewal of the program 
(which expires at the end of 2006), given the conclusion of 
the U.S.-Peru FTA.  While the U.S. position has been 
consistent that ATPDEA will not be renewed, FTA opponents 
repeatedly point out that Colombia does not need an FTA 
because the U.S. Congress will continue to provide the 
country with unilateral trade benefits in exchange for 
cooperation in the war against drugs.  Repeated admonitions 
to the contrary by visiting members of the U.S. Congress 
have not had much effect on the advocated of this position. 
 
------------- 
Now or Later? 
------------- 
 
6.  Opponents of the FTA in Colombia's congress and in 
affected sectors have called on the government to delay 
signing the FTA until after the Congressional elections take 
place in March.  Some Senators have suggested that the GOC 
wait several years before completing negotiations.  The 
Colombian negotiators, however, seem as determined as ever 
to close as quickly as possible.  New offers have been 
presented in agriculture, perhaps clearing the way for a 
final round to take place in January.  While it appears that 
President Uribe wants to finish negotiations before his 
Presidential campaign begins at the end of January, it is 
unclear how FTA politics will affect the upcoming 
Congressional elections, should Colombia and the U.S. 
finalize its agreement in the near term. 
 
-------------- 
Press Coverage 
-------------- 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD ECON ECON CO COETRD FTA
 
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA'S REACTION TO U.S.-PERU FTA 
 
7.  Although the leading national daily attempted to 
diminish the impact of the agreement between the U.S. and 
Peru arguing that Colombia's "special relationship" with the 
U.S. would in the end move the U.S.'s position, regional 
media outlets and conservative-leaning weeklies have 
welcomed the agreement as "positive pressure" and as a "wake- 
up call" with the "clock ticking" for Colombian negotiators. 
Equally, the two financial dailies of record, have carried 
columns arguing in favor of signing the agreement - even if 
the U.S. position is characterized as "inflexible." 
Regional newspapers, particularly those of Antioquia 
(Medellin is the Department capital), continue to call for 
the Colombian government to sign on the dotted line, 
pointing out that the "agreement is crucial for the 
department."  And, for those in the government and in the 
media hoping or wishing for an ATPDEA extension, the most 
widely read weekly noted that the agreement with Peru marked 
"ATPDEA's death certificate." 
 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
8.  The GOC appears committed to completing the FTA in 
January.  If they were ever in doubt, the GOC negotiators 
now fully know what is expected, and the government must 
decide if the country is ready to trade off some 
politically important agricultural interests for access tot 
en U.S. economy for Colombian exports.  To deal with the 
political fallout from critics of the FTA, the GOC has 
announced WTO-consistent support programs to aid affected 
Colombians during transition periods in sensitive sectors. 
In another positive sign, large trade associations, whose 
members would benefit from the FTA, have begun to speak 
publicly about the importance of signing the agreement. 
 
Wood