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Viewing cable 05ANKARA7236, TURKEY-IRAQ: WAY FORWARD ON SUSTAINMENT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05ANKARA7236 2005-12-09 13:43 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 007236 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 4212/ITA/MAC/CPD/CRUSNAK 
DOE FOR CHARLES WASHINGTON 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EPET ENRG PREL TU IZ
SUBJECT: TURKEY-IRAQ:  WAY FORWARD ON SUSTAINMENT 
 
REF: (A) ANKARA 6952, (B) ANKARA 6870, (C) ADANA 205 
 
Sensitive But Unclassified.  Please Handle Accordingly. 
 
1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY: Post and EUCOM/DESC are prepared to 
work with Turkish authorities to explore short/medium 
term options that could improve predictability and 
consistency of fuel product flow across the border. 
These include staging sustainment trucks on the Turkish 
side of the border before they cross Habur and building a 
short pipeline to carry sustainment fuel across the 
border.  These measures would not address the longer-term 
issue of the inadequacy of the existing infrastructure to 
support greater trade between Iraq and the rest of the 
world, which Post would support re-engaging on 
trilaterally, after the formation of a new Iraqi 
government.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) Embassy, Consulate Adana, ODC, EUCOM, and DESC 
(Defense Energy Support Center) participated in a 
December 1 Habur Gate inspection and fuels meeting at the 
Turkey-Iraq border.  Representatives of Coalition COSCOM 
and CENTCOM called for increased predictability and 
consistency of sustainment tanker flow (averaging 45 per 
day per current requirement, but subject to volatility 
due to SOMO ebb and flow and other external factors). 
Building on Ref A (Habur Gate - Where Do We Go From 
Here?) recommendations, Post proposes the following 
actions: 
 
----------------------------------- 
Short-Term - Consider Staging Ideas 
----------------------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) Consulate Adana and ODC will seek to make a 
January call on the Sirnak Governor for informal inquiry 
and fact-finding whether there would be scope for the 
U.S. military to use a Turkish contractor to organize 
staging of sustainment vehicles (including non-fuel) in 
the new Silopi parking yard.  The unpaved 5000-truck 
capacity parking yard is now being used as an extension 
of the waiting queue.  (U.S. use of a portion of the 
facility - with or without improvement - could allow re- 
prioritization among sustainment trucks, but any 
perception of preferential treatment for sustainment 
trucks in crossing the border on an expedited basis would 
have negative consequences.)  Alternatively, the U.S. 
could consider creating a stand-alone yard facility 
further west of Silopi, which might offer the opportunity 
to stage and insert batches of trucks into the queue. 
(Note: the GOT does not allow convoying of fuel tankers 
from the Adana CoCo loading facility to the border.) 
 
4.  (SBU)  DESC will also engage with its contractors 
(Petrol Ofisi and SHG/Kizil Group) to establish 
mechanisms for communicating more information on tanker 
location in an attempt to gain greater predictability and 
consistency.  (DESC had used a contractor in the past to 
attempt to accomplish similar goals, but with 
unsatisfactory results.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Move Away from Reliance on Habur - Use a Pipeline 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
5.  (SBU) As an intermediate step for weaning our 
reliance from the single Habur Gate, DESC will develop a 
complete proposal for using a pipeline, thereby avoiding 
the border crossing to meet its fuel requirements.  This 
could either be an independent facility or in 
collaboration with the TPIC unloading facility and 
pipeline, substantially complete on the Turkish side (but 
awaiting completion of the SOMO partner facility on the 
Iraqi side).  TPIC is a subsidiary of Turkish State Oil 
Company TPAO.  Its facility and short pipeline adjacent 
to Habur Gate will have a capacity equivalent to about 60 
tankers equivalent per day.  If DESC decides to seriously 
pursue this course, Embassies Ankara and Baghdad would 
have to undertake formal communication with the GOT and 
GOI, respectively. 
 
--------------------- 
Someday a Second Gate 
--------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU)  COMMENT:  Mission Turkey understands how 
important northern GLOC is to the success of our mission 
in Iraq; support for this mission is our top priority. 
As a result, we counsel that short term steps identified 
may not be successful for a variety of reasons.  Use of 
the parking yard at Silopi may not be available to us for 
practical, economic, or political reasons.  Changing 
status quo with Turkish Customs may be risky and cause 
unanticipated knock-on problems, which could increase -- 
rather than decrease -- volatility or uncertainty.  Any 
perception of preferential treatment for sustainment 
drivers (already paid higher wages than those driving for 
SOMO) could elicit strikes or violence among the frazzled 
drivers.  We encourage all parties supporting coalition 
sustainment to do careful cost/benefit analysis for 
options, to include considering that staging on the Iraq 
side of Habur Gate (status quo) may be the best option. 
 
7.  (SBU)  Any new observer to the situation at Habur 
Gate cannot fail to be struck by the inefficiency and 
risk of reliance on a single congested border gate for 
sustainment fuel and growing bilateral trade.  From any 
security, economic, and environmental perspective, lining 
up thousands of trucks on each side of the border does 
not make sense.  The incremental measures proposed above 
are not a long-term solution, which in our view requires 
Iraqi-Turkish-U.S. political engagement to let the 
economics carry the day for a second border gate (Ref A). 
Another subject that could be addressed tri-laterally is 
improving payments and communications between SOMO and 
its Turkish suppliers (Ref B) to encourage more timely 
payment of arrears.  SOMO arrears are again mounting to 
the next crisis point where suppliers will again cease 
delivery. 
 
Wilson