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Viewing cable 05BOGOTA11257, Colombia's Capital Control Regime - Ineffective and

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BOGOTA11257 2005-12-05 17:29 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Bogota
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 011257 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ETRD EINV CO SIPDIS
SUBJECT: Colombia's Capital Control Regime - Ineffective and 
Politically Motivated 
 
1. SUMMARY: Colombia's Central Bank has used capital controls to 
provide macroeconomic stability both before and after the 
liberalization of the economy since 1967.  The latest controls 
were enacted in late 2004 in hopes of stemming the flow of 
speculative capital as a response to exporter complaints 
regarding the peso's appreciation against the dollar.  These 
controls have proven ineffective and the Minister of Finance has 
promised their revocation. 
 
---------------------------- 
URIBE SIZED CAPITAL CONTROLS 
---------------------------- 
 
2. At the close of 2004, the exporter community pressured the 
Uribe Administration to do something about the strong 
appreciation of the peso, which they blamed on speculative 
capital flows as well as increasing remittances from abroad. In a 
political move, the Administration issued a decree implementing 
capital controls as a means of preventing short-term speculation 
on the peso.  The capital controls targeted short-term portfolio 
investments and required that investments remain in the country 
for at least one year.  Most economists and the Ministry of 
Finance, the Central Bank and the Stockmarket Commission 
(Superintendencia de Valores) were not in favor of implementing 
the controls as they felt that they did not address the major 
causes of the peso's appreciation - rising export revenues from 
commodities and increasing repatriation flows. 
 
----------------------- 
CAPITAL CONTROL RESULTS 
----------------------- 
 
3. Despite the capital controls, the peso continues to appreciate 
against the dollar and Colombian exports continue to grow.  In 
2004 and 2005 the Peso appreciated a total of 25 percent, which 
exporters claimed would hurt their competitiveness abroad. 
Despite the loss of competitiveness, Colombian exports grew 37 
percent in the first 6 months of 2005 to 10.1 billion USD. 
Bankers note that the controls have slowed short term capital 
inflows, but 2005 is shaping up to be a good year for foreign 
direct investment (FDI).  Portfolio investment, however, dropped 
from USD 300 million in 2004 to USD 113 million as a result of 
the controls.  FDI through March 2005 was USD 822 million (33 
percent growth over 2004) and the estimated level of remittances 
for 2005 is 3.3 billion USD (24 percent above 2004). 
 
----------------------------------- 
HISTORICAL USES OF CAPITAL CONTROLS 
----------------------------------- 
 
4. The liberalization of Colombia's rules in capital inflows 
began in the early 90's, before which the GOC used a variety of 
capital controls to maintain stability. In a two step process, 
Colombians and Colombian firms were given the right to issue 
bonds in foreign capital markets and access to credit in foreign 
currency from both local and foreign institutions. Colombian 
residents were also authorized to invest freely in liquid assets 
abroad. The liberalization resulted in steadily increasing 
capital inflows beginning in 1992 and peaking in 1997. 
 
Net Foreign Direct            Net Foreign 
Investment (US$ Million)      Portfolio Investment (US$ Million) 
1990       500                      0 
1993       959                    145 
1995       968                    165 
1996     3,111                    292 
1997*    5,639                    592 
1998     2,032                   -265 
1999     1,468                    -27 
2000     2,395                  1,332 
2001     2,525                  3,381 
2002     2,115                 -1,031 
2003     1,793                    104 
2004     2,739                    743 
 
Source: Central Bank, Coinvertir 
 
5. However, the capital account liberalization had its own 
capital controls.  A reserve requirement was implemented 
obligating issuers of foreign currency debt to maintain a non- 
remunerated dollar deposit at the Central Bank.  This volume- 
based capital control was intended to discourage capital inflows 
and short term speculative behavior. Additional restrictions were 
implemented on the net foreign exchange position ("posicion 
propia") of financial intermediaries preventing them from funding 
peso loans with external liabilities; which was designed to limit 
potentially destabilizing asset/liability mismatches within the 
financial system.  Restrictions on dollar denominated deposits 
also helped to limit the incentive to speculate on foreign 
exchange markets. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
6. The Central Bank has bought 2.9 billion dollars of reserves in 
2005 to counter the increasing value of the peso.  In addition, 
net portfolio capital inflows have, in fact, risen markedly since 
the introduction of new capital controls. There is a great deal 
of confidence among those knowledgeable about Colombia that the 
stage is set for sustainable long term growth in Colombia. 
Increased security has allowed significant new investment (see 
Bogota 10027 for more information of favorable trends). These 
trends prompted the Finance Minister to declare in mid-2005 that 
the controls would be eliminated.  Historically, capital controls 
helped stabilize the economy's transition from an administrative 
control regime to a liberal regime, but the IMF, the Central Bank 
and many in the private sector agree that the current control was 
more political than economic in nature. 
 
7. Nonetheless, many in Colombia recognizing the small size of 
the economy in global terms are reluctant to foreswear some type 
of capital market regulation completely.  They fear currency and 
capital markets will be buffeted by regional and global trends 
which could play havoc with domestic markets.  One often cited 
example is the period from 1999 to 2001, when successive debt 
crises in Brazil and Argentina raised risk premiums on Colombian 
debt and affected currency values when there was no objective 
reason for such a market reaction. 
 
8. The impulse to use government regulation to control so called 
market excesses is quite strong, even if the controls have proven 
futile. (end comment) 
 
WOOD