Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 05SOFIA1902, BULGARIA: PRESIDENT SIGNALS A MEK DECISION IS CLOSE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05SOFIA1902.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05SOFIA1902 2005-11-08 15:39 2011-05-17 16:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Sofia
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 001902 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2010 
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR KCRM IZ BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA: PRESIDENT SIGNALS A MEK DECISION IS CLOSE 
 
REF: A. 04 SOFIA 0196 
     B. KOLEV-ABIZAID LETTER 01 NOV 05 
     C. SOFIA 1882 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle, for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: In a November 8 meeting with the Ambassador, 
President Parvanov mirrored the General Staff's 
forward-leaning position on Bulgaria's follow-on activities 
in Iraq, indicating the government is now leaning toward the 
MEK mission at Camp Ashraf.  He also expressed his optimism 
for a positive outcome on bilateral base negotiations and 
emphasized the importance of Bulgaria's fight against 
organized crime following the murder of prominent businessman 
Emil Kyulev.  The President reiterated a previous request 
(ref A) for U.S. help in obtaining information on allegations 
that Parvanov's Bulgarian Socialist Party benefited from 
corrupt oil deals with the government of Saddam Hussein. END 
SUMMARY 
 
2. (C) On Iraq, President Parvanov echoed the recent letter 
of General Staff Chief Kolev (ref B), referring to a 
Bulgarian follow-on mission at Camp Ashraf as if it were 
already a firm decision.  In a follow up discussion with the 
DCM, Deputy Foreign Minister Kyuchokov said the MFA and MOD 
will be sending a joint recommendation in favor of the MEK to 
the Council of Ministers.  They hope to have their final 
proposal ready for deliberation at the Council's Nov. 17 
meeting.  Both Kyuchokov and Parvanov indicated the proposed 
force size would be 100-120 troops.  Kyuchokov said the 
government is preparing for a negative public reaction to the 
decision, but hopes to mute this by emphasizing the 
humanitarian nature of the MEK mission and the reduced force 
size.  The Ambassador thanked Parvanov for Bulgaria's 
continued engagement with the USG throughout the planned 
withdrawal of their current battalion. 
 
3. (C) Parvanov also remained optimistic on the issue of 
joint basing negotiations, indicating that he expected all 
political forces in the country except one (a reference to 
the extreme nationalist party "Ataka") to ultimately support 
an agreement on U.S. forces in Bulgaria.  Ambassador Beyrle 
stressed the importance of reclaiming the basing issue from 
Ataka and highlighted Prime Minister Stanishev's recent 
positive statements on basing as an example of Bulgarian 
politicians shaping public opinion on the issue. 
 
4. (C) The President thanked the Ambassador for U.S. offers 
to assist in the murder investigation of banker Emil Kyulev 
(ref C).  He emphasized the GOB's seriousness on this issue 
and his satisfaction at international and inter-ministerial 
cooperation on the investigation.  The Ambassador restated 
the U.S.'s willingness to help, but also expressed concern at 
the investigation's slow pace and failure to collect basic 
pieces of evidence in a timely fashion.  He reminded 
President Parvanov that -- despite the GOB,s request for 
technical experts -- no evidence has yet been seized that 
would require the presence of these experts in Bulgaria.  The 
Ambassador noted that Bulgaria may again be losing an 
opportunity to demonstrate its seriousness in the fight 
against organized crime. 
 
5. (C) Further to the theme of national security, President 
Parvanov emphasized the threat of radical nationalism in 
Bulgaria as one that "we should not underestimate."  The 
President mentioned the success of the recently launched 
"Ataka" newspaper, which he claimed had reached a circulation 
of 40,000 in a matter of weeks, and raised concerns about 
Ataka's financial backers. 
 
6. (SBU) The President expressed great appreciation for the 
hospitality shown by President Bush and the First Lady during 
his recent White House visit.  Parvanov reserved special 
praise for the "meaningful, forceful, and clear" statements 
by President Bush on the Bulgarian nurses in Libya, and noted 
that the U.S. position had been welcomed by the Bulgarian 
public. 
 
7. (C) President Parvanov closed the meeting by repeating a 
"special request" previously made in 2004 (ref A).  In light 
of the "Petrolgate" scandal, Parvanov asked for U.S. help in 
obtaining information regarding ongoing allegations that his 
Bulgarian Socialist Party had profited from "oil for 
influence" deals with the Saddam Hussein regime.  Parvanov 
categorically denied that the BSP had received "a cent" from 
Saddam.  He emphasized that this request was not for public 
use, but merely for party leaders "to know for ourselves what 
this is about." 
 
8. (C) COMMENT: President Parvanov,s White House visit has 
been extremely successful in ensuring Bulgaria,s continuing 
cooperation on a number of high-profile issues.  The 
Government is clearly moving toward the MEK mission, although 
concern remains about public reaction.  We will continue to 
track the government's discussion, encouraging a positive 
decision and developing a public diplomacy strategy that 
minimizes negative public response.  END COMMENT 
BEYRLE