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Viewing cable 05BANGKOK7555, EMBASSY BANGKOK CONCERNS OVER ACES DATABASE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BANGKOK7555 2005-12-09 03:18 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bangkok
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

090318Z Dec 05
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 007555 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV TH HUMAN RIGHTS VETTING
SUBJECT: EMBASSY BANGKOK CONCERNS OVER ACES DATABASE 
 
REF: A. 2005 JAKARTA 9962 
 
     B. 2005 JAKARTA 2322 
     C. 2005 STATE 131486 
     D. 2005 STATE 21314 
     E. 2003 STATE 34981 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY.  After careful review at post, Embassy 
Bangkok believes the Abuse Case Evaluation System (ACES) 
database falls short of its announced goal (reftel C) of 
being a tool to "facilitate the management of human rights 
abuse allegations and compliance with the Leahy amendment 
guidelines".  ACES today is filled with entries that 
complicate the Leahy vetting process by being so cumbersome 
that it makes it more difficult in some instances to 
determine whether an individual or military unit is guilty of 
gross human rights violations.  Current guidance encourages 
posts to input data "even if there is some doubt about the 
credibility of the information," rather than using the 
"credible evidence" standard spelled out in the Leahy 
Amendment.  This present standard could easily lead to 
misleading, even false information being entered into the 
system.  Post offers some suggestions about ways to improve 
quality control for ACES.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------ 
THIS IS ACES TODAY 
------------------ 
 
2.  (SBU)  The standards for implementing the Leahy Amendment 
are laid out in Reftel E, which states that no funds can be 
made available "to any unit of a foreign country,s security 
forces if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that 
such unit has committed gross human rights violations."  When 
ACES was launched, Embassies were told that it would be a 
useful tool to determine whether a police or military unit is 
guilty of gross human rights violations by compiling reports 
from post reporting, the media, NGOs, and others about 
alleged human rights abuses.  In July (Reftel C), we were 
advised that users at post and in the Department would be 
able to enter and comment on allegations put into ACES and 
that DRL would validate all reports.  Today, ACES is up and 
running, yet there seem to be quality control issues 
regarding the information that is placed into ACES.  The 
following examples, taken from entries already in the ACES 
database, illustrate this problem: 
 
--An entry about an Indonesian maid who was beaten by her 
private employer in Saudi Arabia (Comment. The employer is 
not a member of the security forces); 
--A group of Burmese soldiers who stole 5 sacks of rice from 
local villagers; 
--A police officer who took a $108 bribe in Nigeria; 
--The killing of villagers by unnamed anti-government (FARC) 
rebels in Colombia. (The FARC is not a part of the Colombian 
security forces.) 
 
3.  (SBU) None of these entries are listed in ACES in a 
manner that would assist an officer conducting Leahy 
Amendment human rights vetting because they don't concern 
possible recipients of USG funding.  Further, many of the 
entries cited above were entered by an anonymous author known 
only as "ACESMAN".  Users are therefore unable to check with 
the source of the reports for clarification.  Although ACES 
is a classified database, we understand from the Department 
that individuals in the field, in the Department, and in 
other agencies will have access to it.  Conceivably, anyone 
with ACES access can, at their own discretion, enter data 
that could prevent the training of a foreign military or 
police unit, perhaps even years after the initial data was 
entered. 
 
------------------------------ 
THE CREDIBLE EVIDENCE STANDARD 
------------------------------ 
 
4.  (SBU) ACES is designed to assist us in determining 
whether there is "credible evidence" that a vetted individual 
or unit has committed a gross human rights violation. 
However, the ACES instructions seem to require a less 
exacting standard for putting information into the ACES 
database than is called for by the Leahy Amendment.  Reftel B 
states that "even if there is some doubt about the 
credibility of an allegation, post should enter it into 
ACES".  This guidance was reaffirmed by Department officials 
at the September 27 Human Rights Conference presentation, 
which is linked to the homepage for ACES, in which we are 
told that "entering reports known to be false IS 
appropriate".  We understand that one underlying purpose of 
entering "unsubstantiated" cases into ACES is to prevent 
future redundancies when new vetting officers track down 
rumors that turn out to be unsubstantiated.  However, without 
clarifying more precisely what type of questionable cases 
should be entered into ACES, the guidance as it stands leaves 
open considerable potential for the system to be literally 
flooded with irrelevant material.  Over time, this runs the 
risk of making ACES a less usable, and useful tool to 
distinguish the true Leahy cases from the superfluous ones. 
 
5.  (SBU) Embassy Bangkok recommends that the Department 
redefine the standard of what is and is not acceptable for 
entry into the database as "credible evidence".  The first 
webpage on ACES states: "This system exists to manage serious 
human rights abuse allegations that are seen as reasonably 
credible by the Department of State".  Returning to this 
"reasonably credible" standard might be a good starting 
point. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
THE LOWER THE STANDARD, THE HIGHER THE PRICETAG 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
6.  (SBU) As our colleagues in Jakarta recently pointed out 
(reftels A and B), effectively using ACES might require 
additional resources in a number of posts.  In the case of 
Bangkok, to improve quality control at our post, we propose 
to vet entries with an informal committee of interested 
sections / agencies and limit entries to the ACES officers in 
the POL section.  This will ensure that we access all 
information at post about each case, and hopefully prevent 
the entry of questionable information such as the cases 
listed in paragraph 2. 
 
7.  (U) Embassy Bangkok appreciates Department's 
consideration of our suggestions. 
BOYCE